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Abstract
The present thesis project considers the multidimensional evaluation of different as-
pects related to the cost efficiency of local governments in Spain, using non-parametric
frontier analysis methods. In doing so, the economic crisis scenario that seriously
affected Spanish local government revenues and finances in general is taken into
account. The thesis contributes to the development of robust tools to evaluate and
promote the improvement of the efficiency of local governments. The empirical results
provide evidence for a better definition of public policies through the evaluation and
identification of the benchmark local governments in order to set potential improve-
ments and, therefore, minimize (cost) inefficiencies which might help to reduce public
expenditures.
Specifically, the thesis is structured around five relevant research objectives in the
field of local governments performance, in general, and Spanish municipalities, in
particular, which are: (1) to assess local governments cost efficiency from a global
point of view, taking into account the complexity in the measurement of local services
and facilities and the inclusion of quality variables, (2) to examine the evolution of
local government efficiency during the period of the economic crisis (2008–2013),
(3) to investigate the existence of structural differences in the cost efficiency results
between municipalities located in different Spanish regions and provinces as well
as differences according to the size of the municipalities, (4) to compare different
non-parametric methods to estimate efficiency, considering the difficulties arisen from
the methodological selection, as well as to define a consistent method to choose a
efficiency estimators which might be more appropriate to measure local governments
performance in Spain, and (5) to analyse the impact of external or environmental
factors that affect local governments’ efficiency results, considering variations in the
impact for differing efficiency levels and possible endogeneity issues.
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Resumen
El presente proyecto de tesis plantea la evaluación multidimensional de distintos
aspectos relacionados con la eficiencia en costes de los gobiernos locales en España,
utilizando métodos de análisis frontera no paramétricos. Al hacer esto se tiene en
cuenta el escenario de crisis económica vivido en España durante los últimos años
y que ha tenido un gran impacto en los ingresos y finanzas locales en general. La
tesis contribuye al desarrollo de herramientas robustas para evaluar y promover la
mejora de la eficiencia de los gobiernos locales. Los resultados empíricos aportan
evidencia para una mejor definición de políticas públicas mediante la evaluación e
identificación de los gobiernos locales más eficientes como punto de referencia para
establecer mejoras potenciales y, por lo tanto, poder eliminar ineficiencias (en costes)
que ayuden a reducir el gasto público.
En concreto, la tesis se estructura en torno a cinco objetivos relevantes en el campo
de la eficiencia de las corporaciones locales en general, y de los municipios españoles,
en particular, que son: (1) evaluar la eficiencia en costes de los gobiernos locales
desde una perspectiva global, teniendo en cuenta la complejidad en la medición de las
instalaciones y servicios municipales y la inclusión de información sobre la calidad de
los servicios, (2) analizar la evolución de los índices de eficiencia durante el periodo de
crisis (2008–2013), (3) investigar la existencia de diferencias estructurales en los índices
de eficiencia entre municipios situados en distintas regiones y provincias, así como
diferencias relacionadas con el tamaño de los municipios, (4) comparar diferentes
métodos no paramétricos para estimar la eficiencia, considerando la complejidad y
las las dificultades derivadas de la selección metodológica, y además tratar de definir
de una forma robusta y controlada qué metodologías son más adecuadas para medir
la eficiencia en los gobiernos locales en España, y (5) evaluar el impacto de factores
externos o ambientales que afectan a los niveles de eficiencia, teniendo en cuenta
las posibles variaciones en los efectos según los niveles de eficiencia y los posibles
problemas de endogeneidad.
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Chapter 1
Public sector efficiency and local
governments in Spain: an overview
1.1. General context, motivation and objectives
In recent years, improving public management efficiency has been a growing concern
in many developed and developing countries, partly due to the new public finance
scenarios resulting from the international economic crisis. However, other mechanisms
have also operated in certain contexts. This is the case in the European Union,
where the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) stipulates that all governments should
prioritise managing their resources efficiently in order to contribute to the viability of
the European Economic and Monetary Union. Since 2011, the SGP has undergone
several reforms in order to better consider each country’s specific circumstances, and
to strengthen the rules concerning budget deficits or public debt burdens.1 Therefore,
in a context in which the financial crisis has challenged public finances in several
euro area and non-euro area countries, leading to unprecedented increases in some
1In 2013, the SGP was reformed through a collection of new laws, known as the “Six Pack”. It
laid down detailed rules for national budgets to ensure EU governments respect the requirements
of economic and monetary union and do not run excessive deficits. In 2014 the SGP was further
strengthened by new laws, known as the “Two Pack”, as well as budgetary targets set by a law
known as the “Fiscal Compact”. Taken from the History of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-
economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/stability-and-growth-pact/history-stability-
and-growth-pact. Last accessed 23.3.17
1
countries, efficient management of resources at all levels of government (central,
regional and municipal) has become essential (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2013).
The present thesis focuses on Spain, a country that has not escaped the effects of
this international scenario (Barreiro and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2012). The crisis that started
in 2007, together with the bursting of the housing bubble2 in 2008, led the country
into a deep recession and became a priority issue3,4 for the Eurozone in 2012. Thus, in
response to the macroeconomic situation, the Spanish government adopted austerity
programmes that advocated higher taxes and reduced public spending in order to
meet budgetary stability targets. In a decentralised country such as Spain, the central
government’s budgeting efforts would be of little use if they were not backed by lower
levels of government (Cabasés et al., 2007). The framework for budgetary stability in
Spain was therefore enacted in the Law on Budgetary Stability,5 which introduced
more control over public debt and public spending at all levels of government with
the aim of achieving a balanced budget. In this law, the principles of economic
and financial management include compliance with effectiveness in achieving the
objectives, within a framework of transparency and efficiency in the allocation and
use of public resources.
Focusing on local governments, they are responsible for a significant number of
public powers (Devas and Delay, 2006; Da Cruz and Marques, 2014), although this
varies from country to country. For instance, since the approval of the 1978 Constitu-
tion, in Spain local governments have played an important role in providing public
services, and form a sub-sector whose powers have increased over time—although
modestly compared with higher (regional) levels of government (Vilalta Ferrer, 2010).
In addition, as local government is the closest level of government to its citizens,
2In 2007 the construction sector represented 13% of Spain’s gross domestic product (GDP). Low
interest rates and the expansion of the Spanish savings banks (Cajas de Ahorros) substantially contributed
to a construction boom that turned into a “bubble”, which burst when borrowing was severely curtailed
after the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 (Almendral, 2013).
3Traynor, I. and Watt, N. (6 June 2012). “Spain calls for new tax pact to save euro: Madrid calls
for Europe-wide plan but resists ‘humiliation’ of national bailout”. The Guardian. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jun/06/spain-euro-finished-fiscal-union, last accessed
23.3.17
4Forell, C. and Steinhauser, G. (11 June 2012). "Latest Europe Rescue Aims to Prop Up Spain". Wall
Street Journal. Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com, last accessed 23.3.17
5Ley General Estabilidad Presupuestaria (2007,2012), or Law on Budgetary Stability.
2
it has a first-hand impression of society’s demands (Martín et al., 2011). However,
municipalities have seen their resources severely reduced since the severe impact of
the economic crisis on most of their revenues (Pérez López et al., 2013), as well as
stricter budget limitations. The decline in municipal revenues combined with harsh
budget constraints has therefore made the task of managing available resources with
maximum efficiency an even greater challenge. Under these circumstances, in which
issues related to Spanish local government efficiency and their contribution to public
sector deficit are more relevant than ever, performance measurement may successfully
support local public organisations in their effort to increase the value for money in
service provision (Lo Storto, 2016) in order to provide the best possible local services
(output) at the lowest possible cost (input).
In short, as evidenced by the latest regulatory reforms in Spain where the in-
formation demands are much more oriented towards the financial transparency of
governments and the sustainability of public services in with the principles of effec-
tiveness and efficiency, the growing need to have adequate management tools to meet
the demand of citizens together with the need of public managers to evaluate the
activity carried out and comply with current legislation, requires a considerable effort
to improve public management.
Conscious of this need, in Spain the General State Comptroller (Intervencioón
General de la Administración del Estado, IGAE), a public institution which depend on the
Spanish Ministry of the Treasury and Public Administrations (Ministerio de Hacienda y
Administraciones Públicas), published a document entitled “Management Indicators for
Public Organizations”, becoming a guide for public entities to implement management
indicators in order to evaluate effectiveness, economy, efficiency and quality.6 In
this document, express reference is made to the use of benchmarking techniques,
by comparison with other units (in principle homogeneous) of the public sector
in order to contribute to an improvement in the provision of goods and services.
More specifically, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology is accepted as an
6One of the most important novelties of the current General Public Accounting Plan (Plan General
de Contabilidad Pública, PGCP) from 2010 is the inclusion of management indicators, referring to the
document entitled “Management Indicators for Public Organizations” published by the IGAE in 20017.
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appropriate approach to make this evaluation (pp. 235). Indeed, this methodology
has been successfully applied to public services provided by municipalities of several
Spanish regions (Prieto and Zofio, 2001; Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007; Balaguer-Coll and
Prior, 2009; Bosch-Roca et al., 2012; Benito et al., 2010; Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez,
2010).
However, the adequate measurement of local governments efficiency is usually
a highly complex issue. First, the measurement of the costs of public activities,
the identification and definition of the local public services and facilities and the
assessment of their quality are thorny issues. In most cases the problems arise from
the difficulties to collect data and directly quantify the provision of public services
(Balaguer-Coll et al., 2013). In the Spanish case, we find largely available data on
most of the services that municipalities are legally obliged to provide. However,
the law only establishes the minimum services and facilities that each municipality
must provide according to their size and, as a consequence, municipalities could
provide additional services and facilities which might spend a significant part of
local resources. Second, despite the high academic interest in efficiency measurement,
widely applied in local governments and other public and private organizations, there
is still a lack of consensus as to what methodology to perform efficiency analysis. This
is not a trivial question because the method selected may affect the efficiency analysis
(Geys and Moesen, 2009b) and could lead to biased results.
Finally, the presence of different environmental conditions beyond the control of
local managers could affect local governments efficiency, so performance analysis
should control for this heterogeneity (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007). However, although
the literature on this topic is extensive, the inclusion of external or environmental
factors in previous studies often lacks structure (Da Cruz and Marques, 2014), since
there is no well-established theory as to which variables constitute the “environmental
conditions” that might impact on local governments’ cost structure (Balaguer-Coll
et al., 2013). In addition, the evidence from different studies is inconclusive about
the direction of some determinants on local governments’ cost efficiency. Therefore,
these and other challenging questions when analysing technical, cost or other forms
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of efficiency in local governments provision of public goods and services, make the
accurate efficiency evaluation a challenging empirical issue.
In view of these considerations, the main focus of this thesis is to analyse different
aspects of the efficiency on local governments in Spain through the application of
different non-parametric frontier techniques. In doing so, the economic crisis scenario
in Spanish municipalities is taken into account. In addition, this thesis also aims to
overcome some of the limitations to measure efficiency found in previous literature.
More specifically, we consider six main research objectives related to the analysis of
the cost efficiency of local public services:
• To widely review the current state of the efficiency in local governments, to
discuss and survey which variables and methodological issues have been applied
and to identify problems related to previous literature and ways for further
research.
• To accurately define the bundle of services and facilities that municipalities must
provide, to consider alternative input-output models in order to assess whether
the different choices might explain heterogeneity among local governments and
to analyse the possible implications of service quality when measuring local
government cost efficiency.
• To examine the evolution of local government efficiency over time, i.e., to analyse
whether Spanish local governments have succeeded in reducing their budget
expenditures while maintaining public service provision in times of crisis.
• To investigate the existence of structural differences in the cost efficiency results
between municipalities located in different Spanish regions and provinces as
well as differences according to the size of the municipalities.
• To compare different non-parametric methodologies to assess local governments
performance and to use a consistent method to choose an efficiency estimator
which might be more appropriate to measure local governments performance in
Spain.
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• To analyse the impact of a comprehensive set of external or environmental
factors that affect local governments’ cost efficiency also taking into account
possible endogeneity issues, and to obtain a detailed analysis of the relationship
between the environmental variables and efficiency by considering variations in
the impact across the efficiency distribution.
1.2. Specific aspects of public sector efficiency
Since the efficiency measurement of the provision of public goods and services in
local governments is the main topic of this thesis, it is necessary to first give detailed
definitions of several concepts. The basic idea of efficiency analysis in public sector
can be defined as a comparison among a group of decision-making units or DMUs
(in our particular case, Spanish local governments), in order to evaluate how the
available resources (or inputs) are employed to produce public services and facilities
(or outputs).7
As efficiency is defined in terms of a comparison between the observed and the
optimal values of inputs or outputs, it can take either input or output orientation forms
(Daraio and Simar, 2007a). The output-oriented framework looks at maximize the
output levels given a set of inputs, while the input-oriented aims at reducing as much
as possible the input levels required to produce at least the given set of outputs. This
second orientation is generally adopted when decision makers can control the amount
of inputs but not the outputs. Indeed, this is the case of most public sector entities,
in general, and local governments, in particular. They are committed to provide a
bundle of public services and facilities which are established externally while they are
interested in the efficient management of their inputs, in terms of minimisation.
In addition, three different types of efficiency measures can be distinguished,
depending on the available data for inputs and outputs (Farrell, 1957; Debreu, 1951).
First, technical efficiency (TE) requires data on input and output quantities and it refers
to the ability to use the productive resources in the most technologically efficient man-
ner (Fried et al., 2008). Second, allocative efficiency (AE) requires additional information
7See Coelli et al. (2005) and Fried et al. (2008) for an introduction to efficiency measurement.
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on input prices because it refers to the ability to combine the productive resources in
optimal proportions considering the set of prices (Daraio and Simar, 2007a). Moreover,
these two measures can be combined to obtain economic efficiency, also called cost
efficiency (CE)8 when the economic objective is cost minimisation (although revenue
efficiency and profit efficiency may also be considered). Specifically, cost efficiency
refers to the ability to produce a specified level of output in the cheapest possible
manner (Worthington and Dollery, 2000a).
In contrast to private sector, it should be noted that public sector goods and
services are frequently unpriced due to their non-market nature (Kalb et al., 2012).
However, if data on costs are available but data on prices and physical units are not,
cost efficiency can be measured but not decomposed (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007). In
this context, since there is no data available on local input prices, the evaluation of
local governments efficiency in the following chapters will be based on cost efficiency
measures, using data in municipal budgets as input costs. In addition, public goods
and services.
Finally, we also should mention that we can distinguish two different stages in the
production of public goods and service provision (De Witte and Geys, 2011). In the
first stage, inputs (such as employees or equipment) are transformed into outputs (for
example, in public sector the tons of waste collected). In the second stage, outputs are
transformed into outcomes, which ultimately have welfare effects on consumers (in
the waste collection example, perceiving cleanliness in the street). We note that the
efficiency of public good provision can be measured at each stage of this production
process. However, in practice, it is often very difficult to distinguish between inputs,
outputs and outcomes given the unavailability of data. Under this circumstances, the
analysis is usually confined to the first stage of the process, i.e., the links between
inputs and outputs (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2013).
8Cost Efficiency (CE) = Technical Efficiency (TE) · Allocative Efficiency (AE)
7
1.3. Institutional framework of the local governments in Spain
As stated in section 1.1 the main objective of this thesis is to conduct a multidimen-
sional assessment of the cost efficiency in Spanish public sector, and specifically, local
governments in Spain. The institutional context of the Spanish public sector was
formally established in the 1978 Constitution. Accordingly, Spain has three levels
of government: central, regional and local, and as such, is one of the most decen-
tralised countries in Europe (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2010a). Spain has 17 autonomous
communities or regions (NUTS2), 50 provinces (NUTS3) and 8,114 municipalities
(NUTS5).9
Spanish local governments are characterised by their very diverse populations and
territorial distributions. In 2011, almost 83.74% of municipalities had populations
below 5,000, and accounted for only 13% of the total population. Despite this diversity,
because local governments are responsible for providing the most basic services, they
are closer to citizens than other levels of government. Since the approval of the 1978
Constitution, local governments have played an important role in providing public
services and their responsibilities have increased over time. However, their share of
total public spending has remained relatively stable during this period, at least when
compared to regional governments.10 Table 1.1 shows the distribution of total public
expenditures among central, regional and local levels. As can be seen, while regional
governments’ share of total public spending has increased at the expense of central
government, local government spending remains stable at around 15%.
The Constitution also recognises local municipal autonomy to manage their respon-
sibilities, though the local governments constitute the lowest level of government. This
principle guarantees their right to participate in the affairs that affect their interests,
meaning that municipalities can manage and assume responsibility for a substantial
share of public undertakings for the benefit of their inhabitants. Local autonomy is
therefore reflected in their financial resources as well as their competencies.
9Data from INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Spanish Statistical Office), January 2011.
10Regional governments have been gaining powers at the expense of central government at a greater
rate than local governments (see, Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007, 2010a).
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Table 1.1: Distribution of total public ex-
penditures among central, re-
gional and local administra-
tions in Spain (%)
1995 2000 2005 2010
Central 62.05 53.81 46.31 45.68
Regional 24.19 30.91 38.22 38.60
Local 13.76 15.28 15.48 15.72
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: IGAE, Ministry of the Treasury and
Public Administrations (IGAE, Ministerio de
Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas).
With regard to their financial structure, local government revenues come mainly
from local taxes, the most relevant being property taxes (IBI, Impuesto de Bienes Inmue-
bles), transfers received from central government, and fees paid for the use of public
infrastructures or provision of public services. Table 1.2 shows the most important
revenue categories in municipal budgets for the years 2008–2013. Note that although
municipalities are considered financially autonomous by law, they only generated
54.07% of their total revenues in 2008–2013 from their own resources (i.e., through
taxes, fees, property incomes and sale of fixed assets ) while transfers from other levels
of government accounted for 27.08% and financial transactions, 19.98%.
As regards local government competencies, the distribution of basic municipal
powers is established in the 1985 Spanish local government law (Ley 7/1985 Reguladora
de Bases de Régimen Local). Article 26 of this law establishes the minimum services and
facilities that each municipality must provide, according to their size. In addition,
articles 25, 27 and 28 of the law consider that local powers also depend on central or
regional government legislation, and state that municipalities can take the initiative to
exercise complementary activities for other specific purposes. This open framework
may therefore lead to disparities in the services municipalities provide. The law only
establishes the minimum services; however, it does not prevent municipalities from
going beyond this legal minimum and offering not only more quantity or improved
quality of a particular compulsory service, but also additional services and facilities
(Balaguer-Coll et al., 2013). Table 1.3 reports the services and facilities Spanish local
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Table 1.2: Structure of local revenues in Spain during the period 2008–
2013 (%)
Revenuesa(%)
Current revenues 81.09
Direct taxes 32.23
Property taxb 21.32
Motor Vehicle taxc 4.48
Tax on the Increase in the Value of Urban Landd 2.77
Tax on Business Activitiese 2.80
Other direct taxes 0.86
Indirect taxes 2.39
Tax on Construction, Installations and other Worksf 1.60
Other indirect taxes 0.79
Fees and other revenues 16.14
Fees 10.35
Public fares 1.15
Other revenues 4.64
Current grants received 28.05
From central government 17.59
From regional government 6.79
From provincial council (Diputaciones) 2.91
Other grants 0.75
Property incomes 2.28
Capital revenues 11.00
Sale of fixed assets 1.03
Capital transfers 9.98
Non-financial revenues 92.09
Financial revenues 7.91
Total revenues 100.00
Sources: Data from Ministry of the Treasury and Public Administrations (Ministerio de Hacienda
y Administraciones Públicas).
a Share of total revenues averaged over the period 2008-2013.
b IBI, Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles.
c IVTM, Impuesto sobre Vehículos de Tracción Mecánica.
d IIVTNU, Impuesto sobre el Incremento de Valor de los Terrenos de Naturaleza Urbana.
e IAE, Impuesto de Actividades Económicas.
f ICIO, Impuesto sobre Construcciones, Instalaciones y Obras.
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governments provide as stipulated by law.
Table 1.3: Municipal powers in Spain (Ley 7/1985 Reguladora de Bases de Régimen
Local, LRBRL)
Article 26 Articles 25, 27 and 28
Public street lighting Powers exercised in the conditions defined by State and Regional laws:
Cemetery Public safety
Waste collection Traffic management
Street cleaning Civil protection, fire prevention and extinction
Drinking water to households Management of parks and garden
Sewage system Urban policies
Access to population centres Cultural heritage
Paving of public roads Protection of the environment
Regulation of food and drink Fairs and related activities
Public parks Protection of public health
Public library Participation in the management of primary healthcare
Market Cemeteries and funeral services
Treatment of collected waste Social services, promotion of social reinsertion
Civil protection Local public networks (waste and water supply, public lighting)
Provision of social services Public transport
Fire prevention and extinction Cultural or sport activities and facilities
Public sports facilities Tourism
Urban passenger transport Participation in the design of education programmes and facilities
Protection of the environment Any delegated competence
Complementary activities from other levels of government (related to
education, culture, promotion of equality for women, housing, health
and environmental protection).
1.4. Structure and contents
This thesis is organised as follows: chapter 2 presents an extensive and comprehensive
review of the existing empirical literature on local governments’ efficiency from a
global point of view, covering all articles from 1990 up to the year 2016. The chapter
shows a detailed overview of the studies on local governments’ efficiency across
various countries, comparing the data and samples employed, and the main results
obtained. Moreover, it summarises the inputs, outputs and the environmental variables
used, as well as the methodologies applied to measure efficiency in the context of
local governments. Given that the efficiency results depend heavily on the variable
selection and the methods used, this chapter provides a good basis for researchers in
the field of local governments’ efficiency. Finally, at the end of chapter, we give some
operative directions and considerations for further research in the field.
Chapter 3 investigates different aspects of the cost efficiency in Spanish local
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governments during the period of the economic crisis (2008–2013). Specifically, we
attempt to learn whether Spanish local governments have succeeded in reducing
their budget expenditures while maintaining public service provision; in other words,
whether local government cost efficiency has improved in times of crisis. Moreover,
regardless of the context of the analysis, chapter 3 attempts to address some common
problems from previous literature earlier discussed in chapter 2, such as the accurate
definition of output variables as well as the selection of methodologies to measure
efficiency. For this, in order to assess whether the different choices might explain
the differences between local governments, we consider several output models and
different non-parametric methodologies, namely, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA),
Free Disposal Hull (FDH), order-m frontier and the bias corrected DEA estimator
proposed by Kneip et al. (2008).
Finally, this chapter also investigates the existence of structural differences in
the efficiency scores between municipalities located in different Spanish regions and
provinces as well as the variation of the efficiency scores according to the size of the
municipalities. The results suggest that the efficiency of Spanish local governments
has improved over the crisis period 2008–2013 since they have reduced their budget
expenditures (inputs or costs) while maintaining local public services and facilities
(outputs). In addition, the further results show that the efficiency scores also vary
according to the size of the municipalities as well as the location in different Spanish
regions and provinces.
Chapter 4 compares the estimation techniques previously explained in chapter
3 using an extension of the experiment developed in the study of Badunenko et al.
(2012). Since the method chosen to perform efficiency analysis may affect the efficiency
results, this chapter aims to uncover which techniques are more appropriate to assess
cost efficiency in Spanish local governments. We carry out an experiment via Monte
Carlo simulations and we discuss the relative performance of the efficiency estimators
under various scenarios. Then, from the simulation results, we determine in which
scenario our data lies in, and we follow the suggestions related to the performance
of the estimators for this scenario. The findings show that there is no one approach
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suitable for all efficiency analysis. When using these results for policy decisions, local
regulators must be aware of which part of the distribution is of particular interest
and if the interest lies in the efficiency scores or the rankings estimates. From a
technical point of view, the analytical tools introduced in this chapter would represent
an interesting contribution that examine the possibility of using a consistent method
to choose an efficiency estimator, and the obtained results give evidence on how
efficiency could certainly be assessed to provide some additional guidance for policy
makers.
Chapter 5 analyses local governments’ cost efficiency in Spain while explicitly
accounting for external or environmental influences that might affect municipalities’
performance. Based on the classification provided for the different types of determi-
nants of local governments’ efficiency in chapter 2, we identify a set of environmental
variables that are associated with better/worse economic performance of local govern-
ments in Spain. Afterwards, the relationship between these environmental variables
and the efficiency scores is assessed in a two-stage analysis. In a first stage, cost
efficiency results are measured via the non-parametric methods developed in chapter
3. In the second stage, when the factors causing inefficiency are included in the
analysis, a instrumental variable quantile regression is considered.
In contrast to previous two-stage initiatives, this technique contributes to the litera-
ture by providing an alternative basis for considering the impact of the environmental
variables on local governments’ efficiency according to the differing levels of efficiency,
while allowing to control for the possible endogeneity of some of our explanatory
variables. Results show an asymmetry regarding the determinants of efficiency for the
best and worst local governments. Indeed, for the worst local governments, perfor-
mance is a result not only of their managers’ decisions but also other factors related to
their environment, such as such as tax revenues, the debt levels, transfers from higher
levels of government, share of retired people or the electoral participation.
Finally, chapter 6 gives a short summary of the main results and conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Local governments’ efficiency: a
systematic literature review
2.1. Introduction
Over the last 30 years there have been many empirical studies that have focused on
the evaluation of efficiency in local governments from multiple points of view and
contexts. Following De Borger and Kerstens (1996a), it is possible to identify two
strands of empirical research. On the one hand, some studies concentrate on the
evaluation of a particular local service, such as refuse collection and street cleaning
(Worthington and Dollery, 2000b, 2001; Bosch et al., 2000; Benito-López et al., 2011,
2015), water services (García-Sánchez, 2006a), street lightning (Lorenzo and Sánchez,
2007), fire services (García-Sánchez, 2006b), library services (Stevens, 2005) and road
maintenance (Kalb, 2012) among others. On the other hand, other studies evaluate
local performance from a “global point of view” considering that local governments
supply a wide variety of services and facilities.
In this chapter we provide a systematic review of the existing literature on local
government efficiency from a global point of view, covering all articles from 1990 up to
the year 2016. More specifically, it contributes to the literature in three major aspects.
First, it presents a detailed review of the studies investigating local government
efficiency across various countries, comparing the data and samples employed as
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well as the main results obtained. Second, it describes which techniques have been
used for measuring efficiency in the context of local governments. Finally, it suggests
classifications for the input, output as well as the operational environment. In local
government efficiency measurement, the selection of variables is a complex task, due
to the difficulty to collect data and the measurement of local services (Balaguer-Coll
et al., 2013). Indeed, different studies use diverse measures, even those which analyse
efficiency using data from the same country. Moreover, many investigations have
attempted to determine whether external factors affect local governments’ performance.
However, the inclusion of these environmental variables is not unanimous since there
is a lack of a clear and standard classification (Da Cruz and Marques, 2014). Here,
we identify all variables used in previous literature according to the classifications
proposed, and we comment their correlation with efficiency.
Our review starts from five previous works that referred to local government
literature. First, Worthington and Dollery (2000a) provided a survey of the empirical
analysis on efficiency in local government until 1999. Second, Afonso and Fernandes
(2008) reviewed some relevant studies that evaluated both non-parametric and global
local governments efficiency. Third, Kalb et al. (2012) collected 23 studies which
analysed local government efficiency and made a comparison across various coun-
tries. Fourth, Da Cruz and Marques (2014) suggested a general classification for the
determinants of local government performance. Finally, De Oliveira Junqueira (NA)
reviewed some empirical studies on local government efficiency and identified the
main inputs and output variables included in the analysis. However, to the best of our
knowledge, the literature review presented in this chapter is the most complete source
of references on local government efficiency analysis. We show a complete overview
of the existing literature, the variables selection, the methodologies employed as well
as some considerations for further work.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 provides the
bibliographic selection process to construct the systematic literature review. Section 2.3
presents an extensive review of the existing literature on local governments efficiency
at country level. Section 2.4 reports which techniques have been used for measuring
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efficiency, while section 2.5 describes the input and output variables most commonly
used. Section 2.6 provides the methodologies used to incorporate environmental
variables in the analysis, while section 2.7 proposes a classification and comments the
impact of the different variables over efficiency. Finally, section 2.8 discuss the main
conclusions and suggest operative directions for future researchers in the field.
2.2. A systematic review on local government efficiency
In this review, we have used the search engines Web of Science (WoS)1, Scopus2
and Google Scholar. The search was limited to the Social Sciences Citation Index
(SSCI) in WoS and to the Social Sciences and Humanities area in Scopus to reduce
the likelihood of retrieving articles that were not related to the topic, like energy or
health efficiency. Also, we have restricted the literature search to English language.
We included empirical papers until August 2016.
As the main focus is local governments’ efficiency, the initial search was done
using combinations of the keywords “efficiency”, “performance measurement”, “local
government” and “municipality”. Using these keywords, the databases provided us
more than 250 books, papers and unpublished working papers. To limit the total
number of results, we excluded the presentations given at conferences as well as
dissertations. Next, the results retrieved were filtered qualitatively to ensure they
addressed the research question. As a criterion for inclusion we included studies which
present empirical data, measuring efficiency at local government level (LAU-2)3, with
a selection of inputs and outputs, and excluding studies addressed to international
comparisons and studies addressed to measure a particular service, such as refuse
1Web of Science (WoS) is an scientific citation indexing database and search service maintained by
Thomson Reuters. It allows for in-depth exploration of specialized sub-fields within an academic or
scientific discipline.
2Scopus is a bibliographic database maintained by Elsevier. It contains abstracts and citations for
academic journal articles, books and conference proceedings.
3Local administrative units (LAUs) are basic components of the Nomenclature of Territorial Units
for Statistics (NUTS) for referencing the subdivisions of countries regulated by the European Union.
Specifically, LAU-2 is a low level administrative division of a country, ranked below a province, region,
or state. So, we exclude studies focused on intermediate level of local governments, such as those of
Nold Hughes and Edwards (2000), Hauner (2008), Nieswand and Seifert (2011) and Otsuka et al. (2014),
among others.
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collection, water services, road maintenance, education, etc. Finally, we obtained 84
studies. Note that in the second part of the chapter, when we only take into account
those studies which included environmental variables in the analysis, i.e., 63 studies.
2.3. Country level analysis
As mentioned in the introduction, there have been many empirical studies that have
focused on the evaluation of the overall efficiency in local governments covering
several countries. Table A.1 in the appendix A summarises the empirical contributions
focused on local government efficiency from a global point of view, listed by countries
and chronological order of publication. As we can observe, some of these studies
also attempted to analyse the relationship between local government efficiency and
other important topics, such as the municipal size, the effect of amalgamation of the
municipalities, the impact of fiscal decentralization, the effects of political competition
and the influence of the spatial closeness between municipalities, among others. The
differences in the average efficiency scores found between the studies are remarkable
due to differences in the samples, methodologies and variables included. However,
we summarise efficiency scores by countries with the aim to define general trends.
Looking first at Japan, Nakazawa (2013, 2014) evaluated 479 municipalities in 2005
considering the effects that amalgamation had over cost efficiency. Moreover, Nijkamp
and Suzuki (2009) evaluated 34 cities in Hokkaido prefecture in 2005, and Haneda
et al. (2012) used 92 municipalities in Ibaraki prefecture for the years 1979–2004 to
analyse the change in efficiency in the post-merger period. In general, Japanese
municipalities show high efficiency levels, scoring from 0.75 to 0.90 depending on the
method and the data. Two studies have evaluated local governments in Korea. Seol
et al. (2008) analysed 106 local governments in 2003, while Sung (2007) assessed 222
local governments from 1999 to 2001. Both studies examined the impact of information
technology on Korean local government performance. Their results vary from 0.57 to
0.97 depending on the specification model and the sample.
In addition, five more studies focused on other Asian countries. Yusfany (2015)
analysed 491 Indonesian municipalities in 2010, Liu et al. (2011) measured 22 local
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governments in Taiwan in 2007, Kutlar and Bakirci (2012) evaluated 27 Turkish
municipalities from 2006 to 2008, and Ibrahim and Karim (2004) and Ibrahim and
Salleh (2006) analysed 46 local governments in Malaysia in 2000. Efficiency results for
Indonesian municipalities are quite low (0.50), while in Taiwan results range from 0.38
to 0.82, in Turkey from 0.53 to 0.86, and in Malaysia from 0.59 to 0.76.
Three studies have evaluated local governments on the Australian context. Specifi-
cally, Worthington (2000) measured cost efficiency for municipalities in New South
Wales for 1993. Also, Fogarty and Mugera (2013) evaluated efficiency for Western
Australia municipalities in 2009 and 2010. Finally, Marques et al. (2015) used a sample
of 29 Tasmanian local councils between 1999 and 2008 with the aim to estimate the
optimal size on local government. The mean efficiency scores in Australian munici-
palities range from 0.40 to 0.86, however heterogeneous results were expected since
none of the Australian studies used the same dataset and method. Moreover, there
are three studies which analysed local governments in Brazil. Sampaio de Sousa et al.
(2005) evaluated 3,756 local governments in 1991 while Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos
(1999) and Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005) used 4,796 municipalities in 1991
and 2001, respectively. Despite data in these last two studies are 10 years difference,
their efficiency scores are quite similar, ranging from 0.52 to 0.92 depending on the
method used. In addition, Pacheco et al. (2014) analysed the efficiency of 309 Chilean
municipalities from 2008 to 2010, reporting an average efficiency score of around 0.70.
Further, some studies assessed cost efficiency in local governments in the United
States. Hayes and Chang (1990) evaluated 191 US municipalities in 1982, studing
whether or not the council-management form is more efficient than the mayor-council
form of government in formulating and implementing public policies. Moreover,
Grossman et al. (1999) examined 49 US central cities for the years 1967, 1973, 1977
and 1982. They measured technical inefficiency in the local public sector based on
a comparison of local property values. Finally, Moore et al. (2005) analysed largest
cities in the US from 1993 to 1996. Interestingly, despite the different methods and
data used, results for the efficiency levels in US local governments are quite consistent,
varying between 0.81 to 0.84. Three studies assessed provision of basic services in local
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municipalities in South Africa from 2005 to 2010 (Dollery and van der Westhuizen,
2009; Mahabir, 2014; Monkam, 2014). In general, they show low efficiency levels,
scoring from 0.17 to 0.64.
There exist several studies about performance in Belgian local governments4.
De Borger et al. (1994) and De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b) measured cost efficiency
for 589 municipalities in 1985, while Eeckaut et al. (1993) analysed 235 Walloon mu-
nicipalities in 1986. Moreover, Geys and Moesen (2009a,b) and Geys (2006) evaluated
304 Flemish municipalities in 2000, analysing in the last study the existence of spa-
tial interdependence in local government policies. Similarly, Coffé and Geys (2005)
evaluated 305 Flemish municipalities, studying the effect of social capital on local
government performance, while Ashworth et al. (2014) assessed 308 Flemish munici-
palities, measuring whether political competition affect local government efficiency. In
general, despite many studies have used similar samples for the same years, efficiency
results for Belgian municipalities differ from 0.49 to 0.99. These differences might
be explained by the different methodologies applied as well as the different topics
studied.
In addition, some studies analysed German local governments. Kalb et al. (2012)
and Geys et al. (2013) analysed cost efficiency in 1,021 municipalities for data in 2001
and 2004, respectively. The last study considered local government size to measure the
effect of economies of scale. Similarly, Bönisch et al. (2011) evaluated local governments
in Saxony-Anhalt in 2004 taking into account municipality size. Moreover, Geys et al.
(2010) assessed whether voter involvement is related to government performance
using 987 German municipalities for the years 1998, 2002 and 2004. Kalb (2010)
and Bischoff et al. (2013) studied municipalities from 1990 to 2004, considering the
impact of intergovernmental and vertical grants on cost efficiency, while Asatryan
and De Witte (2015) evaluated 2,000 Bavarian municipalities in 2011, connecting the
efficient provision of local public services with the role of direct democracy. Finally,
Lampe et al. (2015) analysed the effect of new accounting and budgeting regimes
4See De Borger and Kerstens (2000) for a literature review on Belgian local governments up to the
year 1998. They discuss the difficulties to benchmark local governments.
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in 396 German municipalities from 2006 to 2008. On average, results on German
municipalities showed that inputs or costs should be reduced by 1% to 20% of their
current level.
Six studies have analysed local government in Norway. Kalseth and Rattsø (1995)
used 407 Norwegian local authorities in 1988, while Borge et al. (2008) and Bruns
and Himmler (2011) evaluated between 362 to 374 local governments from 2001 to
2005. The second study investigated whether efficiency in public service provision
is affected by political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic
participation, while the last study examined the role of the newspaper market for
the efficient use of public funds by elected politicians. Moreover, Sørensen (2014)
and Helland and Sørensen (2015) evaluated 430 Norwegian local authorities from
2001 to 2010, both considering whether political variables affect local government
efficiency. Finally, Revelli and Tovmo (2007) analysed 205 local governments located
in the 12 southern counties of Norway, investigating whether the efficiency exhibits a
spatial pattern that is compatible with the hypothesis of yardstick competition. The
only study which used frontier techniques to measure efficiency in Norwegian local
governments showed efficiency results from 0.74 to 0.84. The others concluded that
efficiency values of the ratios between inputs and outputs ranged from 100 to 104.9.
Otherwise, Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005) and Loikkanen et al. (2011) evaluated
cost-efficiency of basic welfare service provision in Finnish municipalities for data
from 1994 to 2002. This second study examined whether Finnish city managers’ char-
acteristics and work environment, in addition to external factors, explain differences
in cost efficiency. On average, the results for Finnish municipalities show a high
efficiency level, scoring from 0.75 to 0.89. In addition, two studies have focused on
the English case. Revelli (2010) studied 148 main local authorities in England from
2002 to 2007. Moreover, Andrews and Entwistle (2015) analysed 386 local authorities
in England in 2007. They investigated the relationship between a commitment to
public-private partnership, management capacity and efficiency. In the English case,
the efficiency values of the ratios between inputs and ouputs were 1.05.
Furthermore, six papers focused their attention in Italian local governments.
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Barone and Mocetti (2011) analysed the links between public spending inefficiency and
tax morale using a sample 1,115 municipalities for data from 2001 to 2004. Moreover,
Boetti et al. (2012) evaluated 262 Italian municipalities in the province of Turin in 2005,
assessing whether efficiency of local governments is affected by the degree of vertical
fiscal imbalance. Similarly, D’Inverno et al. (2017) analysed 282 Tuscan municipalities
in 2011, while Agasisti et al. (2015) analysed 331 Lombardy municipalities with more
than 5,000 inhabitants from 2010 to 2012. Finally, Lo Storto (2013, 2016) used 103 Italian
municipalities in 2011 and 2013, respectively. In general, the efficiency scores in Italian
municipalities vary drastically (from 0.19 to 0.88), depending on the specification, the
sample and the method employed.
Five studies have evaluated local governments in Portugal. The studies of Afonso
and Fernandes (2003, 2006) analysed 51 Portuguese municipalities in the regions of
Lisbon and Vale do Tejo in 2001. Similarly, Afonso and Fernandes (2008), Da Cruz and
Marques (2014) and Cordero et al. (2017) investigated cost efficiency in 278 Portuguese
local governments’ for data from 2001 to 2014. In general, the efficiency results shown
in Portuguese municipalities are quite low, scoring from 0.22 to 0.76. Otherwise,
there are two studies which assessed cost efficiency in Greek local governments.
Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998) analysed municipalities with more than 2,000
inhabitants for 1986 data, while Doumpos and Cohen (2014) focused on the period
2002-2009, exploring optimal reallocation of the inputs and outputs. Mean efficiency
on Greek municipalities differs from 0.5 to 0.85 depending on the method applied
as well as the sample analysed. In addition, El Mehdi and Hafner (2014) analysed
the efficiency of 91 rural districts in the oriental region of Morocco from 1998/1999,
showing average efficiency scores ranging from 0.38 to 0.50.
Moreover, Štastná and Gregor (2011, 2015) compared 202 local governments in the
Czech Republic in the transition period of 1995-1998 and the post transition period of
2005-2008. Their results show low efficiency levels, scoring from 0.30 to 0.79 depending
on the method used. In addition, other studies focused on data in Central and East
European countries. Pevcin (2014a,b) measured efficiency in 200 Slovenian munici-
palities in 2011. Their results suggested that mean technical inefficiency should be
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approximately 12-25% above the estimated best-practice frontier. Moreover, Radulovic
and Dragutinovic´ (2015) measured efficiency for 143 Serbian local governments in
2012, and Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013) analysed 74 municipalities in Macedonia. This
last study took into account the ethnic fragmentation of municipalities to explain
efficiency. Their results show that mean efficiency scores are quite low in Macedonia
(0.59), while Serbian local governments should reduce their inputs by 15% to 33%.
Finally, some studies analysed the case of Spanish municipalities (13 papers).
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) and Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009) measured local govern-
ments in the Valencian Region for data from 1992 to 1995. The last study considered a
temporal dimension of efficiency and applied different output specifications. Similarly,
the study of Giménez and Prior (2007) evaluated 258 Catalonian municipalities for
data in 1996, decomposing the total cost efficiency into short and long term, while
Bosch-Roca et al. (2012) evaluated 102 Catalonian municipalities between 5,000 and
20,000 inhabitants in 2005, connecting efficiency of local public services with citizen’s
control in a decentralized context. Moreover, Benito et al. (2010) analysed the efficiency
in 31 municipalities of the Murcia Region in 2002, Prieto and Zofio (2001) analysed
209 municipalities of less than 20,000 people in Castile and Leon Region in 1994, and
Arcelus et al. (2015) measured efficiency in small municipalities (fewer than 20,000
inhabitants) from Navarre Region in 2005.
Differently, other studies focused on Spanish data covering most part of the
Spanish territory. For instance, Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a,b) analysed the links
between overall cost efficiency and the decentralization power in Spain with more
the 1,164 Spanish local authorities over 1,000 inhabitants for data from 1995 to 2005.
Moreover, Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013) used 129 Spanish municipalities with
populations over 10,000 from 1999 to 2007 and Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010)
measured the cost efficiency of 923 municipalities for the years 2000 and 2005 together
with their financial condition. Finally, in Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013) and Pérez-López
et al. (2015) an analysis of local government performance is assessed with a sample of
municipalities between 1,000 and 50,000 inhabitants for the years from 2000 to 2010.
The first study splits municipalities into clusters according to various criteria (output
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mix, environmental condition and level of powers). The last study analysed the long
term effects of the new delivery forms over efficiency. Broadly speaking, efficiency
results for Spanish municipalities are really heterogeneous, scoring from 0.53 to 0.97
depending on the different variables specifications, methodologies used and the data.
To summarise, figure 2.1 presents the average efficiency scores by country, mea-
sured as the average between the maximum and the minimum scores found in
previous literature. We observe that Germany presents the highest average efficiency
results (0.90), while South Africa presents the lowest (0.40).
Figure 2.1: Average efficiency scores by country.
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2.4. Methodological approaches to measure efficiency
The literature uses different techniques to analyse local governments’ efficiency5. It is
possible to distinguish two main branches of best practice frontiers: the non-parametric
and the parametric methods. Table 2.1 provides a review of the studies using the
different approaches to measure efficiency in local governments.
On the one hand, the most commonly non-parametric tools used in local gov-
ernment efficiency literature are Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Charnes et al.,
1978) and its non-convex version Free Disposal Hull (FDH) (Deprins et al., 1984).
Non-parametric methods have received a considerable amount of interest mainly
because they have less restrictive assumptions and greater flexibility than parametric
methods. Moreover, they can easily handle multi-input and multi-output analysis in a
simple way (Ruggiero, 2007). As observed in table 2.1, in total 41 papers used DEA,
13 used FDH and 2 used the super-efficiency DEA model of Andersen and Petersen
(1993).
Nevertheless, the traditional non-parametric methods also present several draw-
backs: their deterministic nature (all deviations from the frontier are considered as
inefficient and no noise is allowed), the difficulty to make statistical inference, and the
influence of outliers and extreme values. In this setting, other recent techniques in the
non-parametric field have been used to solve these problems. First, bootstrap methods
based on sub-sampling (Simar and Wilson, 1998, 2000, 2008) have been used to correct
DEA or FDH bias6. They allow for statistical inference (consistency analysis, bias
correction, confidence intervals, hypothesis testing, etc) in the non-parametric setting.
We found 6 papers which used bias-corrected methods. Moreover, Sampaio de Sousa
et al. (2005) and Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005) introduced a method known as
DEA or FDH with “jackstrap” that combines bootstrap and jackknife resampling to
eliminate the influence of outliers and possible measurement errors in the data.
Second, partial frontiers such as order-m (Cazals et al., 2002) are more robust to
5See Coelli et al. (2005) and Fried et al. (2008) for an introduction to efficiency measurement.
6As stated by Simar and Wilson (2008), DEA and FDH estimators are biased by construction, which
means that the true frontier would be located under the DEA-estimated frontier.
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Table 2.1: Approaches to measure efficiency in local governments
A. NON-PARAMETRIC APPROACHES AND SEMI-PARAMETRIC APPROACHES
1. DEA
Eeckaut et al. (1993); Kalseth and Rattsø (1995); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a); Athanassopoulos and
Triantis (1998); Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos (1999); Worthington (2000); Prieto and Zofio (2001); Ibrahim
and Karim (2004); Coffé and Geys (2005); Moore et al. (2005); Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Afonso and
Fernandes (2006); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Afonso and Fernandes (2008); Geys and Moesen (2009b); Seol
et al. (2008); Nijkamp and Suzuki (2009); Dollery and van der Westhuizen (2009); Balaguer-Coll and Prior
(2009); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Benito et al. (2010); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010); Štastná and Gregor
(2011); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Bönisch et al. (2011); Boetti et al. (2012); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Lo Storto
(2013); Fogarty and Mugera (2013); Monkam (2014); Ashworth et al. (2014); Pevcin (2014b); D’Inverno et al.
(2017); El Mehdi and Hafner (2014); Marques et al. (2015); Yusfany (2015); Lo Storto (2016)
1.2. Malmquist index with DEA
Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Haneda et al. (2012); Sung (2007); Kutlar and Bakirci (2012)
1.3. DEA super-efficiency
Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Liu et al. (2011)
2. FDH
Eeckaut et al. (1993); De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos
(1999); Afonso and Fernandes (2003); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Giménez and Prior (2007); Geys and Moesen
(2009b); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a); El Mehdi and Hafner (2014); Mahabir (2014)
2.2. Malmquist index with FDH
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010b)
3. DEA or FDH Bias-corrected
Bönisch et al. (2011); Fogarty and Mugera (2013); Bischoff et al. (2013); El Mehdi and Hafner (2014)
3.2. Malmquist index with DEA Bias-corrected
Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013); Agasisti et al. (2015)
4. DEA or FDH with “Jackstrap”
Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005)
5. Order-m
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Pérez-López et al. (2015)
6. Conditional efficiency
Asatryan and De Witte (2015); Cordero et al. (2017)
B. PARAMETRIC APPROACHES
1. SFA
De Borger and Kerstens (1996a); Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Grossman et al. (1999); Worthington
(2000); Geys (2006); Ibrahim and Salleh (2006); Geys and Moesen (2009a,b); Geys et al. (2010); Kalb (2010);
Barone and Mocetti (2011); Kalb et al. (2012); Boetti et al. (2012); Geys et al. (2013); Nakazawa (2013); Nikolov
and Hrovatin (2013); Nakazawa (2014); Pacheco et al. (2014); Pevcin (2014a,b); Arcelus et al. (2015); Lampe
et al. (2015); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015)
1.2. SFA time variant
Štastná and Gregor (2011, 2015)
2. COLS, OLS, Fixed effects regressions
Hayes and Chang (1990); Kalseth and Rattsø (1995); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a); Revelli (2010); Sørensen
(2014); Helland and Sørensen (2015)
C. RATIOS
Revelli and Tovmo (2007); Borge et al. (2008); Revelli (2010); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Andrews and En-
twistle (2015)
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extremes or outliers in data and they do not suffer from the curse of dimensionality.
We only found 2 studies which employed order-m approach. Finally, Asatryan and
De Witte (2015) used the conditional efficiency model (Daraio and Simar, 2005) while
Cordero et al. (2017) used the time-dependent conditional frontier model recently
developed by Mastromarco and Simar (2015). They are an extension to the traditional
FDH and order-m which allow to account for heterogeneity among municipalities.
On the other hand, some studies used parametric approaches. They determine the
frontier on the basis of a specific functional form using econometric techniques. The
deviations from the best practice frontier derived from parametric methods can be
interpreted in two different ways. While deterministic approaches interpret the full
deviation from the best practice frontier as inefficiency (standard OLS or corrected
OLS method), Stochastic Frontier Approach (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and Van den
Broeck, 1977) decompose the deviation of the best practice frontier between the effect
of measurement error and inefficiency. In addition, environmental variables can be
easily treated with a stochastic frontier. They can adopt different cost or production
functions, for instance, the Cobb-Douglas or Translog. As observed in table 2.1, in total
25 papers used SFA, 3 studies used COLS or OLS, 2 studies fixed effects regression
and 1 study used standard cost regression.
Otherwise, some studies have applied a dynamic approach in order to reveal the
efficiency changes over the time. The most popular method among the non-parametric
field is the Malmquist productivity index Caves et al. (1982), which has been used
joint DEA, FDH or bootstrap methods. Moreover, two studies assessed the efficiency
scores over time with parametric approaches, using the time-variant SFA analysis.
Finally, 4 studies measured efficiency by using a index developed by Borge et al.
(2008) instead of traditional frontier techniques. The index is defined as the ratio of the
total aggregate output to local government revenues. Finally, the efficiency measure is
normalized to 100, so that deviations from the mean can be interpreted as percentage
deviations.
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2.5. Inputs and outputs indicators
The selection of variables depends on the availability of data and the specific services
and facilities that local government provide in each country. Therefore, many variables
cannot be used in all countries.
2.5.1. Input variables
We review the input variables most widely used in previous literature to proxy for
the municipal resources employed for local service provision. The selection of inputs
could vary across countries since they depend on specific accounting practices and
characteristics of local governments. Moreover, we note that most studies used input
variables in cost terms since data on prices and physical units are not available. Public
sector goods and services are frequently unpriced since they have a non-market nature
(Kalb et al., 2012). Despite some authors have tried to decompose physical inputs and
input prices, most of these input prices variables coincide with the input variables
in cost terms. In this setting, in our input classification we do not differentiate input
prices. Following, we discuss all variables describing how different studies have
measured them. Table A.2 in appendix A also summarises the studies containing local
inputs from different areas, using the same structure as the main text.
Financial expenditures
Inputs variables within this category come from local public accounts or budget
expenditures. We include indicators such as total expenditures, current expenditures,
capital expenditures and financial expenditures.
• Total expenditures (24 papers)
This variable has been commonly used in local government efficiency analysis
to proxy for the total cost of service provision.7 Mainly, it includes different
7Kalseth and Rattsø (1995); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Prieto and Zofio (2001); Afonso and
Fernandes (2003, 2006); Coffé and Geys (2005); Afonso and Fernandes (2008); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010b);
Kutlar and Bakirci (2012); Nakazawa (2013, 2014); Ashworth et al. (2014); Pevcin (2014a,b); Mahabir
(2014); Yusfany (2015); Andrews and Entwistle (2015).
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expenditures categories such as current (or operational) expenditures, capital
and financial expenditures.
In addition, other variants of total expenditures have been used. Some studies
measured total local government expenditures excluding personnel expenses
since these are measured separately.8 Similarly, Lampe et al. (2015) and Asatryan
and De Witte (2015) measured total government expenditures net of transfers
from the central government to municipalities arguing that municipalities have
no discretion to make decisions on their use.
• Current expenditures (46 papers)
Current expenditures or operating expenses are the most widely used input
indicators to measure the costs incurred by local governments to provide local
services.9 They do not include capital expenditures since they are highly volatile
because of investments in large infrastructures.
Similarly, some studies have used the total net current expenditures in a mu-
nicipality. These include all spending on the current budget minus interest and
amortization repayments from local public debts. Again, spending from the
capital budget is not considered, since this mainly refers to large investment
events which inflate total spending in the year they emerge.10
In addition, some studies measured current expenditures as the spending on
those issues for which they observed government outputs. They aggregate data
on expenditures or costs given a number of local services provided.11
8Sung (2007); Seol et al. (2008); Nijkamp and Suzuki (2009); Cordero et al. (2017).
9Eeckaut et al. (1993); Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos (1999);
Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005); Geys
(2006); Ibrahim and Salleh (2006); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2010a); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Štastná and Gregor (2011);
Kutlar and Bakirci (2012); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Cuadrado-Ballesteros
et al. (2013); Pacheco et al. (2014); Monkam (2014); Marques et al. (2015); Štastná and Gregor (2015);
Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015); Arcelus et al. (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015).
10Geys et al. (2010); Kalb (2010); Kalb et al. (2012); Geys et al. (2013); Pacheco et al. (2014); Nakazawa
(2014); Lampe et al. (2015).
11Hayes and Chang (1990); Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Moore et al. (2005); Geys and Moesen
(2009a,b); Benito et al. (2010); Revelli (2010); Barone and Mocetti (2011); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Boetti
et al. (2012); Lo Storto (2013); Pacheco et al. (2014); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Agasisti et al. (2015); Lo Storto
(2016).
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• Personnel expenditures (26 papers)
Local personnel expenses can be measured as the number of local government
employees12 or as the total personnel costs or wages and salaries13. In addition,
Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005) and Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005) used the
number of teachers as a proxy for personnel inputs.
• Capital and financial expenditures (17 papers)
Capital or financial expenses are related to interest payments and loans. Includ-
ing capital expenditures means considering the investment expenditure that
local entities make on a regular basis, such as expenditure on the maintenance
of municipal facilities and equipment.14 Moreover, the study of Liu et al. (2011)
used the accumulation of fixed assets as a proxy for capital inputs, and De Borger
et al. (1994) employed the surface of building owned by the municipality as a
proxy for capital stocks. In addition, the study of Nijkamp and Suzuki (2009)
included the amount of outstanding city bonds as a proxy for financial costs,
while Hayes and Chang (1990) used the municipal bond rating.
• Other financial expenditures (6 papers)
In this category, we include physical expenses which consisted on material pur-
chases and inventory, plants and equipment, contract expenses, utility expenses,
insurance costs and any other costs grouped as other expenses in the financial
statements,15 as well as resources and intermediate inputs which contained all
other current expenditures not related to labour or capital expenditures.16
12De Borger et al. (1994); Worthington (2000); Moore et al. (2005); Sung (2007); Seol et al. (2008);
Nijkamp and Suzuki (2009); Haneda et al. (2012); Da Cruz and Marques (2014).
13Hayes and Chang (1990); Worthington (2000); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Giménez and Prior (2007);
Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Dollery and van der Westhuizen (2009); Benito et al. (2010); Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2010a); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010); Bönisch et al. (2011); Liu et al. (2011); Kutlar and
Bakirci (2012); Fogarty and Mugera (2013); Bischoff et al. (2013); Nakazawa (2013); Balaguer-Coll et al.
(2013); Cordero et al. (2017).
14Worthington (2000); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Balaguer-Coll et al.
(2010a); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010); Bönisch et al. (2011); Kutlar and
Bakirci (2012); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Fogarty and Mugera (2013); Bischoff et al. (2013); Cuadrado-
Ballesteros et al. (2013); Da Cruz and Marques (2014).
15Worthington (2000); Giménez and Prior (2007); Fogarty and Mugera (2013).
16Bönisch et al. (2011); Bischoff et al. (2013); Da Cruz and Marques (2014).
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Financial resources
Inputs variables within this category come from local public accounts or budget
revenues. We include own revenues as well as transfers.
• Local revenues (7 papers)
Some studies measured total local government revenues as the available re-
sources in local government, which include own tax revenues (tax revenues, fees
and charges) as well as central government grants or subsidies.17 In addition,
El Mehdi and Hafner (2014) used the own receipts of the municipality measured
as the total operating receipts less the subsidies.
• Current transfers (8 papers)
Current transfers represent transfers and grants received from higher levels of
government.18
Non-financial inputs
We include input indicators not related to local financial statements:
• Public health services (2 papers)
The studies of Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005) and Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´
(2005) used the number of hospital and health centres (as they are the main
providers of health services) to proxy for public health services. Also, they
accounted for the rate of infant mortality serves as an input, suggesting that if
health services are efficient, this indicator should be as low as possible.
• Area (1 paper)
Finally, Haneda et al. (2012) included the area in Km2 considering it as a
municipal asset.
17Revelli and Tovmo (2007); Borge et al. (2008); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Sørensen (2014); Doumpos
and Cohen (2014); Helland and Sørensen (2015).
18Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Giménez and Prior (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2010a, 2013); Benito et al. (2010); Kutlar and Bakirci (2012); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010).
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2.5.2. Output variables
Measuring local governments’ outputs is a complex task which comes from the
difficulty to collect data and the measurement of local services (Balaguer-Coll et al.,
2013). Indeed, different studies use diverse measures of outputs, even those which
analyse efficiency using data from the same country. Also the number of output
variables included in the different studies is varied, since some studies aggregate
various municipal services in a global index, while others evaluate a set of specific
local services. We discuss all variables containing local outputs from 17 different
categories. Table A.3 in appendix A also summarises the local outputs, following the
same structure as the main text.
Global output indicator (14 papers)
A global output indicator represents an index containing a set of services and facilities
that municipalities must provide (such as education, health, roads infrastructure,
social services, sports and culture, waste collection, water supply, etc.). Given that the
services offered by local governments are varied and not all have the same budgetary
weight, each output included in the global output indicator is weighted according to
different criteria. In this context, Afonso and Fernandes (2003, 2006, 2008), Nijkamp
and Suzuki (2009) and Yusfany (2015) gave the same weighting for the different
outputs included in the composed index, Bosch-Roca et al. (2012) weighted each
output according to the relative weight in the accounts of each municipality, and
Nakazawa (2013, 2014) gave specific numerical weights to each different area of public
service included.
In addition, other studies have used official indicators of the provision of local ser-
vices developed by public institutions. For instance, in Norway the studies of Revelli
and Tovmo (2007), Borge et al. (2008), Bruns and Himmler (2011), Sørensen (2014) and
Helland and Sørensen (2015) used an aggregate output measure published annually
by the Norwegian Advisory Commission on Local Government Finances. This aggre-
gate measure is calculated as the weighted average of the output measures for the
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individual service sectors using the average spending shares as weights. Moreover,
in United Kingdom the studies of Revelli (2010) and Andrews and Entwistle (2015)
used an official rating of local government performance (Comprehensive Performance
Assessment, CPA) built annually by the Audit Commission (a central government
regulatory agency).
Total population (46 papers)
This variable is the output indicator most frequently used in local government ef-
ficiency analysis. It reflects the basic administrative tasks performed by municipal
governments through the service general administration as well as other services for
which more direct outputs do not exist. Eeckaut et al. (1993) was the pioneer study
which proposed the use of population as a proxy indicators for public services in
the evaluation of local efficiency. The route opened up by the latter study was later
expanded by De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b) and converted as a common standard
in governmental efficiency research thus far.19 Otherwise, the studies of Štastná and
Gregor (2011), Haneda et al. (2012) and Pacheco et al. (2014) used population size as a
proxy for the scope of services since bigger municipalities should provide more public
goods and services.
In addition, some studies used proxy variables for the services delivered to non-
resident population. For instance, local governments in areas with tourist visitors
would have higher demand for their services. Therefore, variables such the as share
of non-residents, tourist presence, number of visitors or number of beds in tourism
establishments have been used.20
19Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos (1999); Worthington (2000); Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Coffé and Geys
(2005); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005); Ibrahim and Salleh (2006);
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Giménez and Prior (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Geys et al. (2010);
Kalb (2010); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a,b); Bönisch et al. (2011);
Kalb et al. (2012); Kutlar and Bakirci (2012); Boetti et al. (2012); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Fogarty
and Mugera (2013); Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Bischoff et al. (2013);
Geys et al. (2013); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Lo Storto (2013); Pevcin (2014a,b); D’Inverno et al. (2017);
Monkam (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Lampe et al. (2015); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015);
Agasisti et al. (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Cordero et al. (2017); Lo Storto (2016).
20Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); De Borger et al. (1994); Kutlar and Bakirci (2012); D’Inverno
et al. (2017).
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Area of municipality and built area (10 papers)
Municipal area (measured as total municipal surface, urban area or built-up area) has
been used as a proxy for the demand of public services delivered to citizens in several
studies.21 It works as an indirect approximation due to the difficulty of quantifying
the supply of public services and facilities. In addition, some studies have used the
number of properties or households in the local area22 as a proxy for the demand of
urban services.
Administrative services (9 papers)
Many studies have used variables such as “population” to proxy administrative
services. However, others have used more direct outputs designed to measure the
provision of services linked to administrative tasks. For instance, Arcelus et al. (2015)
used an index measuring the provision of administrative services defined by the
Local Administration of the Navarre government. Moreover, Kalseth and Rattsø
(1995) defined the administrative activities as the administrative costs of central
administration and the sectoral administration of different services. In addition, other
studies included civil affairs23, the number of certificates and requested documents
handled24, the number of receipts processed25, electoral service26, the number of
planning applications27, the amount of internal reports produced28, the number of
building permits issued29, and taxes on construction and square feet of city building
space available to proxy for urban and building management30.
21Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Giménez and Prior (2007); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Lo Storto
(2013); Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013); Štastná and Gregor (2015); Arcelus et al. (2015); Pérez-López
et al. (2015); Lo Storto (2016).
22Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Fogarty and Mugera (2013); Arcelus
et al. (2015); Štastná and Gregor (2015).
23Sung (2007).
24Seol et al. (2008); Barone and Mocetti (2011).
25Marques et al. (2015).
26Barone and Mocetti (2011).
27Marques et al. (2015).
28Seol et al. (2008).
29Sung (2007); Barone and Mocetti (2011); Cordero et al. (2017).
30Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013); Moore et al. (2005).
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Infrastructures
We include indicators of the basic municipal infrastructures related to street lighting
and municipal roads:
• Street lighting (11 papers)
This variable measures the provision of public street lighting in the municipali-
ties, mostly measured as the number of lighting points.31
• Municipal roads (34 papers)
The length of municipal roads (in km) is a proxy for the provision of local road
maintenance services (such as paving or street cleaning), traffic, urban transport
and access to the municipality.32 Similarly, the study of Moore et al. (2005)
included the miles of streets serviced as a proxy of street maintenance, Štastná
and Gregor (2011, 2015) used the size of municipal roads measured in hectares,
Sung (2007) used the ratio of road length to area, and Lo Storto (2013) used
the urban infrastructure development. In addition, Doumpos and Cohen (2014)
and Arcelus et al. (2015) used the variable “Pavement” to proxy for municipal
roads services, while Prieto and Zofio (2001) measured the pavement shortage
as well as the pavement condition. Finally, some studies included the number of
vehicles as a proxy for surfacing of public roads.33
Communal services
This group of variables related to “network services” include indicators such as
waste collection, sewerage system, water supply and electricity as part of municipal
31Prieto and Zofio (2001); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2010a,b); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010); Barone and Mocetti (2011); Balaguer-Coll et al.
(2013); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Arcelus et al. (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015).
32Eeckaut et al. (1993); De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996b); Worthington (2000);
Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Ibrahim and Salleh (2006); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Geys (2006); Geys and
Moesen (2009a,b); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010); Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2010a,b); Barone and Mocetti (2011); Boetti et al. (2012); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Fogarty
and Mugera (2013); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); D’Inverno et al. (2017);
Ashworth et al. (2014); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Marques et al. (2015); Agasisti et al. (2015); Radulovic
and Dragutinovic´ (2015).
33Moore et al. (2005); Sung (2007); Giménez and Prior (2007).
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outcomes:
• Waste collection (32 papers)
The municipal waste collection and treatment of waste collected are mainly
measured as the amount of waste collected in tons, quintals or kilograms.34
Moreover, the study of Liu et al. (2011) included the volume of garbage genera-
tion measured in kilos as an undesirable output.
In addition, some studies have used the number of properties receiving domestic
waste management service or the population served to proxy for waste collection
service.35 Similarly, Geys and Moesen (2009a,b) used the share of municipal
waste picked up through door-to-door collections. Otherwise, Hayes and Chang
(1990) and Štastná and Gregor (2011, 2015) used the expenditures on waste
collection.
• Sewerage system (10 papers)
The sewerage network and cleansing of residuals water can be measured as
the number of properties receiving sewerage services36, or as the number of
sewerage connections.37 Similarly, Sung (2007) used the penetration rate of
sewage as the share of the households with sewage over all households. In
addition, the study of Da Cruz and Marques (2014) measured the waste-water
treated in thousands of cubic meters. Finally, Prieto and Zofio (2001) measured
the treated flow, the sewerage network shortage as well as the sewerage network
condition.
• Water supply (16 papers)
34Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Ibrahim and Salleh (2006); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Giménez and Prior
(2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a,b); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez
(2010); Benito et al. (2010); Barone and Mocetti (2011); Boetti et al. (2012); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013);
Pacheco et al. (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Ashworth et al. (2014); Pérez-López et al. (2015);
Agasisti et al. (2015); Cordero et al. (2017).
35Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos (1999); Worthington (2000); Moore et al. (2005); Sampaio de Sousa
et al. (2005); Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005); Benito et al. (2010); Mahabir (2014); Monkam (2014).
36Worthington (2000); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005); Pacheco
et al. (2014); Monkam (2014); Mahabir (2014).
37Marques et al. (2015).
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Different variables have been used to proxy for water supply. Some studies have
used the number of properties or consumers receiving water services.38 In a
similar way, Sung (2007) used the penetration rate of water supply measured as
the share of households with water supply over all households.
Moreover, other studies used the amount of water supplied or produced in
megalitres or thousands of cubic meters.39 In addition, Benito et al. (2010) used
the number of new connections to potable water network conduct while Pérez-
López et al. (2015) used the water network length. Finally, Prieto and Zofio
(2001) measured the treated flow, the water tanks capacity, the water distribution
net shortage as well as their quality condition.
• Electricity (3 papers)
Only three studies measure the provision of electricity by a municipality, mea-
sured as the number of consumer units or households receiving electricity.40
Parks, sports, culture and recreational facilities
In this section we include indicators related to leisure and recreational facilities that
municipalities must provide. We found five indicators:
• Sport facilities (4 papers)
This service can be measured as the surface of indoor and outdoor sporting
facilities41, or as the number of users registered in municipal sport activities.42
Štastná and Gregor (2015) also proxy the expenses related to sport clubs and
sporting events. Additionally, Prieto and Zofio (2001) measured the quality of
the sport facilities as the indoor sporting facilities condition.
38Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos (1999); Worthington (2000); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Sampaio de
Sousa and Stošic´ (2005); Moore et al. (2005); Mahabir (2014); Monkam (2014); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´
(2015).
39(Moore et al., 2005; Benito et al., 2010; Da Cruz and Marques, 2014; Marques et al., 2015; Cordero
et al., 2017).
40Dollery and van der Westhuizen (2009); Monkam (2014); Mahabir (2014).
41Prieto and Zofio (2001); Benito et al. (2010); Štastná and Gregor (2011, 2015).
42Benito et al. (2010).
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• Cultural facilities (4 papers)
This variable is used as a proxy for the expenses related to subsidies for the-
atres, cinemas, municipal museums and galleries, and the costs of monument
preservation Štastná and Gregor (2011, 2015). Additionally, Benito et al. (2010)
employed the number of visits to municipal museums and Štastná and Gregor
(2011, 2015) included the number of monuments and the number of museums
and galleries. Finally, Prieto and Zofio (2001) measured the surface of cultural
facilities as well as their quality condition.
• Libraries (4 papers)
Different variables have been used to proxy for the public library services, such
as the number of volumes in public libraries and collection turnover43, total
loans 44, and the number of library registrations or visits45.
• Parks and green areas (16 papers)
Municipal parks and green areas are mainly measured as the registered surface
area of public parks.46 Similarly, Sung (2007) used the area of urban parks per
person, Moore et al. (2005) used the acres of park space in use, Ibrahim and
Karim (2004) and Ibrahim and Salleh (2006) used the number of trees planted,
and Štastná and Gregor (2011, 2015) used nature reserves and the size of urban
green areas to reflect spending on parks maintenance.
• Recreational facilities (20 papers)
Some studies included the total surface of public recreational facilities (in
hectares) as an indicator of municipalities’ surface of parks, sports, leisure
and other recreational facilities.47 In addition, Da Cruz and Marques (2014)
43Moore et al. (2005); Benito et al. (2010)
44Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Loikkanen et al. (2011)
45Moore et al. (2005)
46Prieto and Zofio (2001); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Benito et al. (2010);
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010b, 2013);
Pacheco et al. (2014); Pérez-López et al. (2015).
47De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Coffé and Geys (2005); Geys (2006); Geys
and Moesen (2009a); Geys et al. (2010); Bönisch et al. (2011); Kalb et al. (2012); Bischoff et al. (2013);
Ashworth et al. (2014); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Lampe et al. (2015); Asatryan and De Witte (2015).
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used the variable “infrastructures” which includes cultural (municipal museums,
auditoriums, libraries and cultural and congress centres) and sports facilities
(municipal pools, sports halls, courts and race tracks) managed by municipalities,
while Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a,b, 2013) used “Public building surface area" to
proxy public libraries and public sports facilities.
Health (6 papers)
Few studies measured basic municipal services in health. Pacheco et al. (2014) captured
the provision of health services by the number of health centres, while Kutlar and
Bakirci (2012) used the number of beds in hospitals. Moreover, Loikkanen and
Susiluoto (2005) and Loikkanen et al. (2011) measured basic health care and dental
care as the number of visits and bed wards, and Moore et al. (2005) reported emergency
medical services as the response time in minutes. In addition, the study of Marques
et al. (2015) used the number of food handling premises inspected as a variable related
to community and health safety activities.
Education
The variables included in this category are related to kindergartens provision and
primary and secondary education as part of municipal outcomes:
• Kindergartens or nursery places (14 papers)
The number of students in Kindergartens is assumed to proxy for kindergarten
places facilitated by the municipality.48 In addition, Lo Storto (2013) used
the number of nursery schools, Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015) used the
number of preschool institutions, Asatryan and De Witte (2015) included “Child
population” measured as the ratio of the number of children at kindergartens
to population and D’Inverno et al. (2017) and Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013)
considered population from 0 to 5 years old proxy the services for kindergarten.
48Geys et al. (2010); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Barone and Mocetti (2011); Boetti et al. (2012); Kalb
et al. (2012); Geys et al. (2013); Štastná and Gregor (2015); Lampe et al. (2015).
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• Primary and secondary education (33 papers)
The main indicator used for the provision of education services in primary and
secondary levels is the number of students enrolled in primary and secondary
schools.49 Similarly, Asatryan and De Witte (2015) used “Pupil population”
measured as the ratio of the number of students at secondary schools to popula-
tion, while Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos (1999), Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005)
and Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005) used literate population to proxy for
educational services. Moreover, D’Inverno et al. (2017) considered the school-age
population (i.e. from 3 to 13 years old), while Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013) used
population ages from 5 to 19 to proxy for primary and secondary schools.
In addition, other variables have been employed to proxy educational service
provision. Pacheco et al. (2014) used the number of public schools in a munic-
ipality. Moreover, Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005) and Loikkanen et al. (2011)
included the number of hours of teaching in comprehensive and senior sec-
ondary schools. Also, Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015) used the number of
school institutions. Finally, Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005) and Sampaio de
Sousa and Stošic´ (2005) chose schooling variables that reflected problems of the
Brazilian education system: the enrolment per school, the student attendance
per school, the students who get promoted to the next grade per school and the
students in right grade per school.
Social services
We include as social services the indicators related to subsidence grants, care for
elderly, care for children and social organizations:
• Beneficiaries of minimal subsistence grants (12 papers)
49Eeckaut et al. (1993); De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Sampaio de Sousa
et al. (2005); Geys (2006); Coffé and Geys (2005); Geys and Moesen (2009a,b); Kalb (2010); Geys et al.
(2010); Bönisch et al. (2011); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Boetti et al. (2012); Kalb et al. (2012); Geys et al.
(2013); Bischoff et al. (2013); Ashworth et al. (2014); Pevcin (2014a,b); Pacheco et al. (2014); Štastná and
Gregor (2015); Lampe et al. (2015).
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The number of minimal subsistence grants are related to services provided to
low-income families.50 They proxy the extent of social welfare.
• Care for elderly (21 papers)
Care for elderly reflects the supply of social services to the elderly, such as
retirement or geriatric homes, general assistance for the elder, and medical
assistance in public hospitals. The main indicators to proxy for provisions for
the elderly are the number of senior citizens or the share of populations older
than 65 years.51 In addition, the studies of Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005) and
Loikkanen et al. (2011) used the days of institutional care of the elderly, while
Asatryan and De Witte (2015) used the elderly patient population as a proxy to
the capacity in public care centres.
• Care for children (4 papers)
Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005) and Loikkanen et al. (2011) measured care for
children as te days in children’s day centres and family day care. Otherwise,
Bönisch et al. (2011) and Bischoff et al. (2013) used the number of approved
places in childcare centres.
• Social services and organizations (12 papers)
Social services are considered essential for social welfare. They include areas
such as care services, education and economic subsistence. To measure the
amount of social services in a municipality, Pacheco et al. (2014) included the
variable social organizations, which registers all social organizations by munici-
pality. Moreover, Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a,b, 2013) measured the provision of
social services as the surface area of assistance centres. Sung (2007) included the
seating capacity of social welfare institutions per 100 persons. Also, Cuadrado-
Ballesteros et al. (2013) used unemployed population as a proxy for social
50Eeckaut et al. (1993); De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Geys (2006); Coffé
and Geys (2005); Geys and Moesen (2009a,b); Ashworth et al. (2014).
51Eeckaut et al. (1993); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Coffé and Geys (2005); Kalb (2010); Geys
et al. (2010); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Boetti et al. (2012); Kalb et al. (2012); Kutlar and Bakirci (2012);
Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Geys et al. (2013); Pevcin (2014a,b); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Ashworth et al.
(2014); Lampe et al. (2015); Štastná and Gregor (2015); Arcelus et al. (2015).
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services, while D’Inverno et al. (2017) included the immigrant population to
proxy the need of these people. In addition, Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015)
used the share of social protection users in total resident population Radulovic
and Dragutinovic´ (2015). Otherwise, Štastná and Gregor (2011, 2015) included
the number of homes for disabled, while Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005) and
Loikkanen et al. (2011) measure the institutional care of the handicapped as the
number of days in social centres.
Public safety (9 papers)
Public safety involves municipal police and fire services. Police services pursue the
prevention of crimes, patrolling the geographical area of the municipality, while fire
service has the objective to reduce the probability of fires and limit losses when fires
occur. Different variables have been used to proxy for public safety services. Štastná
and Gregor (2011, 2015) used a dummy for municipal police, while Hayes and Chang
(1990) used the expenditures on police and fire protection.
Moreover, Eeckaut et al. (1993) used the number of crimes registered in the munic-
ipality, and Moore et al. (2005) employed a crime index to proxy for police services.
Similarly, Benito et al. (2010) included the number of interventions and detentions
made. In addition, Barone and Mocetti (2011) and Agasisti et al. (2015) used kilometres
covered by local police, and Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013) used the number of po-
lice vehicles in circulation. Otherwise, Moore et al. (2005) used the number of civilian
fire deaths and total losses as fire protection proxies, while Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al.
(2013) included population density representing the probability of fire spreading.
Market (5 papers)
Some studies have measured the market surface area to proxy for the provision of
local markets.52 Similarly, Ibrahim and Karim (2004) and Ibrahim and Salleh (2006)
used the number of business lots and stall spaces.
52Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a,b, 2013).
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Public transport (2 papers)
Only two studies have used direct outputs for measuring public transportation,
proxied as the number of bus stations in a municipality.53
Environmental protection (5 papers)
This variable includes services related to environmental protection and regulations
in matter of health, air, soil and water protection, and nature preservation. Different
variables have been used to proxy for environmental services. Lo Storto (2013)
measured the urban ecosystem quality. Moreover, Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013)
used the number of economic activities as a proxy for health services related to
environmental protection and business regulations in matters of health and consumer
protection. Also, Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998) included the heavy industrial
area since it reflects the need to provide pollution measurement due to the heavy
industrial activities. Finally, Štastná and Gregor (2011) used the variable “Pollution
area” that includes environmentally harming areas such as built-up area and arable
land, while Liu et al. (2011) employed “Air pollution” as an undesirable output
measured by the emissions of ozone and sulfur dioxide per year.
Business development (12 papers)
Business development account for the government’s role in the need to offer infrastruc-
ture to companies. As a proxy for infrastructure and business development services,
some studies have included the number of employees paying social security contri-
butions in a municipality based on the idea tha such services are associated with
employment, i.e., the number of jobs in a municipality are correlated with the need to
provide production related to infrastructure and services.54 Otherwise, the study of
Liu et al. (2011) included the unemployment rate as an undesirable output.
In addition, Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998) included the average industrial
53Štastná and Gregor (2011, 2015).
54Geys et al. (2010); Kalb (2010); Bönisch et al. (2011); Kalb et al. (2012); Bischoff et al. (2013); Geys et al.
(2013); Pevcin (2014a,b); Asatryan and De Witte (2015); Lampe et al. (2015).
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size area to reflect the spatial concentration of industrial activities in local government,
while Arcelus et al. (2015) used the percentage of inhabitants employed in manufac-
turing due to the more industrialized is a town, the more and costlier services will be
demanded.
Quality index (5 papers)
Some studies have included a quality indicator designed to measure not only the
quantity but also the quality of the services provided, measured as a weighted average
quality and the number of physical units of each service and infrastructures.55 In
addition, Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009) also included the number of votes as a variable
to proxy the level of citizen satisfaction, and Haneda et al. (2012) used the number
of employees per 10,000 residents, since the familiarity between local government
and the residents implies that the local administration can give careful instructions to
residents.
Others (6 papers)
Finally, we include other outputs which are not classified in previous subcategories.
Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998) included the average house area as an indication
of wealth, suggesting that wealthier population would pressure municipalities to
provide more services related to recreation, the development and maintenance of
local parks, repairs and maintenance, and street lighting and cleaning. Moreover,
Grossman et al. (1999) used the aggregate market value of residential and business
property as an indicator of municipal services. They argue that if a city is generates
the highest attainable market value of aggregate property within its boundaries given
the local fiscal choices that it has made, then it is producing local government in
a technically efficient manner. In addition, Pérez-López et al. (2015) included the
municipal cemetery area to proxy for cemetery service provision.
Otherwise, two studies included variables related to local revenue to proxy for
55Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010b); Zafra-Gómez
and Muñiz-Pérez (2010).
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local service delivery. El Mehdi and Hafner (2014) used the financial autonomy,
defined as ratio of the own receipts of the municipality and its operating expenses,
while Nijkamp and Suzuki (2009) used local revenues by local governments. Finally,
Doumpos and Cohen (2014) employed the cost of services as a proxy of the value of
resources used to provide citizens with all sorts of municipality services, assuming
that the higher the net book value of assets as well as the value of goods and services
rendered, the higher the quality and the range of options offered to citizens.
2.6. Methodological approaches to include environmental variables
Municipalities face different environmental conditions in terms of social, economic, po-
litical and financial, among others. These external factors, also known as determinants
or environmental variables, can have a huge impact on the inefficiency scores because
they are beyond the control of local managers. In this context, many studies have
dealt with estimating how the contextual variables that face municipalities affect their
performance. Table 2.2 provides a review of the studies using the different approaches
to incorporate environmental variables in the efficiency estimation.
On the one hand, the empirical studies on local government efficiency which used
traditional non-parametric methodologies (such as DEA or FDH) usually include
external or environmental variables focusing on three main families of models56: the
two-stage approaches (including the semi-parametric bootstrap-based approach), the
frontier separation or meta-frontier approach and conditional models.
The first category is based on the two-stage analysis, the most popular method
used to include environmental variables in local government efficiency. The efficiency
scores are estimated in a first stage and a set of determinants are included in a second
stage, using techniques such as Tobit censored regression model, OLS (Ordinary
Least Squares) or single and double bootstrap methods (Simar and Wilson, 2007).
The multi-stage approaches assume (implicitly) a separability condition where the
operational environment would not influence the input or output levels, but only
56For a comprehensive review on methods used to include environmental variables in non-parametric
efficiency analysis see the studies of Fried et al. (2008) and De Witte and Kortelainen (2013).
45
Table 2.2: Approaches to incorporate environmental variables in the efficiency estima-
tion in local governments
A. NON-PARAMETRIC APPROACHES
1. Two stage approach
1.1. Tobit
De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996b,a); Worthington (2000); Ibrahim and Karim (2004);
Moore et al. (2005); Sung (2007); Giménez and Prior (2007); Seol et al. (2008); Afonso and Fernandes (2008);
Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Boetti et al. (2012); Monkam (2014); D’Inverno et al.
(2017); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Yusfany (2015)
1.2. OLS
De Borger and Kerstens (1996a); Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Rev-
elli and Tovmo (2007); Borge et al. (2008); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Fogarty and
Mugera (2013); Sørensen (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Andrews and Entwistle (2015)
1.3. Single and double bootstrap methods (Simar and Wilson, 2007)
Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Bönisch et al. (2011); Bischoff et al. (2013); Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013); Fog-
arty and Mugera (2013); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Ashworth et al. (2014);
Agasisti et al. (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Lo Storto (2016)
1.4. Other approaches: non-parametric Kernel regression (Nadaraya-Watson), bivariate density functions,
Generalised Least Squares, Kendall τ test, linear regression model, quantile regression
Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Benito et al. (2010); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013);
Helland and Sørensen (2015)
2. Metafrontier
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013)
3. Conditional efficiency (Cazals et al., 2002; Daraio and Simar, 2005, 2007b; Mastromarco and Simar, 2015)
Asatryan and De Witte (2015); Cordero et al. (2017)
B. PARAMETRIC APPROACHES
1. Single stage approach
Hayes and Chang (1990); Grossman et al. (1999); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Geys et al. (2010); Kalb (2010);
Štastná and Gregor (2011); Kalb et al. (2012); Boetti et al. (2012); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Geys et al.
(2013); Nakazawa (2013, 2014); Pacheco et al. (2014); Pevcin (2014a,b); Lampe et al. (2015); Štastná and Gregor
(2015); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015); Arcelus et al. (2015)
2. Two stage approach
2.1. Tobit
De Borger and Kerstens (1996a); Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Worthington (2000)
2.2. OLS
De Borger and Kerstens (1996a); Geys (2006)
46
efficiency. As observed in table 2.2, in total 17 papers used Tobit analysis in a second
stage, 12 used OLS methods and 11 bootstrapped truncated regressions.
In addition, some studies compared results from different methodologies when
they introduced determinants of efficiency in the analysis. For instance, Da Cruz
and Marques (2014) compared Tobit, OLS and double bootstrap. Also, Fogarty and
Mugera (2013) employed OLS and single bootstrap method, Athanassopoulos and
Triantis (1998) used Tobit and fuzzy k-means cluster analysis. De Borger and Kerstens
(1996a) used Tobit and OLS, Borge et al. (2008) used OLS and random effects, and
Bosch-Roca et al. (2012) used Tobit and bootstrap methods. Otherwise, the study of
Benito et al. (2010) used Kendall τ test. Finally, in contrast to previous two-stage
research studies, the studies of Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) and Nikolov and Hrovatin
(2013) used non-parametric smoothing techniques instead of econometric methods,
which focus on graphical aspects of efficiency results, while Helland and Sørensen
(2015) used linear regression and Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005) used linear regression
as well as quantile regression.
The second category refers to the frontier separation or meta-frontier approach.
It evaluates separate efficiency performance for different groups according to the
environmental characteristics (De Witte and Marques, 2009). In this context, the study
of Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013) evaluated the efficiency of Spanish municipalities after
splitting them into clusters according to the output mix, environmental conditions
and the level of powers.
The third category for including environmental factors is called conditional ef-
ficiency, based on a probabilistic formulation of the efficient process formulation.
It incorporates the operational environment by conditioning on the external char-
acteristics (Cazals et al., 2002; Daraio and Simar, 2005, 2007b). Its main advantage
is that it avoids the problem related to the separability condition from two stage
analysis. We found only one study in the literature using this technique (Asatryan and
De Witte, 2015). In addition, the study of Cordero et al. (2017) used the time-dependent
conditional frontier models recently developed by Mastromarco and Simar (2015).
On the other hand, the empirical studies which used parametric methodologies
47
to estimate local government efficiency (such as SFA) usually include environmental
variables focusing on two main families of approaches: the single-stage approach and
the two-stage analysis.
First, the single-stage approach jointly estimates the efficiency scores including
the environmental variables in one stage. As shown in table 2.2, in total 19 papers
have included environmental variables by using a single-stage approach. Second, as
commonly used with non-parametric two-stage models, the efficiency scores obtained
in a first step via parametric methodologies are regressed in a second step with a set
of determinants, using techniques such as OLS or Tobit censored regression. In fact, 3
studies used Tobit analysis in a second step and 2 used OLS.
2.7. Environmental variables
The efficiency analysis literature does not provide a clear and standard classification
of the external or environmental variables to include in the analysis. In contrast
to the study of Da Cruz and Marques (2014), who proposed a classification for the
different type of determinants, we classify the observed variables in six main categories:
social and demographic, political, financial, economic, geographical or natural and,
institutional or managerial. Table 2.3 shows the classification of the environmental
variables included.
Additionally, we notice that in many cases the effects of the determinants present
ambiguous effects over efficiency, i.e., results from different studies are mixed. These
unclear effects can be explained by the different characteristics of each country and
the availability of data. We discuss every single variable used, describing the results
shown in previous studies and the expected impact of each variable over efficiency.
Table A.4 in the appendix A also summarises the studies containing the variables
included in the proposed classification, using the same structure as the main text.
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Table 2.3: Classification of non-discretionary variables considered on local gov-
ernments efficiency
Category Variables
1. Social and demographic
determinants
Population density
Population growth
Population size
Age distribution population
(Share of young people, Share of retired people, Aging index)
Education level
Immigration share and Ethnic diversity
Share of homeowners
Other related social and demographic characteristics
2. Economic determinants
Unemployment
Citizen’s income or purchasing power
Economic status
Tourism
Commercial activity
Industrial activity
Other related economic characteristics
3. Political determinants
Ideological position
Political concentration/fragmentation and strength
(Herfindahl index, Coalition parties, Majority, Strength)
Voter turnout and potential electors
Re-election and number of years for elections
Other related politic characteristics
4. Financial determinants
Self-generated revenues
Transfers or grants
Debt or financial liabilities
Fiscal surplus
Infrastructure investments
Other related financial characteristics
5. Geographical and
natural determinants
Distance from the centre and localization effects
Area
Type of municipalities
(Sea, Mountain)
Other related to geographical or natural characteristics
6. Institutional and
management determi-
nants
Informatization or level of computer usage
Mayor and local government employees characteristics
Amalgamation
Managerial forms
(Municipal cooperation, Externalization, Mixed firms, Agentification)
Other related to institutional or management characteristics
49
2.7.1. Social and demographic determinants
This group of environmental variables is composed by citizens’ related characteristics.
It is explained by eight indicators: population density, population growth, population
size, age distribution of the population, education level, share of immigrants, share of
homeowners and others.
• Population density (37 papers)
The population density is measured as the number of inhabitants of each munic-
ipality divided by its extension, mostly expressed in squared kilometres. Based
on previous empirical studies, the influence of this variable is not, a priori, clear
and we have alternative hypothesis on the effect that population density has on
efficiency. On the one hand, it affects the cost of providing public services, i.e.,
economies of scale could exist when population concentration rises (cost advan-
tages). Hence, it would enhance efficiency.57 Moreover, some studies included
“urbanization rate” as a variable to capture scale effects.58 They suggested that
an increase in the urbanization rate leads to higher levels of efficiency. Similarly,
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013) used the total surface area divided by population as a
proxy for urban sprawl as well as urbanised municipalities.
On the other hand, if the population concentration is larger, the cost of providing
public services can become higher (problems of agglomeration and higher
complexity). Thus, the provision of the service would be less efficient.59 However,
there are also research studies which found that population density is not
statically significant.60 Additionally, the studies of Kalseth and Rattsø (1995)
and Revelli and Tovmo (2007) introduced the variable “settlement pattern”,
57De Borger and Kerstens (1996a); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Sung (2007); Afonso and Fernandes
(2008); Geys et al. (2010); Kalb (2010); Bönisch et al. (2011); Boetti et al. (2012); Fogarty and Mugera
(2013); Bischoff et al. (2013); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Yusfany (2015); Agasisti et al. (2015); Radulovic and
Dragutinovic´ (2015); Lo Storto (2016).
58Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Bruns and
Himmler (2011).
59Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Geys (2006); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Kalb et al. (2012); Geys
et al. (2013); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Lampe et al. (2015).
60Giménez and Prior (2007); Revelli and Tovmo (2007); Revelli (2010); Ashworth et al. (2014); Pevcin
(2014a,b); Arcelus et al. (2015); Andrews and Entwistle (2015); Cordero et al. (2017).
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calculated as the travelling distance to the administration centre of the local
authority, to measure sparseness of population. The first study found that a
decentralized settlement pattern seems not to be an important factor, while the
second suggested that more sparsely populated areas manage to attain higher
levels of efficiency.
• Population growth (6 papers)
Total population growth is the variation of inhabitants (in percentage) which
municipalities face over the years. If the population growth is high, munici-
palities must increase local services and infrastructures proportionally because
population’s demand has also increased. If they do it properly, efficiency levels
would improve. For instance, Afonso and Fernandes (2008) showed a positive
and significant relation with efficiency—but only in the North Region of Por-
tugal. In contrast, if they do not keep pace with the proportional increase of
services and infrastructures, they might face an imbalance and we will expect
a negative relation with efficiency.61 Otherwise, some studies concluded that a
demographic change does not cause significant efficiency effects.62
• Population size (24 papers)
Population size is mostly measured as the total population for each local gov-
ernment as well as dummy variables representing different population groups.
The effect of this variable over efficiency is, a priori, ambiguous. A common
intuition is that economies of scale and agglomeration externalities typically
make larger municipalities more efficient.63 However, the negative effects of
having a larger population (scale inefficiencies) were also confirmed by some
studies.64 Otherwise, results in the study of Doumpos and Cohen (2014) did not
61Kalseth and Rattsø (1995); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013).
62Bönisch et al. (2011); Bischoff et al. (2013); Monkam (2014); Andrews and Entwistle (2015).
63De Borger et al. (1994); Kalseth and Rattsø (1995); Grossman et al. (1999); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007);
Giménez and Prior (2007); Benito et al. (2010); Revelli (2010); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Boetti et al.
(2012); Nakazawa (2013); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Nakazawa (2014); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Asatryan
and De Witte (2015).
64Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Sung (2007); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Štastná and Gregor (2011);
Loikkanen et al. (2011); Sørensen (2014); Ashworth et al. (2014); Štastná and Gregor (2015).
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follow a linear pattern (the coefficient was negative for small municipalities and
positive for medium and large municipalities). Finally, Andrews and Entwistle
(2015) did not find population size related to efficiency.
• Age distribution of the population (10 papers)
The different age distribution of the population can have an impact on the
different needs that local governments have to satisfy. Mainly, two variables are
included: share of young people (18 years old or below) and share of retired
people (over 65 old). First, higher percentages of young population demand
higher levels of social and recreational services to the public administrations
(for instance, kindergartens, gyms or playing fields among others), so there
is an incentive for municipal administrators to improve efficiency.65 However,
this higher spending on public services could also affect efficiency negatively.66
Other studies found the share of young population not statistically significant.67
Second, retired people could have higher control over council performance
because they take part in organizations of local nature.68 However, the share of
retired people over population could have a negative effect since this population
group is more likely to use health care and nursing services.69 Otherwise, some
studies concluded that the share of retired people has no statistical significance.70
Finally, the study of Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015) included an “ageing
index”, i.e., a ratio between the number of people over 65 and the number of
people under 18, while Andrews and Entwistle (2015) included the age diversity.
Only Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015) found significant results, showing a
negative relation between the age index ratio and efficiency.
• Education level (17 papers)
Education level includes primary, secondary and tertiary education. On the
65Agasisti et al. (2015).
66Nakazawa (2013, 2014).
67Giménez and Prior (2007); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Asatryan and De Witte (2015).
68Bosch-Roca et al. (2012).
69Bönisch et al. (2011); Bischoff et al. (2013); Nakazawa (2013, 2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014).
70Giménez and Prior (2007); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Agasisti et al. (2015).
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one hand, highly educated citizens might be more effective in demanding more
efficient governments since education has an effect on political participation and
control. Moreover, municipalities with larger proportion of educated people
may imply a more qualified labour force. Therefore, it would have a positive
correlation with efficiency.71 Moreover, the study Da Cruz and Marques (2014)
found that higher illiteracy is related to inefficiency.
In contrast, the studies of De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) and Štastná and
Gregor (2011, 2015) showed a negative correlation with efficiency. Finally, some
the studies found that the education level is not related to local government
efficiency.72
• Immigration share and ethnic diversity (7 papers)
The share of immigrants is the percentage of foreign inhabitants related to the
total population of a municipality. This variable is assumed to decrease cost
efficiency because foreign population does not have right to vote73 or are less
interested in politics74. In addition, the study of Lampe et al. (2015) introduces
the migration rate (measured as the immigration rate less the migration rate)
to measure the municipality’s popularity. They found that migration rate is
positively correlated to efficiency since it increases the population and the
services of a municipality in a short term, while expenditures will not increase
in the same proportion (in the respective year).
Otherwise, Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013) studied “ethnic fragmentation”, arguing
that more ethnically fragmented municipalities exhibit less efficiency. Similarly,
Revelli (2010) and Andrews and Entwistle (2015) included indicators of ethnic
composition (percentage of the population that is white) and ethnic diversity (16
groups), concluding that higher ethnic diversity has a negative correlation with
71De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996b); Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Afonso and
Fernandes (2008); Revelli (2010); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Monkam (2014);
Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015).
72Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Bosch-Roca et al.
(2012).
73Bosch-Roca et al. (2012).
74Bruns and Himmler (2011).
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efficiency. Also, Hayes and Chang (1990) used the percentage of the population
that is minority, however they did not find significant correlation with efficiency.
• Share of home-owners (3 papers)
Share of home-owners represents the amount of owner-occupiers over local gov-
ernment population. Home-ownership entails a significant financial investment,
so home-owners demand more efficient government behaviour and monitor
local politicians.75 Otherwise, the study of Geys and Moesen (2009a) did not
find significant relation to local government efficiency.
• Other determinants related to social and demographic characteristics
Finally, we include other determinants related to social and demographic char-
acteristics which are not classified in the previous subcategories. Agasisti et al.
(2015) included the number of families, suggesting that the more families within
the municipality, the more services different from the essential ones will be
asked, so it has a positive correlation with efficiency. Moreover, Bruns and
Himmler (2011) included the average household size as well as the commuter
share, however they did not find significant results. Nakazawa (2013) included
the ratio of daytime to night-time population, which had negative effects over
efficiency, and Revelli (2010) used the share of disabled workers but they did not
find significant results.
In addition, Andrews and Entwistle (2015) included the social class diversity
(however, they did not find significant results). Lo Storto (2016) and Da Cruz and
Marques (2014) included the crime rate, suggesting that when the level of urban
crimes grow, the municipality efficiency increases. Finally, Revelli (2010) and
Bruns and Himmler (2011) included the share of religious population. While the
first study suggested that religious people are associated with better government
performance, the second one argued that a higher share of religious population
is associated with lower levels of efficiency since they are possibly less interested
in local politics.
75Hayes and Chang (1990); Geys (2006).
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2.7.2. Economic determinants
This group of environmental variables is composed by variables related to the eco-
nomic situation of each local government. It is explained by seven indicators: unem-
ployment, citizen’s disposable income, economic status, tourist index, commercial
activity, industrial activity and others.
• Unemployment (15 papers)
The variable unemployment is measured as the percentage of unemployment re-
lated to the working population of each municipality. A difficult socio-economic
municipal situation (i.e., a high unemployment rate) implies higher spending on
social and housing benefits, so it tends to decrease efficiency (“cost effect”).76
However, unemployment could imply lower demand for high-cost or high-
quality public services (“preference effect”), so it will be expected to have higher
levels of efficiency.77 Other studies indicated that unemployment is not related
to municipal efficiency.78
• Citizen’s income level or purchasing power (26 papers)
The variable income per capita represents the citizen’s economic level estimated
for each municipality. On the one hand, municipalities which have richer local
residents have an increased population pressure to provide efficient local services.
These higher-income citizens might pay greater taxes and, as a consequence,
they will have more requirements on local services and facilities. Therefore,
higher citizen’s incomes would increase efficiency.79 Similarly, Agasisti et al.
(2015) used a taxable income per capita (a progressive tax on all the income
of a person called IRPEF) as a proxy of the average income per capita. The
higher it is, the more citizens’ supervision on municipal administrators, so it is
76Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Revelli (2010); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Kalb et al. (2012); Pevcin
(2014a,b); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015).
77Geys et al. (2010); Kalb (2010); Lampe et al. (2015).
78Geys and Moesen (2009a); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Bönisch et al. (2011); Geys et al. (2013);
Cordero et al. (2017).
79Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Afonso and Fernandes (2008); Afonso et al. (2010); Boetti et al. (2012);
Asatryan and De Witte (2015).
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positively related to efficiency. Also, Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013) and Da Cruz and
Marques (2014) proxied the economic status with the capita GDP, however, only
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013) found a positive relation with efficiency.
On the other hand, if local governments have higher financial resources (because
they collect higher incomes), interest of the politicians in reaching efficiency
in the provision of local services and facilities is reduced. In addition, citizens
from high income municipalities may be less motivated to monitor expenditures.
So, it would be negatively related to efficiency.80 In a similar way, Cuadrado-
Ballesteros et al. (2013) measured income level using the variable GDP per
capita, and their results present a negative correlation with efficiency. Other
studies concluded that citizen’s income did not have a significant relation with
efficiency.81
Additionally, Geys and Moesen (2009a) and Ashworth et al. (2014) included
“income inequality” to assess the effect of income heterogeneity in the population.
Only Ashworth et al. (2014) found negative significant results.
• Municipal economic situation (6 papers)
The determinants within this subcategory refer to variables related to the eco-
nomic situation of each municipality. Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005) used the
average earnings as a poverty proxy as well as a dummy variable for those
municipalities which took part in the Alvorada Program (a federal program for
low income municipalities). They found that poor cities, specially those partici-
pating in the Alvorada Program, tend to be more efficient. Similarly, Lo Storto
(2016) used the value added per inhabitant as a proxy of the economical context,
suggesting that higher efficiency is associated to less rich contexts. Otherwise,
Revelli (2010) and Andrews and Entwistle (2015) included a deprivation index
to capture the levels of disadvantage in: income, employment, health, education,
80De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Sampaio de
Sousa et al. (2005); Giménez and Prior (2007); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Nikolov
and Hrovatin (2013); Monkam (2014); Ashworth et al. (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014).
81Geys (2006); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Benito et al. (2010); Yusfany
(2015); Cordero et al. (2017).
56
housing, crime, and environment. They showed a negative relationship with
efficiency, indicating that providing public services in disadvantaged areas is an
especially challenging task. Fogarty and Mugera (2013) measured the relative
socio-economic disadvantage. They hypothesised that councils with higher
socio-economic disadvantage would have lower efficiency scores, however, they
do not find significant results. Finally, Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013) included the
number of bank branches to proxy for the economic level of the municipality.
• Tourist activity (13 papers)
Tourism measures the importance of the tourist activity of each municipality. On
the one hand, seasonal population has an impact on the provision of services
because local governments must face higher investments during some periods
of the year. Moreover, tourists have a greater demand for higher quality public
services that increase the costs. Hence, we will expect that an increase in the
tourist index has a negative correlation with efficiency.82 On the other hand,
Giménez and Prior (2007) and Pérez-López et al. (2015) found a positive relation
between this variable and efficiency, concluding that the more tourism activity,
the lower the cost excess. Finally, some studies found that tourism is not
statistically significant.83
• Commercial activity (4 papers)
This variable measures the importance of the commercial activity of each munic-
ipality. High commercial activity means more pressure over local managers to
improve efficiency because traders exercise more control. Therefore, we expect a
positive relation to efficiency.84 However, Sung (2007) showed that an increase in
the number of establishments and service-related establishments may reduce
efficiency since more time and effort by local servants is required.
82Geys and Moesen (2009a); Kalb (2010); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Kalb et al. (2012); Cuadrado-
Ballesteros et al. (2013); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Da Cruz and Marques (2014).
83Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Benito et al. (2010); Lampe et al.
(2015).
84Giménez and Prior (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012).
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• Industrial activity (2 papers)
This variable measures the importance of industrial activity of each municipality.
We can hypothesize that more efficient municipalities will attract business, so it
will enhance efficiency.85 On the contrary, the study of Giménez and Prior (2007)
concluded that the industry activity has no relation with efficiency.
• Other determinants related to economic characteristics
Finally, we include other determinants related to economic characteristics which
are not classified in the previous subcategories. Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005)
measured the municipalities that receive substantial royalty revenues (on oil
and water), suggesting that extra revenues, rather than encouraging the optimal
use of resources, contribute to increase inefficiency. Moreover, the study of
Revelli (2010) included the percentage of self-employed population, which had a
negative correlation with efficiency. Also, Revelli (2010) included the property
tax base to capture income effects on the demand for public services, which were
estimated to have a positive effect on performance. Otherwise, Balaguer-Coll et al.
(2013) and Geys and Moesen (2009a) indicated whether it is a rural municipality
(whose needs might differ from others with different sectoral specializations),
while Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013) also included municipalities where construction
was higher. Finally, Da Cruz and Marques (2014) included the automotive fuel
consumed and new vehicles sold as a measure for the economic consumption
levels, showing a positive correlation with efficiency.
2.7.3. Political determinants
We have focused on the impact of political and legal determinants on efficiency
including five indicators: ideological position, political concentration/fragmentation
or strength, voter turnout, re-election and others.
• Ideological position (26 papers)
85Geys and Moesen (2009a).
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The ideological position represents local governments’ political sign. The basic
hypothesis is that left-wing parties prefer a larger public sector which, in general,
is associated with low efficiency levels.86 Similarly, the study of Sørensen (2014)
concluded that electoral polarization (distance between the socialist and non-
socialist party blocs) cause lower government performance. Moreover, Geys
(2006) and Štastná and Gregor (2015) introduced measures for the ideological
fragmentation of the governing coalition. Only Štastná and Gregor (2015) found
significant evidence, concluding that the strength of a left-wing mayor seems to
further increase cost inefficiency.
However, the available evidence is not entirely uni-directional, since the studies
of De Borger et al. (1994) and De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b) concluded that
the presence of the socialist party is associated with higher efficiency. Similarly,
Andrews and Entwistle (2015) suggested that Labour vote shares are positively
related to productive efficiency, suggesting that whether is a greater support
to public services, local authorities may find less difficult to make the best use
of their resources. Also the studies of Geys et al. (2010) and Agasisti et al.
(2015) concluded that a low share of left-wing parties is associated with lower
efficiency. Other studies, however, concluded that the ideological position did
not have a significant influence on efficiency.87 Additionally, Boetti et al. (2012)
and Bruns and Himmler (2011) measured governing coalitions with a civic list,
which are not identified with any ideological position and are associated with
higher efficiency, while Štastná and Gregor (2011) introduced a dummy for
parliamentary parties (less votes for parliamentary parties implies more votes
for local parties with no ideology).
• Political concentration/fragmentation and political strength (25 papers)
Most part of the studies which measure political concentration in local govern-
86Revelli and Tovmo (2007); Borge et al. (2008); Kalb (2010); Revelli (2010); Štastná and Gregor (2011);
Loikkanen et al. (2011); Kalb et al. (2012); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014);
Ashworth et al. (2014); Helland and Sørensen (2015).
87Geys and Moesen (2009a); Benito et al. (2010); Boetti et al. (2012); Sørensen (2014); Asatryan and
De Witte (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Cordero et al. (2017).
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ment calculate the Herfindahl index. It takes values between 0 and 1, indicating
a higher degree of political concentration (or a lower degree of political fragmen-
tation) and, as a result, a higher degree of political strength (or lower degree
of competition). On the one hand, when the degree of political concentration
is higher, there exist a lower political opposition and it is easier to implement
policies and impose budget constraints, so it is expected to increase efficiency.88
On the other hand, a low political competition makes more difficult to other
parties to control expenditures and therefore efficiency can be reduced.89 Finally,
some studies found no statistical significance.90
In addition, other variables related to political concentration and strength dif-
ferent from the Herfindahl index have been used. For instance, De Borger et al.
(1994) introduced the number of coalition parties, while Ashworth et al. (2014)
introduced variables reflecting different aspects of the local government competi-
tion as well as the variables “single party government” and “number of coalition
parties” to capture the effect of government fragmentation. The first study
argues that political coalitions may affect technical efficiency because arbitrage
in the bargaining process may require more payments, however, they did not
find significant results. The second one found that government fragmentation
and coalitions have a significant negative correlation with efficiency. Similarly,
Eeckaut et al. (1993) measured political majorities from different parties as well
as coalitions, concluding that local governments with multiple-party coalitions
are more efficient than municipalities governed by a single party. Otherwise, the
studies of Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998) and Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013)
measured the coalition between central government and local government, while
the study of Pacheco et al. (2014) used the percentage of council representatives
who belongs to the governmental coalition. The first two studies presented
contrary results, leading Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998) to lower levels of
88Revelli and Tovmo (2007); Borge et al. (2008); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Štastná and Gregor (2011);
Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Pacheco et al. (2014); Yusfany (2015).
89Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Geys et al. (2010); Kalb (2010); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Kalb et al. (2012);
Geys et al. (2013); Helland and Sørensen (2015).
90Geys (2006); Revelli (2010); Sørensen (2014).
60
efficiency and the Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013) to higher levels, while Pacheco
et al. (2014) did not show significant results.
In addition, Sørensen (2014) included “electoral dominance” as the share of
election periods wherein a party bloc received more than 60% of the votes.
They concluded that party competition leads to higher levels of efficiency. Also,
Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013) introduced variables reflecting different aspects
of the local government competition (difference between the percentages of
votes obtained by the parties coming in first and second place) as well as
political strength (percentage of seats obtained by the governing party). Similarly,
Pérez-López et al. (2015) introduced “political strength”, concluding that parties
governing with an absolute majority present lower levels of efficiency. Finally,
the study of Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) found a negative correlation between
efficiency and the relative importance of votes held by the governing party, while
Monkam (2014) revealed a positive coefficient of the percentage of council seats
held by the majority.
• Voter turnout and democratic participation (9 papers)
The variable voter turnout represents the political participation of the citizens
in local elections, i.e., the voter turnout related to the citizens entitled to vote.
This variable affects the degree of control that inhabitants have over politicians
with their votes in local elections, so we expect an improvement in the efficiency
of the municipalities.91 However, results in Da Cruz and Marques (2014) and
Asatryan and De Witte (2015) suggested a negative correlation with efficiency,
supporting that less efficient governments motivate more citizen participation.
Finally, some studies concluded that voter turnout do not explain efficiency
differences.92
Moreover, additional variables related to democratic participation are considered.
Bosch-Roca et al. (2012) and Geys et al. (2010) employed the variable “potential
electors” (citizens entitled to vote related to total population), which is expected
91Borge et al. (2008); Geys et al. (2010); Štastná and Gregor (2011, 2015).
92Revelli and Tovmo (2007); Loikkanen et al. (2011).
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to increase efficiency. Moreover, Geys et al. (2010) included the variable “free
voter unions” as an indicator of voter involvement, arguing that their existence
improves efficiency since citizens actively participate in politics. Finally, Asatryan
and De Witte (2015) considered dummies for citizens initiatives, associated with
higher government efficiency.
• Re-election and number of years for elections (5 papers)
Re-election or second mandate represents a municipal mayor that has been re-
elected at the municipal elections. Similarly, “new government” represents when
a different government has been elected. On the one hand, re-election can have
a positive effect on efficiency because at the second mandate the municipality’s
government has become more competent on local issues. On the other hand, in
a second mandate local administrators could tend to spend in a less prudent
manner, since they have been elected again.93 Other studies found re-election
not statistically significant.94
In addition, variables related to the number of years for elections are considered.
Boetti et al. (2012) used the variable “electoral mandate” which represents the
number of years since the mayor and the governing coalition were elected,
in order to test the presence of opportunistic behaviour by local politicians
attributable to the electoral budget cycle, however they did not find significant
results. Similarly, Agasisti et al. (2015) measured the years that remain until the
end of municipal term, which is positively related to efficiency.
• Other determinants related to political characteristics
Finally, we include other determinants related to political characteristics which
are not classified in the previous subcategories. Bruns and Himmler (2011)
introduced the number of municipality council seats per 1,000 inhabitants, which
was found positively related to efficiency. They also included local newspaper
reach, which is associated with higher efficiency, arguing that newspapers are
93D’Inverno et al. (2017).
94Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014).
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a major provider of the political information that voters use to monitor their
elected officials. Moreover, Grossman et al. (1999) included both the Mayor-
council form of government and Mayor elected in a general election, however,
they showed no significant results. Finally, Helland and Sørensen (2015) included
the variables “partisan bias” (voters that vote for party labels and do not care
about performance) and “electoral volatility”. Their main hypothesis is that
non-partisans want better performance and care little about ideology, while
partisans vote for labels and care little about high performance. They found that
efficiency decreases when the relative partisan bias of the incumbent increases,
particularly in municipalities with large electoral volatility.
2.7.4. Financial determinants
We have included a group of environmental variables related to fiscal and financing
mechanisms of the local governments. It is explained by five indicators: self-generated,
grants and transfers, debt or financial liabilities, surplus and others.
• Self-generated revenues (25 papers)
Self-generated revenues are the total amount of taxes, fees and charges collected
by each local government. On the one hand, when local councils are more able
to generate revenues (by collecting higher taxes), politicians are less motivated
to manage them properly. Moreover, these local governments will have good
services even if they are not efficient. As a consequence, this variable would
have a negative correlation with efficiency.95 Similarly, Agasisti et al. (2015)
measured the incidence of the proceeds of public services suggesting that higher
revenues different from taxes influence negatively the efficiency of the local
administrations. Moreover, D’Inverno et al. (2017) used the ratio of total revenues
over total resident population arguing that the more resources are available for a
municipality, the greater is the possibility to waste resources. On the other hand,
95Grossman et al. (1999); Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Moore et al. (2005); Balaguer-Coll et al.
(2007); Revelli and Tovmo (2007); Sung (2007); Borge et al. (2008); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Štastná
and Gregor (2011); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Boetti et al. (2012); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Ashworth
et al. (2014); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Štastná and Gregor (2015).
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higher taxes will increase citizen control on public management, so it will be
expected better levels of efficiency.96 Other studies showed that tax revenues are
not correlated with efficiency.97
Additionally, some studies used the share of own taxes in local governments’
total revenues as a proxy of fiscal autonomy.98 They found that fiscal autonomy
has a positive correlation with efficiency supporting that the higher the revenues
from fees and taxes (i.e., from citizens contribution), the higher the responsibility
of the local government.
• Transfers or grants (26 papers)
Transfers or grants represent the municipal revenues which come from transfers
or grants received from higher government levels. Also, the financial inde-
pendence from central governments (i.e., less transfers and grants received) is
employed. Local governments which have greater security in obtaining resources
via grants are less efficient because politicians will take less care in managing
them adequately. Moreover, there will be less citizen control over public man-
agement because the cost of inefficient performance is shared by regional and
national taxpayers (i.e., they do not pay these revenues directly). Hence, we will
expect a negative correlation with efficiency.99
On the contrary, some studies showed a positive association with efficiency,
explaining that transfers and grants are linked to a more accurate control of
local expenditures by higher levels of government control.100 Moreover, Bischoff
et al. (2013) found that the relationship between vertical grants and efficiency is
mixed, since they found a positive relationship between grants and efficiency
96De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Benito et al. (2010).
97Fogarty and Mugera (2013); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Arcelus et al. (2015); Yusfany (2015).
98Boetti et al. (2012); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Monkam (2014); D’Inverno et al. (2017).
99De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Grossman et al. (1999);
Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Borge et al. (2008); Balaguer-Coll and Prior
(2009); Geys et al. (2010); Kalb (2010); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Pacheco et al.
(2014); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Yusfany
(2015); Agasisti et al. (2015); Štastná and Gregor (2015).
100Worthington (2000); Geys (2006); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Bönisch et al. (2011); Ashworth et al.
(2014).
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but a negative one between fiscal capacity and efficiency. Finally, some studies
indicated that transfer grants have no statistical significance.101
• Debt or financial liabilities (14 papers)
Outstanding debt is the value of the financial unresolved liabilities at the financial
year. When local governments have an excess on expenditures over revenues they
will need to take out loans. The first hypothesis is that local governments which
make loans are those with low fiscal revenue capacity. These local governments
might be more concerned about cost saving due to their financial problems.
Moreover, debt can be the result of past investments on equipment that enhance
current efficiency. Therefore, considering these reasons, debt would be positively
related to efficiency.102
On the contrary, if the amount of local government debt is higher, there will be
more resources employed to attend debt interests and amortization payments
and, as a consequence, less resources will be employed in the provision of local
services. Hence, the variable would be negatively related to efficiency.103 Other
studies showed that debt is not statically significant.104 In addition, Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2007) consider also financial deficit. If deficit rises, local governments will
have a financial weaker situation to face their present and future responsibilities.
Hence, deficit affects negatively to efficiency.
• Surplus (6 papers)
Fiscal surplus is the excess from the year’s budget. The main hypothesis is that
municipalities that have higher surpluses have better financial performance and
also witness higher government efficiency ratings.105 Similarly, Pérez-López
et al. (2015) used the “Non-financial Current Budgetary result Index”, which
101Worthington (2000); Boetti et al. (2012).
102Worthington (2000); Benito et al. (2010).
103Geys (2006); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Bönisch et al. (2011); Bischoff et al.
(2013); Ashworth et al. (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Cordero et al. (2017).
104Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Revelli and Tovmo (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Benito et al.
(2010); Pérez-López et al. (2015).
105Geys (2006); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Ashworth et al. (2014); Agasisti et al. (2015).
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presented a positive and significant relationship with municipal cost efficiency.
On the contrary, Yusfany (2015) showed a negative and significant correlation
between surplus and efficiency, stating that local bureaucrats in every year’s
budget tend to maximize the size of the budget in order to create opportunities
to take advantage of local budgets freely according to his personal wishes.
• Infrastructure investments (7 papers)
Infrastructure investments and capital expenditures aim at measuring the effect
of a higher level of investments on the use of the financial means. High capital
investment in a given year encourages cost savings on current expenditures.
Therefore, higher investment expenditure would increase municipal efficiency.106
Similarly, Arcelus et al. (2015) considered that municipalities with higher accu-
mulated past investments in infrastructures are expected to have more modern
endowments and, therefore, more efficient performance. On the contrary, the
study of Štastná and Gregor (2011) found a negative correlation with efficiency.
Moreover, Agasisti et al. (2015) included the variables “propensity to invest per
capita” and “incidence of capital expenditures on total expenditures”. They
found that investment was negatively correlated with efficiency, while capital
was positively since municipalities exposed to long-term expenditures would be
more careful managing the current ones.
Additionally, Doumpos and Cohen (2014) employed the annual depreciation to
cumulative depreciation ratio as an indicator of the assets’ age. The higher the
value of the ratio, the newer the infrastructure used for rendering services to
citizens. They found a statistically significant positive correlation, arguing that
new assets have less maintenance and less operating expenses compared to their
older counterparts.
• Other determinants related to financial characteristics
Finally, we include other determinants related to financial characteristics which
are not classified in the previous subcategories. Kalb (2010) included dummy
106Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Pacheco et al. (2014); Štastná and Gregor (2015).
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variables for abundant and financially weak municipalities to control for financial
power of a municipality. Both variables are positive and statistically significant,
supporting that abundant or financially weak municipalities have (in relation
to financially very weak municipalities) more money to spend and it enables to
afford more or qualitatively higher public goods and services. Pérez-López et al.
(2015) introduced the variable “cash index”. They concluded that the greater the
availability of resources, the more efficiency requirements will be relaxed since
municipalities can cover their cost increases. Benito et al. (2010) used working
capital as an indicator of the local government short-term financial situation.
Moreover, Andrews and Entwistle (2015) included the Formula Spending Share
(FSS) per resident was used as a measure of quantity of service needs (this index
is used by central government to distribute grant funding to local authorities),
as well as the discretionary resources available to each local authority, derived
by dividing its total expenditure by its FSS in the same year. They concluded
that councils spending beyond the needs of a local population could be seen
as an indicator of poor financial performance. Revelli (2010) used the excess
spending defined as local public spending per capita minus standard spending
per capita set by central government. They suggested that local public expendi-
tures in excess of centrally set spending standards have a detrimental effect on
performance. Otherwise, Da Cruz and Marques (2014) and Agasisti et al. (2015)
measured the average payment period to suppliers an the speed of payment
of current expenditures. Only Da Cruz and Marques (2014) found significant
negative results. Finally, Worthington (2000) showed that the higher the level
of current assets and current assets relative to current liabilities, the higher the
level of technical efficiency.
In addition, some studies included variables related to financial constraints.
Boetti et al. (2012) included the effect of the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP), a
mechanism of fiscal discipline which leads to cuts in excess spending. They
found that municipalities subject to the DSP are more efficient due to the higher
control from central government on spending through fiscal rules. Also, Borge
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et al. (2008) included a dummy variable for centralized budgetary procedure,
which was found to be correlated with low efficiency. Finally, Doumpos and
Cohen (2014) introduced the administrative expenses to own revenues ratio to
assess the burden imposed to municipalities by their administrative costs. They
found that municipalities which spend more funds to sustain their bureaucracy
status are less efficient.
2.7.5. Geographical or natural determinants
This group of environmental variables is related to geographical, spatial or natural
characteristics. It is explained by four indicators: distance from centre, area, type of
municipality and others.
• Distance from centre and localization effects (11 papers)
This variable measures the geographical distance of the municipality from
the regional or district centre. The main hypothesis is that the smaller the
distance between the municipality and the centre, the higher the competition
between municipalities. Also the access to local public goods provided by the
region gets easier. Hence, municipalities closer to the centre would be more
efficient.107 However, Štastná and Gregor (2015) found that proximity to the
regional centre increases efficiency, while distance to district centre has the
opposite sign. Otherwise, there are also studies which found that distance from
the centre is not statically significant.108
Otherwise, the study of Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005) used the variable “capital”
as a location aspect, arguing that there is a clear efficiency premium for state
capitals since those cities tend to present higher efficiency scores relative to other
localities with similar characteristics. Similarly, Andrews and Entwistle (2015)
introduced a dichotomous variable for local authorities within London, however
they did not find significant results. Moreover, Grossman et al. (1999) introduced
107Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Afonso and Fernandes (2008); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Štastná and
Gregor (2011); Pacheco et al. (2014).
108Boetti et al. (2012).
68
the number of cities in city’s metropolitan statistical area. They found that a
greater number of cities in a central city’s metropolitan area increase competition
and, as a consequence, more technically efficient is the central city. Finally, the
study of Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015) introduced the variable “distance to
Route E75 (Motorway A1)” as a location factor, supporting that municipalities
closer to the E75 would be more efficient.
• Area (5 papers)
Some studies included the size of local government area measured in squared
kilometres. The main hypothesis is that larger areas would have higher costs
of infrastructure services. Moreover, smaller administrative areas also tend
to be easily managed than bigger ones. So, it is expected to have a negative
correlation with efficiency.109 Other studies found that city size is not significant
in explaining efficiency.110
• Type of municipality (5 papers)
It comprises natural geographical factors that affect the level of municipal effi-
ciency, such as sea, mountain or municipalities located in islands. The first group
relates to coastal or sea variables. Coastal municipalities are better able to achieve
higher levels of economic efficiency due to their higher levels of development
and their greater ability to increase tax receipts. So, a coastal location would
have a positive relation to efficiency.111 However, the sea municipalities can be
subject to seasonality, which could have a negative correlation with efficiency.112
In addition, Da Cruz and Marques (2014) included a dummy variable to differ-
ence municipalities located in islands as well as municipalities located in the
mainland near the coast (littoral area). They argue that municipalities located in
islands have higher costs when providing some public services and equipment
because of its natural constraint, however they showed a positive correlation
109Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Sung (2007); Nakazawa (2013); Da Cruz and Marques (2014).
110Moore et al. (2005).
111Cordero et al. (2017).
112D’Inverno et al. (2017).
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with efficiency, explaining that in the Portuguese islands there exists a regional
government that substitutes the municipality in some of their responsibilities.
The second group relates to mountain or hill variables. The main hypothesis is
that municipalities located in the mountain have higher spending levels than
non-mountain municipalities, so it is negatively correlated with efficiency.113
Similarly, Boetti et al. (2012) found the same results using a dummy for altitude
over 600 meters. Otherwise, Da Cruz and Marques (2014) included the variable
topography (difference between the maximum and minimum altitude) and
Agasisti et al. (2015) used the geographical conformation as the range of altitude
mountains, however neither studies found significant results.
• Other determinants related to geographical or natural determinants characteris-
tics
Finally, we include other determinants related to geographical or natural char-
acteristics which are not classified in the previous subcategories. Sampaio de
Sousa et al. (2005) introduced spatial correlation effects showing the relevance of
the neighbourhood in the spatial distribution of the efficiency scores. They found
positive spatial correlation, thus indicating that higher efficiency levels tend to
spread out to the surrounding localities. Also, Arcelus et al. (2015) included a
dummy for the municipalities located in the north of the territory, however it
was not significant.
Otherwise, Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005) also found that municipalities located
in drought areas were less efficient than their counterparts in more clement areas
since these municipalities have more difficulties to provide the required public
services to their population. Agasisti et al. (2015) introduced a dummy variable
to measure the seismic risk. They concluded that lower seismic risk reduces the
expenditures of the municipalities for taking anti-seismic measures, i.e., it affects
positively to efficiency. Finally, Moore et al. (2005) included variables related
to weather such as the average precipitation, the average snowfall, the average
113D’Inverno et al. (2017).
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temperature, the maximum temperature and the minimum temperature. Only
average temperature and average snowfall were found significant.
2.7.6. Institutional and management determinants
In this section, we have included a group of environmental variables related to
institutional and management characteristics of the local governments. It is explained
by five indicators: informatization or level of computer usage, mayor and local
government employees characteristics, amalgamation, managerial forms and others.
• Informatization or level of computer usage (4 papers)
The variables in this subgroup measure the level of technology used by local
government. Ibrahim and Karim (2004) and Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005)
used the level of computer usage, suggesting that it is a powerful tool for
management, thus being indicative of a superior and more effective decision-
making process since computer utilization eases administrative tasks. Both
studies found a positive relationship between the efficiency scores and the
level of computer utilization. Moreover, Sung (2007) and Seol et al. (2008)
attempted to examine the impact of “informatization technology” on local
government efficiency. They constructed an index containing variables such as
investments and equipments, share of informatization technology personnel and
the application of informatization technology to administrative process, among
others. Their results confirm a positive and significant correlation between
“informatization technology” and efficiency.
• Mayor and local government employees characteristics (10 papers)
On the one hand, some studies included characteristics related to local govern-
ment’s mayor. Loikkanen et al. (2011) studied whether Finnish city managers’
characteristics and work environment explain differences in cost efficiency. They
included variables such as age, education level, gender and work environment
(cooperation, contact intensity etc.). City manager’s education level, attitudes to-
wards the participation of workers, attitude concerning the efficiency advantage
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of private sector relative to public sector and positive view on cooperation with
partners were correlated with higher efficiency. Moreover, Boetti et al. (2012)
considered mayor’s gender and age, arguing that the presence of older mayors
significantly reduces inefficiency, while gender is not statistically significant.
Also Agasisti et al. (2015) found mayors’ gender not statistically significant.
In addition, Ibrahim and Karim (2004) introduced the job vacancies in local
government and the education level of the municipal managers, however they
did not find significant results. Finally, Grossman et al. (1999) included a vari-
able representing the number of years for the mayor’s term, however it is not
significant.
On the other hand, some studies included variables related to council employ-
ees. Worthington (2000) included the staff per capita, Revelli (2010) used the
percentage of employment in financial and real estate services, and Sampaio de
Sousa et al. (2005) and Fogarty and Mugera (2013) used the employee expenses
per capita. Higher employee expenses or higher level of staff per capita were
negatively correlated with the efficiency scores. In addition, Loikkanen and
Susiluoto (2005) considered the age of council employees, suggesting that of
employees of 35 to 49 seem to be most beneficial to cost efficiency compared to
younger or older groups.
• Amalgamation (5 papers)
Amalgamation measures the process where municipalities of some countries
were merged in one municipality. Geys (2006) and Geys and Moesen (2009a)
assessed the effect of the large-scale municipal amalgamation operation in
Belgium in 1976 by incorporating a variable equal to the number of communities
that were united in one municipality in that year. Only Geys (2006) found
significant results, suggesting that a higher number of merging municipalities
in one municipality was negatively correlated with efficiency. They argue that
their inhabitants are still identified with their old community and the resulting
“intra-municipality” competition reduces overall efficiency.
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Moreover, Nakazawa (2013) introduced the number of Japanese municipali-
ties that participated in an amalgamation while Nakazawa (2014) measured
municipal amalgamation by absorption and by consolidation. They showed
that amalgamation has a negative correlation with efficiency because it causes
integration costs (slack) for an administrative organization. Finally, Da Cruz
and Marques (2014) and Cordero et al. (2017) included the number of parishes
in local governments regarding to the administrative reform of civil parishes
in Portugal which aimed to reduce the number of local council representatives.
Cordero et al. (2017) suggested that the process of amalgamation enhanced the
efficiency of more divided municipalities, i.e., those with a higher number of
civil parishes.
• Managerial forms (11 papers)
As management factors, different studies have included variables related to
municipal association (or cooperation), privatization (or externalisation), mixed
companies and decentralization (agentification). The first category relates to
the associated management between two or more municipalities and it includes
variables such as municipal association, participation in municipal consortia,
joint provision and inter-municipal cooperation. On the one hand, members
of a municipal association pool their resources in order to realise economies of
scale without giving up their status as autonomous municipalities. Moreover,
while local authorities are only controlled by a individual voters, the municipal
association is also and primarily controlled by the politicians of the member
municipalities. So, the joint provision of municipal services would have a
positive impact over efficiency.114 On the contrary, Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005)
found that participation in intermunicipal consortia has a negative impact over
efficiency, arguing that only the municipalities that operate on a scale below
the optimum, have an incentive to join those consortia in an attempt to reduce
average costs. Similarly, Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005) concluded that a big
114Bischoff et al. (2013); Arcelus et al. (2015).
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share of services produced by joint municipal organizations tends to reduce
efficiency, and Pérez-López et al. (2015) found that intermunicipal cooperation
also affects negatively to efficiency. Other studies did not find statistically
significant results.115
The second category is related to the privatisation management process and
it includes variables such as purchases from private producers, private man-
agement or externalization. In this context, some studies found that a big
share of privately produced services enhances efficiency.116 On the contrary,
Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013) showed that externalisation and the adoption
of contracting-out are harmful to efficiency. Finally, some studies did not find
significant differences in efficiency according to the way of management used by
the local government.117
The third category is related to mixed management which is measured as mixed
companies/firms, or joint service delivery. The adoption of mixed firms, featur-
ing collaboration between the public sector and the private sector, contributes to
higher levels of efficiency.118 Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013) also included the
variables total decentralization (measured as the number of functional decen-
tralised agencies created in each municipality such as companies, autonomous
organizations, public business entities and foundations), while Pérez-López et al.
(2015) measured the agentification level. Both studies showed a negative impact
over efficiency.
Additionally, Boetti et al. (2012) and Agasisti et al. (2015) studied the effects
of different managerial forms of waste collection. Boetti et al. (2012) indicated
a positive significant correlation only for the cooperative organization among
municipalities, suggesting that cost savings result from the advantage of sharing
large fixed costs combined with the benefit of increasing expenditure control,
while Agasisti et al. (2015) showed that only external service company is associ-
115Bönisch et al. (2011).
116Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Andrews and Entwistle (2015).
117Benito et al. (2010).
118Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013); Pérez-López et al. (2015).
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ated with efficiency, which is negatively correlated.
• Other determinants related to institutional or managerial characteristics
Finally, we include other determinants related to institutional or managerial
characteristics which are not classified in the previous subcategories. Sampaio de
Sousa et al. (2005) studied the decision power of municipal councils. They
found that the more power yielded to municipal councils, the better the resource
utilization since those councils tend to increase the transparency of the budgeting
process, which contributes to more effective control over corruption and over the
misuse of local funds. Moreover, Hayes and Chang (1990) included the fire rating
arguing that local government has the authority to hire and fire other city officials
outside the merit system, however they do not find significant results. Andrews
and Entwistle (2015) measured the managerial capacity as the expenditure on
central administration per resident. Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005) also included
the degree to which the real estate register is up-to-date, which was found
to have a negative correlation with efficiency. Moreover, Arcelus et al. (2015)
took into consideration the existence of a public comptroller in the municipality.
The hypothesis is that higher degree of local supervision should lead to better
management practices and more efficiency in the provision of local services.
Finally, Lampe et al. (2015) analysed the effect of new accounting and budgeting
regimes. They found that due to the accrual accounting adoption, municipalities’
cost inefficiency decreases.
2.8. Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented a systematic review of the existing literature on local
government efficiency from a global point of view. We identified 84 empirical studies
on the subject, being the most complete source of references on local government
efficiency analysis up to now. We summarised the inputs, outputs and the environ-
mental variables used in previous literature, as well as the methodologies applied.
As the efficiency results depend heavily on the variable selection and methods used,
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this chapter provides a good basis for researchers in the field of local governments’
efficiency.
The literature review leads us to seven main considerations and ways for further
research. First, we found differences in the popularity of local governments’ efficiency
analysis across countries. The best studied countries are in Europe, being Spain the
most analysed country (13 papers), followed by Belgium (9 papers) and Germany
(8 papers). Some studies have also attempted to analyse the relationship between
local government efficiency and other important topics, which converts it in a mul-
tidisciplinary subject. The most important related area is economics, followed by
management, public administration, urban studies and political science.
Second, most previous studies have analysed cross-sectional data. A minority
of papers has an underlying panel structure in the data but does not exploit this
intertemporal variation as they use cross-sectional efficiency techniques. Time period
analysis provides interesting managerial and policy-making insights into the efficiency
effect of long-term decision. More research is needed in dynamic efficiency analysis
in order to investigate the evolution of local government efficiency over time.
Third, there is a wide variety of input and output variables to measure local
government efficiency. The accurate definition of local governments’ inputs and
outputs is a complex task, which comes from the difficulty to collect data and the
measurement of local services. The selection of variables depends on the availability of
data and the specific services and facilities that local government must provide in each
country. Moreover, the number of output variables included in previous literature
varies drastically. Some studies aggregate various municipal services in a global index,
while others evaluate a set of specific local services.
Given the earlier discussed issues to define the bundle of services and facilities
that municipalities must provide, it would be interesting to consider alternative
input-output models, in order to assess whether the different choices might explain
the heterogeneity among local governments, and to determine how the number of
outputs can affect the efficiency scores. Moreover, some measures are too generic
or unspecific. It would be necessary to develop better proxy variables for local
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government services and facilities as well as indicators which measure the quality of
local services. The latter are interesting and informative for local governments, since
performance decisions may have an impact in their quality and not in their quantity.
Fourth, it is necessary to consider the influence of environmental variables on effi-
ciency. If local governments are affected by factors beyond their control, performance
analysis should control for this heterogeneity. Therefore, efficiency estimations which
do not account for the operational environment have only a limited value.
Five, there is a wide variety of determinants of local government efficiency. Un-
fortunately, the literature lacks a clear and standard classification for the inclusion
of environmental variables in empirical efficiency analyses. In addition, we note
that many determinants present ambiguous effects over efficiency, i.e., results from
different studies are mixed. This mixed evidence can be explained by the low external
validity of the results due to, e.g., the different micro and macro economic structure,
geographical conditions, political and social institutions of countries. In this context,
the conclusions and potential policy implications are not necessarily applicable to
other jurisdictions, since they are country specific. Our classification of determinants
as well as the summary on their impact over efficiency might help to structure future
studies on these matters.
Six, past studies interpret their results in a causal way, neglecting the endogeneity
issues in the data (e.g., arising from selection bias, unobserved heterogeneity or
reversed causality). The issue of endogenous data in local government efficiency
literature has received little attention. The large majority of studies tended to omit
variables due to the infeasibility to include a large amount of variables in the analysis
(arising from methodological and computational issues) as well as data unavailability.
Also there is a lack of studies that used municipal or individual fixed effects or
considered the reversed causality problem. In general, more research on the issue of
causality and on how endogeneity biases the efficiency results is needed.
Finally, the large majority of the previous studies have focused only on one
approach, in most cases DEA, FDH or SFA. We must take care when interpreting
results from research studies using one particular methodology because the results of
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the efficiency analysis are affected by the approach taken. Moreover, the most popular
methods to include exogenous variables with non-parametric methods are based on
the two-stage analysis. In general, it is necessary to apply more advanced techniques
to measure efficiency as well as the incorporation of environmental variables.
Given the considerations and conclusions drawn here, in the next chapters we will
attempt to address some of the problems from previous literature such as the accurate
selection of input and output variables, the selection of methodologies, the inclusion
of environmental variables in the analysis and the control of possible endogeneity
issues.
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Chapter 3
Evaluating local government
performance in times of crisis
3.1. Introduction
As explained in chapter 1, in recent years the context of the international economic
crisis has highlighted improving efficiency and reducing the costs of local public
services as prime area of concern. In the particular case of Spanish local governments,
on which we focus, the economic and financial situation that started in 2007 had a huge
impact on most local revenues and finances in general, provoking an increase on their
deficits. In addition, the huge budgetary limitations become stricter with the law on
budgetary stability (Ley General Presupuestaria), which set up more control on public
debt and public spending. Under these circumstances, Spanish local governments
have come under increasing pressure to accommodate severe economic restrictions
while maintaining (or even increasing) their provision of local public services. Taking
this premise as our starting point, one of the aims of this chapter is to analyse overall
cost efficiency in Spanish municipalities during the economic crisis period (2008–2013),
a subject yet to be examined in depth. Specifically, we attempt to learn whether
Spanish local governments have succeeded in reducing their budget expenditures
while maintaining public service provision; in other words, whether local government
cost efficiency has improved in times of crisis.
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Regardless of the context of analysis, one of the most significant tasks in efficiency
measurement is the proper definition of inputs and outputs (Štastná and Gregor, 2015).
Unfortunately, as stated in chapter 2, a common problem in local government efficiency
analysis is the complexity of accurately defining and measuring local governments’
inputs and outputs (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2013). This complexity is due to the difficulty
of collecting data and measuring local services. Indeed, studies use diverse input and
output measures, even when analysing efficiency with data from the same country.
In the Spanish case, some studies consider only the minimum services all local
governments are obliged to provide (Giménez and Prior, 2007), others analyse the
minimum services and a quality variable (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007; Zafra-Gómez
and Muñiz-Pérez, 2010), and a third group examine the complete range of services
provided by local governments (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2010a, 2013).
Given how problematic it is to define the bundle of services and facilities that
municipalities must provide, we consider it reasonable to propose three separate
output models in order to assess whether different choices might explain variations
among local governments, and to determine how the number of outputs can affect
efficiency scores. We use a comprehensive database, which includes measures of
both quantity and quality of the services and facilities provided. The inclusion of
quality variables in the analysis is interesting and informative for local governments,
since performance decisions may have an impact on their quality, but not on their
quantity. In addition, the chapter contributes through the sample selected for analysis.
While other studies using Spanish data focus on a specific region or year, our study
examines a much larger sample of various regions over several years, specifically,
1,574 Spanish local governments with populations between 1,000 and 50,000 for the
period 2008–2013. This sample allows investigation of structural differences in the
average efficiency scores between municipalities located in different Spanish regions
and provinces for the first time in the literature.
Moreover, other common problem from previous literature earlier discussed in
chapter 2 is that the vast majority of previous studies have applied just one frontier
technique, in most cases DEA, FDH or SFA. Only a few authors (De Borger and
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Kerstens, 1996a; Geys and Moesen, 2009b) apply two or more alternative approaches
to analyse public efficiency. In this context in which there is no commonly accepted
methodology to measure efficiency, we must be cautious when interpreting results
from research studies using one particular method, since their results might be affected
by which approach was selected. It is therefore important to assess the robustness
of the estimated efficiency by comparing different methodologies (Da Silva et al.,
2016). In light of the efficiency estimator selection problem, the present chapter
also contributes to the literature by providing a comparative perspective using not
only different specifications for inputs and outputs, but also several non-parametric
methodologies to measure efficiency, namely, DEA, FDH, order-m frontier and the
bias corrected DEA estimator proposed by Kneip et al. (2008).
Our results suggest that Spanish local governments became more efficient over
the crisis period 2008–2013 since their budget expenditures (inputs or costs) fell
while at the same time they managed to maintain (or even increase) local public
services and facilities (outputs). We find statistical evidence that service quality has
possible implications when measuring local government cost efficiency. We also
detect structural differences in average cost efficiency among municipalities located
in different Spanish regions and provinces as well as differences according to the
size. Additionally, in line with previous research, our results confirm that the level
and variation of efficiency scores are affected by the approach taken. We found large
differences in the mean efficiency scores, ranging from 0.44 to 0.96 (also contingent
on the model and the year) depending on the reference technology used. Caution
is therefore essential when interpreting empirical studies that use just one method
and policy-makers must carefully consider their results when taking performance
decisions (Badunenko et al., 2012).
The chapter is organised as follows: section 1.3 establishes the institutional frame-
work of Spanish local governments. Section 3.2 gives an overview of the methodologies
used to determine cost efficiency. Section 5.2.1 describes the data in detail. Section
5.2.2 presents and comments on the most relevant efficiency results. Finally, section
3.5 summarises the main conclusions.
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3.2. Methodologies
In the present chapter, we focus on the cost efficiency of local public goods and service
provision. We introduce cost notation since we have information relative to specific
costs (i.e., we use data in municipal budgets as input costs), although it is not possible
to decompose it into technical and allocative efficiency since there is no data available
on input prices and physical units (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007). It should be noted that
public sector goods and services are frequently unpriced due to their non-market
nature (Kalb et al., 2012).
In addition, we consider four different non-parametric techniques to measure
cost efficiency, namely, DEA, FDH, order-m, and Kneip et al.’s 2008 bias corrected
DEA estimator, henceforth KSW. The former two techniques are the most popular
in the non-parametric field, whereas the latter two are relatively recent proposals.
We focus on non-parametric as opposed to parametric methodologies, due to their
less restrictive assumptions and greater flexibility.1 In addition, parametric and non-
parametric methodologies have not evolved in parallel, and several proposals have
leaned towards the non-parametric field, overcoming most of their limitations in the
process (Daraio and Simar, 2007a; Ba˘din et al., 2014).
3.2.1. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH)
DEA (Charnes et al., 1978; Banker et al., 1984) is a non-parametric methodology based
on linear programming to estimate and compare the relative efficiency of DMUs (in
our case, Spanish local governments). DEA defines an empirical frontier which creates
an “envelope” determined by the efficient DMUs. These units, located on the frontier,
are considered “best-practice” units and have an efficiency score equal to 1. In the
case of input orientation (which in our case is reasonable, as we will see below),
units above the frontier are considered inefficient and have a score lower than 1. The
distance between each DMU and the frontier shows the measure of its inefficiency.
The most important assumptions of the model are: returns to scale, convexity and free
1For a detailed review of the main differences between parametric and non-parametric frontier
techniques, see Murillo-Zamorano (2004) and Bogetoft and Otto (2010).
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disposability of inputs and outputs.
As indicated above, and similarly to previous studies on local government effi-
ciency, we consider an input-oriented DEA model (Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´, 2005;
Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007) because outputs are established externally in the public
sector (the minimum services that local governments must provide) and, consequently,
it is more appropriate to evaluate efficiency in terms of input minimisation (Balaguer-
Coll and Prior, 2009). Moreover, because local governments differ considerably in
size, we assume variable returns to scale (Balaguer-Coll and Prior, 2009; Bosch-Roca
et al., 2012; Doumpos and Cohen, 2014; Da Cruz and Marques, 2014). This has the
added advantage that each municipality is only compared to other municipalities of
the same size.
We introduce the mathematical formulation for the cost efficiency measurement
(Färe et al., 1994). The minimal cost efficiency can be calculated by solving the
following programme for each local government and each sample year:
minθ,λθ
s.t. −yi +Yλ≥0
θxi − Xλ≥0
λ≥0,
n1′λ = 1 i = 1, . . . , n
(3.1)
where for n observations (municipalities), X and Y are the input an output matrix
which represent the data for all n local governments, xi and yi are the observed inputs
and outputs corresponding to each unit (municipality) i under evaluation, and λ is
the activity vector which describes the importance of the unit considered to determine
the virtual reference which is used as a comparison in order to evaluate unit i. The
last constraint (N1′λ = 1) implies variable returns to scale (VRS), which assures that
each DMU is compared only with others of a similar size.
A further extension of the DEA model with variable returns to scale, called FDH,
was proposed by Deprins et al. (1984). Its main difference from DEA is that it drops the
convexity assumption. The FDH linear programming problem is defined as follows:
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minθ,λθ
s.t. −yi +Yλ≥0
θxi − Xλ≥0
λ ∈ {0, 1},
n1′λ = 1 i = 1, . . . , n
(3.2)
Finally, by solving linear programming problems (3.1) and (3.2) we obtain the cost
efficiency coefficient; in other words we find θ, which is the optimal (minimal) input
quantity of producing yi. Since there is no data available for input prices (due to the
difficulty of using market prices to measure public services), all units are assumed
to face the same input prices, and we use input variables of input costs (Kalb et al.,
2012). Local governments with efficiency scores of θ < 1 are inefficient, while efficient
units receive efficiency scores of θ = 1.
3.2.2. Robust variants of DEA and FDH
Although the traditional non-parametric techniques DEA and FDH have been widely
applied in efficiency analysis, they present several drawbacks. One limitation of both
DEA and FDH is that they are sensitive to outliers and extreme values. Since these
techniques envelope all data, the efficient frontier is determined by the observations
that are extreme points (Simar and Wilson, 2008) and, as a consequence, any outliers
strongly influence the estimated frontier as well as the efficiency scores of all obser-
vations. This problem can be addressed by using “partial” frontiers, which are more
robust to extremes or outliers in data. Moreover, these “partial” estimators do not
suffer from the “curse of dimensionality”,2 a major problem that generally affects
efficiency scores obtained using DEA and FDH Daraio and Simar (2007a). Finally, an-
other considerable drawback of traditional non-parametric approaches is the difficulty
of making statistical inference. However, bootstrap methods such as those proposed
by Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000) enable statistical inferences (consistency analysis,
2As Daraio and Simar (2007a) note, the “curse of dimensionality” implies that an increase in the
number of inputs or outputs, or a decrease in the sample under analysis (i.e., the number of units for
comparison), entails higher efficiencies.
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bias correction, confidence intervals, test of hypothesis and so on) about efficiency.
Hence, in this chapter we consider two variants of DEA and FDH estimators that
are able to overcome most of the drawbacks of the traditional non-parametric methods.
We use the order-m approach, which is a partial frontier that mitigates the influence
of outliers, extreme values and the curse of dimensionality; and KSW, which allows
for consistent statistical inference by applying bootstrap techniques.
Order-m
Order-m frontier (Cazals et al., 2002) is a robust alternative to DEA and FDH esti-
mators that involves the concept of partial frontier, as opposed to the traditional full
frontier. The order-m estimators, for finite m units, do not envelope all data points
and consequently are less extreme. The benchmark in the input orientation case is
the expected minimum input achievable among a fixed number of m units producing
at least output level y. Hence, the order-m input efficiency score (Daraio and Simar,
2007a) is given by:
θˆm(x, y) = E[(θˆm(x, y)|Y > y)] (3.3)
The value m represents the number of potential units against which we benchmark
the analysed unit (i.e., how efficient a local government is compared with m local
governments.). If m goes to infinity, the order-m estimator converges to FDH. Daraio
and Simar (2005) suggest that the most reasonable value for m is determined as the
value for which the number of super-efficient observations becomes constant. In our
setting, we consider m = 350, although alternative values delivered similar outcomes.
Note that order-m scores are not bounded at 1. A value greater than 1 indicates
super-efficiency, showing that the unit operating at level (x, y) is more efficient than
the average of m peers randomly drawn from the population of units producing more
output than y (Daraio and Simar, 2007a).
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Kneip et al.’s (2008) bias-corrected DEA estimator (KSW)
The KSW (Kneip et al., 2008) is a bias corrected DEA estimator which derives the
asymptotic distribution of DEA via bootstrapping techniques. Simar and Wilson (2008)
note that DEA and FDH estimators are biased by construction, meaning that the
true frontier would be located under the DEA estimated frontier. As a consequence,
DEA scores (i.e., relative to the estimated frontier) are too optimistic. In the words of
Badunenko et al., the bootstrap procedure to correct this bias, based on sub-sampling,
“uses the idea that the known distribution of the difference between estimated and
bootstrapped efficiency scores mimics the unknown distribution of the difference
between the true and the estimated efficiency scores” (Badunenko et al., 2012). In
addition, the KSW procedure allows for consistent statistical inference of efficiency
estimates (i.e., bias and confidence intervals for the estimated efficiency scores).
Therefore, in order to implement the bootstrap procedure (based on sub-sampling),
first let s = nk for some k ∈ (0, 1), where n and s are the sample and sub-sample
size, respectively. The optimal k depends on the dimensionality of the problem. The
bootstrap then considers the following scheme:
1. First, a bootstrap sample S∗s = (X∗i , Y
∗
i )
s
i=1 is generated by drawing (indepen-
dently, uniformly and with replacement) s observations from the original sample,
Sn.
2. The DEA estimator is applied, where the technology set is constructed with the
sub-sample drawn in step (1), to construct the bootstrap estimates θˆ∗(x, y).
3. Steps (1) and (2) are repeated B times, using the resulting bootstrap values to
approximate the conditional distribution of s2/(p+q+1)( θˆ
∗(x,y)
θ∗(x,y) − 1), which allows
us to approximate the unknown distribution of n2/(p+q+1)( θˆ
∗(x,y)
θ∗(x,y) − 1). The values
p and q are the output and input quantities, respectively. The bias-corrected
DEA efficiency score, which is adjusted by the s sub-sample size, is given by:
θbc(x, y) = θ∗(x, y)− Bias∗ (3.4)
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where the bias is adjusted by employing the s sub-sample size.
Bias∗ =
( s
n
)2/(p+q+1) [ 1
B
B
∑
b=1
θˆ∗b (x, y)− θ∗(x, y)
]
(3.5)
4. Finally, for a given α ∈ (0, 1), the bootstrap values are used to find the quantiles
δα/2,s, δ1−α/2,s in order to compute a symmetric 1− α confidence interval for
θ(x, y)
[
θˆ(x, y)
1+ n−2/(p+q+1)δ1−α/2,s
,
θˆ(x, y)
1+ n−2/(p+q+1)δα/2,s
]
(3.6)
3.3. Sample, variables and model specification
We carry out the analysis for a sample of Spanish local governments between 1,000
and 50,000 inhabitants for the 2008–2013 period. The information on inputs and
outputs comes from the Spanish Ministry of the Treasury and Public Administrations
(Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas). Outputs were obtained from a
survey on local infrastructures and facilities (Encuesta de Infraestructuras y Equipamien-
tos Locales). This survey has only been published annually since 2008 (previously
it was five-yearly), so in contrast to previous studies for Spain we have yearly data
available for our full sample period. The study is therefore also relevant in terms of
the sample analysed. While other studies based on Spanish data focus on a specific
region or year, our study examines a sample of Spanish municipalities comprising
various regions over several years. Information on inputs was obtained from local
governments’ budget expenditures.
The final sample contains 1,574 municipalities for every year (representing 19.60%),
after eliminating all the municipalities with unavailable data on inputs and outputs
for the period 2008 to 2013. Specifically, there was no information for the Basque
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Country, Navarre3, Catalonia and Madrid regions and the provinces of Burgos, Huesca,
Guadalajara and Huelva. In Table 3.1 we summarise the number of observations for
each region in our sample.
Table 3.1: Distribution of the sample, Spanish
regions (Comunidades Autónomas)
Region Number of municipalities
Andalusia 378
Aragon 58
Asturias 42
Balearic Islands 48
Canary Islands 46
Cantabria 45
Castile and Leon 139
Castile La Mancha 170
Extremadura 116
Galicia 211
Murcia 28
La Rioja 24
Valencian Community 269
Total 1,574
3.3.1. Modelling the costs of municipalities
The costs (inputs) are derived from the local governments’ budget expenditures and
are representative of the cost of the municipal services provided. Using budget
expenditures as inputs is consistent with the literature (e.g., Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007,
2010a; Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez, 2010; Kalb et al., 2012; Štastná and Gregor,
2015; Fogarty and Mugera, 2013; Doumpos and Cohen, 2014; Da Cruz and Marques,
2014).4 Local budget expenditures are divided into two main groups: non-financial
transactions and financial transactions. In turn, non-financial transactions comprise
two categories: current or ordinary expenditures, and capital expenditures. The first of
these categories is divided into personnel expenses, current expenditures on goods and
services, financial expenditures (interests and banking expenses) and current transfers
3The Basque Country and Navarre are not obliged to present this information to the Spanish Ministry
of the Treasury and Public Administrations because they have their own autonomous systems and are
therefore not included in the State Economic Cooperation.
4See section 2.5.1 in chapter 3 for an accurate summary for the input variables most widely used in
previous literature.
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(grants and assistance to other entities). The second category, capital expenditures, is
divided into real investments and capital transfers (grants or payments to entities for
real investments). The second group, financial transactions, is divided into financial
assets and financial liability (referring to loans and deposits, and their repayments).
The input measure therefore includes various municipal expenditures. It represents
the total local government costs (X1), by including personnel expenses, expenditures
on goods and services, current transfers, capital investments and capital transfers.
3.3.2. Defining the outputs of municipalities
Outputs are related to the specific services and facilities provided by each munici-
pality. Most previous studies in European countries include output variables such
as road infrastructure, recreational facilities, waste collection, drinking water supply,
social services, primary and secondary education and health care (e.g., Afonso and
Fernandes, 2008; Geys and Moesen, 2009a; Kalb et al., 2012; Štastná and Gregor, 2015).5
Differences in the Spanish case concern the area of education, care for elderly, and
health services, which are not local government responsibilities.
Our modelling of outputs is based on the minimum services and facilities that each
municipality is legally obliged to provide, according to their size. These compulsory
services are listed in Article 26 of the Spanish local government law (Ley reguladora de
Bases de Régimen Local6). Specifically, all local governments must provide public street
lighting, cemeteries, waste collection and street cleaning services, drinking water to
households, sewage system, access to population centres, paving of public roads, and
regulation of food and drink. Furthermore, larger municipalities with populations of
over 5,000, 20,000 or 50,000 (the limits that define the groups) must provide additional
services in accordance with the size of the specific population. The selection of outputs
is consistent with previous studies on efficiency in Spanish local governments (e.g.,
5See section 2.5.2 in chapter 3 for an accurate summary for the output variables most widely used in
previous literature.
6Articles 25 to 28 of this law were amended in 2013Ley 27/2013, de 27 de diciembre, de racionalización y
sostenibilidad de la Administración Local to clarify municipal powers, rationalise local government organisa-
tional structure in accordance with the principles of efficiency, stability and financial sustainability, and
ensure more rigorous financial and budgetary control.
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Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007; Balaguer-Coll and Prior, 2009; Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-
Pérez, 2010; Bosch-Roca et al., 2012) as well as in other European countries, since
for the most part they have similar competencies (e.g., Da Cruz and Marques, 2014;
Doumpos and Cohen, 2014). However, article 26 of this law was modified in 1996,
removing the obligation to provide an abattoir; we therefore do not include it in this
study, in contrast to previous studies in Spain. In addition, we have added four new
variables, including measures for sewage system provision (a compulsory service for
all local governments which has not previously been taken into account).
In order to generate a balanced set of outputs that reflects all the services and
facilities municipalities are legally obliged to provide, we have a final list of 10
output variables.7 Due to the difficulty of measuring public sector outputs, in some
cases proxy variables must be used, a strategy that has been widely applied in the
literature. Based on the study of De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b), many of these
output variables should be considered as crude proxies for municipal services because
more direct outputs are not available.
Population size (Y1), is used as a proxy for the following services: cemetery,
regulation of food and drink, civil protection and social service provision. Street
infrastructure surface area (Y2) is used as a proxy for street cleaning, access to popula-
tion centres, paving of public roads, and fire prevention and extinction. Some services
have direct output measures such as public street lightning (calculated by the number
of lighting points, Y3), waste collection and treatment of waste collected (calculated by
the tons of waste collected, Y4), supply of drinking water to households (measured
by the length of the water distribution network, Y5), the sewage system (measured by
the length of the sewage networks, Y6), public parks (measured by the surface area
of public parks, Y7), public library (measured by the surface area of public libraries,
Y8), market (measured by the market surface area, Y9) and public sports facilities
(measured by the sport facilities surface area, Y10).
7Although the number of output variables is relatively high compared with previous literature, we
have, in general, a more complete and much larger database. We have data available containing the
services that municipalities must provide and measures of their quality, including several Spanish regions
for several years.
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Finally, following Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007), Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009) and
Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010), we also incorporate service quality into the
analysis. These data are not usually included in the literature, although they are
of interest to and informative for local governments, since performance decisions
may have an impact on their quality and not on their quantity. Because services and
facilities for each municipality are classified as “good”, “fair” or “bad” according to
their condition, we include these categories in the output variables explained above,
weighting by the quantity of service provided:
Yqualitypi =
YpiQzi
∑ni=1 Ypi
(3.7)
where for each i = 1, . . . , n local government, Ypi is the quantity of output p, and Qzi
is the quality category, z = 1, 2, 3.
Table 3.2 reports the minimum services that each local government must provide
according to their size for the period 2008–2013 and the different output indicators
used to evaluate the services.
3.3.3. Model specifications
Unlike previous Spanish studies that only consider the minimum services all local
governments are obliged to provide (Giménez and Prior, 2007), the minimum services
and a quality variable (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007; Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez, 2010),
or the total range of services provided by local governments (Balaguer-Coll et al.,
2010a, 2013), we compare how different output specifications affect efficiency scores.
Moreover, in relation to the number of outputs included in the efficiency analysis,
we must take into account the problem of dimensionality. A general guideline
to establish the number of variables is that the number of observations (i.e., local
governments) should be at least twice the number of inputs and outputs considered
(Golany and Roll, 1989); hence, following this rule, as the number of units increases,
more variables can be incorporated in the analysis. However, including a large number
of variables can result in a large number of efficient units.
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We considered it reasonable to specify three output models in order to assess
whether different choices might explain the variations between local governments,
and to determine how the number of outputs can affect the efficiency scores. The
more encompassing the models are (i.e., more outputs are included in the model), the
higher the efficiency (since municipalities have more dimensions in which to excel).
Therefore, considering different models will provide us with a more precise view of
municipalities’ efficiency. The three output models are as follows:
Model 1 includes measures of compulsory minimum services for all governments:
number of lighting points, total population, tons of waste collected, street
infrastructure surface area (m2), length of water distribution networks (m), and
length of sewage networks (m).
Model 2 includes measures of compulsory minimum services for all governments
along with additional services that larger municipalities with populations of
over 5,000 or 20,000 must provide: number of lighting points, total population,
tons of waste collected, street infrastructure surface area (m2), length of water
distribution networks (m), length of sewage networks (m), public parks surface
area (m2), public library surface area (m2), market surface area (m2) and sports
facilities surface area (m2).
Model 3 introduces all the services provided by local governments taking into
account the quality of the services weighted by their quantity.8
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics for inputs and outputs for the period
2008–2013. We include the median rather than the mean to avoid distortion from
outliers.
8Different definitions can be applied to include service quality. Indeed, the studies of Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2007), Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009) and Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010) included service
quality as a single output variable. However, since we aim to compare the efficiency scores with and
without including service quality in the analysis, we consider it appropriate to weight the quality of each
service by its quantity in order to maintain the same number of variables as output Model 2.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for inputs and outputs (2008–
2013)
Mean S.d.
Inputsa
Total costs (X1) 6,856,864.55 7,990,865.20
Outputs
Total population (Y1) 7,555.36 8,460.33
Street infrastructure surface areab(Y2) 336,673.55 325,808.07
Number of lighting points (Y3) 1,519.78 1,567.02
Tons of waste collected (Y4) 4,216.73 19,720.07
Length of water distribution networksb(Y5) 50,503.12 93,877.89
Length of sewer networksb(Y6) 29,650.29 32,424.83
Public parks surface areab(Y7) 88,339.98 565,984.51
Public library surface areab(Y8) 361.38 1,751.10
Market surface areab(Y9) 90,746.34 502,781.06
Sport facilities surface areab(Y10) 3,959.79 10,752.72
a In thousands of euros.
b In square metres.
3.4. Efficiency results
We estimate efficiency scores for 1,574 municipalities for the 2008–2013 period using
the methodologies explained in the previous sections. Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 report
overall cost-efficiency results averaged over all municipalities for each year in Models
1, 2 and 3, respectively. They show summary statistics, including the mean and the
standard deviation, as well as additional statistics which provide deeper insights
into the distributions of efficiency scores. The last column in each table reports the
percentage of efficient local governments.
We also provide violin plots to aid further interpretation of results. They include
all features of the distribution and offer more thorough information on how each
methodology behaves. Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 display the violin plots for DEA,
FDH, order-m and KSW approaches, respectively. We report results for the three
models considered, in order to assess whether different output specifications might
contribute to explain variations between local governments, and to determine how the
number of outputs can affect efficiency scores.
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics for efficiency results, Model 1a
DEA estimator
Year Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008 0.4943 0.4689 0.0437 1.0000 0.1876 2.6048
2009 0.5843 0.5740 0.1257 1.0000 0.1677 2.6684
2010 0.5212 0.4953 0.1312 1.0000 0.1718 1.9695
2011 0.5314 0.5092 0.1359 1.0000 0.1728 1.9060
2012 0.5316 0.5128 0.1079 1.0000 0.1749 1.8424
2013 0.5712 0.5591 0.1138 1.0000 0.1817 2.7954
FDH estimator
Year Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008 0.7444 0.7678 0.0808 1.0000 0.2276 27.0013
2009 0.8186 0.8563 0.2045 1.0000 0.1841 32.8463
2010 0.7761 0.7848 0.1559 1.0000 0.1961 26.1753
2011 0.7453 0.7434 0.2037 1.0000 0.2108 24.3329
2012 0.7630 0.7737 0.1497 1.0000 0.2076 25.4765
2013 0.7619 0.7721 0.1497 1.0000 0.2055 25.0318
Order-m estimator
Year Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008 0.8089 0.8255 0.0834 1.9813 0.2353 29.4155
2009 0.8691 0.8926 0.2122 1.7369 0.2005 36.4041
2010 0.8385 0.8515 0.2172 1.8080 0.2032 29.6061
2011 0.8088 0.8100 0.2368 2.0281 0.2197 27.5731
2012 0.8222 0.8358 0.1797 1.8914 0.2169 29.2884
2013 0.8209 0.8328 0.1785 1.9204 0.2175 28.7802
KSW estimator
Year Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008 0.4421 0.4239 0.0400 1.0000 0.1720 0.0000
2009 0.5383 0.5300 0.1179 1.0000 0.1575 0.0000
2010 0.4541 0.4296 0.0563 1.0000 0.1602 0.0669
2011 0.4752 0.4558 0.1178 1.0000 0.1572 0.0000
2012 0.4677 0.4477 0.0134 1.0000 0.1650 0.0000
2013 0.4846 0.4709 0.0118 1.0000 0.1617 0.0669
a This model includes minimum services compulsory for all governments (6 outputs vari-
ables from Y1 to Y6).
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Table 3.5: Summary statistics for efficiency results, Model 2a
DEA estimator
Year Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008 0.5125 0.4839 0.0446 1.0000 0.1968 2.7954
2009 0.5957 0.5829 0.1268 1.0000 0.1740 3.9390
2010 0.5382 0.5102 0.1421 1.0000 0.1806 3.1131
2011 0.5506 0.5237 0.1359 1.0000 0.1815 3.2402
2012 0.5528 0.5339 0.1269 1.0000 0.1842 3.1131
2013 0.5900 0.5757 0.1299 1.0000 0.1884 4.7014
FDH estimator
Year Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008 0.8900 1.0000 0.0945 1.0000 0.1795 61.8170
2009 0.9251 1.0000 0.3233 1.0000 0.1394 66.4549
2010 0.9112 1.0000 0.3040 1.0000 0.1524 63.2783
2011 0.8923 1.0000 0.2428 1.0000 0.1755 61.8170
2012 0.8957 1.0000 0.2724 1.0000 0.1684 60.6734
2013 0.9023 1.0000 0.2648 1.0000 0.1594 61.3723
Order-m estimator
Year Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008 0.9238 1.0000 0.0969 1.8544 0.1903 63.0241
2009 0.9606 1.0000 0.3420 1.7793 0.1541 68.8691
2010 0.9501 1.0000 0.3130 2.0046 0.1657 65.2478
2011 0.9376 1.0000 0.2800 2.2371 0.1874 63.9136
2012 0.9364 1.0000 0.2946 2.3782 0.1823 63.0877
2013 0.9439 1.0000 0.2937 2.4632 0.1813 63.7230
KSW estimator
Year Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008 0.4462 0.4246 0.0310 1.0000 0.1797 0.0000
2009 0.5333 0.5250 0.1044 1.0000 0.1618 0.0000
2010 0.4562 0.4270 0.0373 1.0000 0.1692 0.0000
2011 0.4815 0.4603 0.1163 1.0000 0.1644 0.0000
2012 0.4775 0.4593 0.0013 1.0000 0.1739 0.1271
2013 0.5318 0.5198 0.0982 1.0000 0.1782 0.0669
a This model includes minimum services compulsory for all governments and additional
services that must be provided by larger municipalities with populations of over 5,000 and
20,000 (10 output variables from Y1 to Y10).
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Table 3.6: Summary statistics for efficiency results, Model 3a
DEA estimator
Year Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008 0.6867 0.6780 0.0614 1.0000 0.2651 28.6531
2009 0.7469 0.7504 0.0925 1.0000 0.2287 30.3685
2010 0.7152 0.6970 0.1141 1.0000 0.2333 27.5731
2011 0.7023 0.6680 0.1257 1.0000 0.2379 26.4295
2012 0.7101 0.7016 0.1073 1.0000 0.2395 27.2554
2013 0.7164 0.7153 0.1043 1.0000 0.2349 26.5565
FDH estimator
Year Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008 0.9210 1.0000 0.2655 1.0000 0.1515 69.6950
2009 0.9285 1.0000 0.2655 1.0000 0.1471 72.4269
2010 0.9291 1.0000 0.2648 1.0000 0.1429 71.3469
2011 0.9230 1.0000 0.2648 1.0000 0.1485 68.8691
2012 0.9212 1.0000 0.2385 1.0000 0.1515 68.4879
2013 0.9226 1.0000 0.2188 1.0000 0.1478 68.6785
Order-m estimator
Year Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008 0.9277 1.0000 0.2676 1.3837 0.1502 70.0127
2009 0.9375 1.0000 0.2677 1.4062 0.1474 72.9352
2010 0.9388 1.0000 0.2648 1.8670 0.1454 71.6010
2011 0.9334 1.0000 0.2648 2.0400 0.1506 69.4409
2012 0.9315 1.0000 0.2526 1.7124 0.1507 69.2503
2013 0.9339 1.0000 0.2335 1.6945 0.1503 69.6315
KSW estimator
Year Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008 0.5913 0.5608 0.0017 1.0000 0.2558 0.0000
2009 0.5911 0.5641 0.0351 1.0000 0.2492 0.0000
2010 0.6007 0.5649 0.0466 1.0000 0.2410 0.0000
2011 0.6144 0.5748 0.0193 1.0000 0.2350 0.0635
2012 0.6146 0.5848 0.0295 1.0000 0.2352 0.0635
2013 0.6085 0.5783 0.0000 1.0000 0.2311 0.0669
a This model includes minimum services compulsory for all governments and additional
services that must be provided by larger municipalities with populations of over 5,000 and
20,000 taking into account service quality (10 output variables from Y1 to Y10 weighted by
their quality).
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Figure 3.1: Violin plots for efficiency measurement with DEA, the three output speci-
fications per year.
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Figure 3.2: Violin plots for efficiency measurement with FDH, the three output speci-
fications per year.
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Figure 3.3: Violin plots for efficiency measurement with order-m, the three output
specifications per year.
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Figure 3.4: Violin plots for efficiency measurement with KSW, the three output speci-
fications per year.
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3.4.1. Evaluating cost efficiency with different non-parametric methodologies
Caution is needed when interpreting results from studies using just one method since
the approach taken might lead to different efficiency levels. Therefore, as De Borger
and Kerstens (1996a) note, a good strategy is to use different methodologies to check
for robust efficiency scores. We now discuss some descriptive statistics for each of the
four cost-efficiency measures.
When comparing DEA and FDH, both efficiency scores and the percentage of
cost-efficient local governments are higher under FDH than under DEA. Note that
FDH drops the convexity assumption underlying DEA and, as a result, it yields a
higher number of efficient units. Therefore, all DEA efficient observations are also
efficient under FDH (De Borger and Kerstens, 1996a). In addition, the increase in the
number of outputs from Model 1 to Models 2 and 3 implies higher efficiency scores
for both methodologies, since DEA and FDH estimators notoriously suffer from the
“curse of dimensionality” (see Daraio and Simar (2007a), for further discussion).
A comparison of DEA and KSW methodologies shows that the average cost ef-
ficiency scores using KSW are lower than those obtained with the DEA approach.
Moreover, under KSW most local governments are found to be inefficient (i.e., we
observe 0% of efficient local governments in most of the years analysed). By con-
struction, KSW methodology takes the standard DEA estimator to correct its bias
and, as a consequence, municipalities considered as efficient when using DEA (i.e.,
municipalities located in the frontier with an efficiency score of 1), are considered
inefficient in KSW because their bias has been corrected (i.e., municipalities could be
close to an efficiency score of 1, but they are no longer considered efficient). KSW
methodology is therefore useful for ranking the observations (i.e., relative ordering of
municipalities) but not for identifying the benchmark units.
The order-m approach yields higher efficiency scores and percentages of efficient
units than all the other methods. Order-m is more robust to extreme values and
outliers, giving more prudent results than FDH. Note that order-m scores are not
bounded by 1, and a value greater than 1 indicates super-efficient units.
Violin plots from Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 support the above descriptive analysis.
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DEA figures present uni-modal structures for Models 1 and 2, indicating tighter
probability masses of inefficient units around 0.55. In addition, Model 3 shows a
bi-modal structure with an additional mode at unity, which are the cost efficient units.
In FDH, the tighter probability masses are concentrated at unity, showing the large
number of cost-efficient units. Figures from both methods provide evidence that
an increase in the number of outputs (from Model 1 to 2 and 3) implies a higher
probability mass around unity (i.e., an increase of efficient units). Moreover, although
the mode is higher in DEA than in KSW plots, there do not seem to be large differences
in the cost structures between the two methods. Finally, order-m figures show a higher
dispersion of the efficiency scores (there are super-efficient units with efficiency scores
greater than 1) with a tighter probability mass around 0.90.
3.4.2. Evaluating cost efficiency with different output models
General discrepancies are observed on comparing the results yielded by the different
models (output specifications). As expected, the selection of outputs affects the
efficiency results. There are some differences between Model 1 and Models 2 and 3,
which can be partly explained by the different number of outputs included. However,
when the quality of the services is also included (Model 3), the increase in the efficiency
scores might be related to the fact that more cost-efficient municipalities provide better
quality services. As Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) suggest, often local governments cannot
directly affect, at least in the short term, the quantity of services and facilities; however,
performance decisions may have a decisive impact on their quality.
These tendencies can be more formally tested to uncover whether or not efficiency
results differ significantly when service quality is included. The methodology used to
determine any significant differences between two different distributions, following
Pastor and Tortosa-Ausina (2008), Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a), Zafra-Gómez and
Muñiz-Pérez (2010) or Prior et al. (2016), is based on the Li (1996) test with the
variation proposed by Simar and Zelenyuk (2006).9,10 Since the test compares the
9Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) adapted the Li (1996) test when applied to efficiency scores yielded by
DEA and FDH via bootstrapping techniques.
10Since the analysis considered in this chapter is based on comparing the results yielded by a broad
103
closeness between two unknown density functions (i.e., it explores the statistical
differences between two distributions, in our case distributions of efficiency scores),
we compare the efficiency scores from Models 2 and 3. We therefore consider the
null hypothesis H0 : f (Model2) = g(Model3), which means that the distribution of
efficiency scores is the same with (Model 3) and without (Model 2) the inclusion
of service quality, against the alternative hypothesis H1 : f (Model2) 6= g(Model3).
Results are provided in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Effect of including the quality of services based on comparing distributions
using Li’s 1996 test with the variation proposed by Simar and Zelenyuk
(2006)
Estimator Year T-statistic (p-value)
DEA 2008 231.2601 (0.0000∗)
2009 256.6770 (0.0000∗)
2010 237.7093 (0.0000∗)
2011 189.2445 (0.0000∗)
2012 204.9543 (0.0000∗)
2013 157.1427 (0.0000∗)
FDH 2008 6.1007 (0.0000∗)
2009 2.2549 (0.0340∗)
2010 6.4186 (0.0000∗)
2011 4.8774 (0.0030∗)
2012 3.9812 (0.0050∗)
2013 4.0908 (0.0020∗)
Order-m 2008 4.4787 (0.0020∗)
2009 4.4153 (0.0020∗)
2010 2.4271 (0.0100∗)
2011 2.8296 (0.0230∗)
2012 2.5501 (0.0230∗)
2013 1.9678 (0.0350∗)
KSW 2008 144.1003 (0.0000∗)
2009 86.4735 (0.0000∗)
2010 140.9611 (0.0000∗)
2011 118.0488 (0.0000∗)
2012 111.1173 (0.0000∗)
2013 45.8914 (0.0000∗)
∗ denotes differences are significant at
the 5% level.
category of non-parametric techniques and specification models to measure efficiency, we look at
non-parametric techniques to formally test whether the variety of efficiency scores obtained differ
significantly. The test is based on the idea of measuring the global distance (closeness) between two
density distributions. We consider this tecnique attractive and appropriate because it focuses on entire
distributions, instead of comparing summary statistics such as the mean, in the case of the two-sample
t-test.
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The test reveals significant differences in the efficiency scores when service quality
is included, suggesting that for the municipalities in our sample there is a trade-off
between cost efficiency and service quality. As a consequence, municipalities which
are efficient in terms of output quantity can be inefficient in terms of output quality.
These results reflect the importance of including quality variables in the analysis, since
different regulatory policies or managerial decisions could have an impact on the
quality of the services and not on their quantity. Violin plots in Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and
3.4 confirm the results. Note that there seem to be differences in the cost structures
when quality is included (Model 3) and when it is not (Model 2), supporting the
statistical evidence of the possible implications of service quality when measuring
local government cost efficiency.
3.4.3. Evaluating cost efficiency over the period 2008–2013
Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 also show the evolution in the distribution of efficiency scores
over the period 2008–2013. Although we do not set out to analyse the dynamics of
efficiency, some tendencies can be seen. The average cost efficiency scores are not
constant over the period; specifically, there is a general increase in the efficiency scores
over time with all approaches.
In the context of economic crisis, Spanish local governments have been immersed
in a process of budgetary reforms. The law on budgetary stability (Ley General de
Estabilidad Presupuestaria) aims to streamline local expenditures in order to achieve a
balanced budget. It establishes annual budgetary stability targets, and expenditure
and debt rules. In these circumstances, local governments have been under pressure
to accommodate severe economic restrictions while at the same time attending to
citizens’ needs. Our aim was therefore to analyse whether Spanish local governments
have attempted to reduce their budget expenditures while maintaining the provision,
and quality, of public services; that is, whether local governments’ cost efficiency has
improved over time.
In order to analyse the evolution of the efficiency scores for the whole period
from 2008 to 2013, we test whether significant differences in efficiency levels took
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place between the initial and the final period, again using the Li (1996) test with the
modification proposed by Simar and Zelenyuk (2006).11 Therefore, we consider the
null hypothesis H0 : f (2008) = g(2013), which means that the distribution of the
efficiency scores in the initial year of the crisis period (2008) is equal to the distribution
of the efficiency scores in the final year of the period (2013), against the alternative
hypotheses H1 : f (2008) 6= g(2013). Results are provided in 3.8. The results reveal
significant differences in most of the distributions of efficiency during the period
2008–2013, both in quantity and quality output models. This finding confirms that
Spanish local governments have improved their efficiency levels in crisis times since
they reduced their costs between 2008 and 2013, while maintaining (or even increasing)
the level of services and facilities (outputs).
Table 3.8: Comparing efficiency over time (2008 vs. 2013) based on Li’s (1996) test
with the variation proposed by Simar and Zelenyuk (2006)
Estimator Model T-statistic p-value
DEA Model 1 66.4750 0.0000∗
Model 2 66.5180 0.0000∗
Model 3 16.2057 0.0000∗
FDH Model 1 6.0456 0.0000∗
Model 2 1.9279 0.0480∗
Model 3 1.1068 0.1560
Order-m Model 1 2.3448 0.0480∗
Model 2 0.8743 0.2920
Model 3 0.7925 0.3290
KSW Model 1 79.9386 0.0000∗
Model 2 80.5064 0.0000∗
Model 3 4.9732 0.0000∗
∗ denotes differences are significant at the
5% level.
11Following the same procedure as in previous section, we use non-parametric techniques to formally
test whether the variety of efficiency scores obtained differ significantly from 2008–2013. Despite we
have pointed out that this is not a specific analysis on the dynamics of efficiency, in the appendix B
we also show results for a commonly used approach to analyse the efficiency changes over time: the
Malmquist productivity index (MPI).
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3.4.4. Evaluating cost efficiency according to the size of municipalities
Additionally, after a global analysis, we now concentrate on the distribution of the
coefficients according to size of the municipalities. Table 3.9, 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 present
overall cost-efficiency results by population sizes for each year and method in Model
1, 2 and 3, respectively.
Similarly to Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007, 2010a) and Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez
(2010), our results indicate that efficiencies vary according to local governments’ size.
Larger municipalities perform better, that is, mean efficiency scores are higher in
municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants than in municipalities between 5,000
and 20,000 inhabitants, which in turn are more efficient than the municipalities with
fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. This result is robust across time, methodologies and
output specifications. Thus, we can conclude that the most inefficient municipalities
are found amongst those municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, that is,
smaller municipalities are further from their efficient frontier, whereas most of larger
municipalities are efficient and closer to the frontier. Of special note is that given our
variable returns to scale assumption we only compare municipalities of similar sizes,
so this inefficiency does not take problems of scale into account.
3.4.5. Evaluating cost efficiency by regions and provinces
A thorough investigation also needs to understand whether there are structural
differences in the average cost efficiency between municipalities located in different
Spanish regions and provinces. The economic and financial crisis has seriously affected
all Spanish public administrations (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2016). However, its impact
has not been uniform across territories, since some of them (both regional and local
levels of government) have faced higher debt increases along with larger falls in
revenues, especially areas hardest hit by the effects of the housing bubble (Portillo
Navarro, 2009). Indeed, the most affected areas were located in the eastern part of the
Spanish peninsula and, to a greater extent, along the Mediterranean coast. In contrast,
the impact was relatively moderate in the Atlantic areas, due to their diversified
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Table 3.9: Summary statistics for efficiency results by population sizes
for DEA
Model 1
Year Size Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008
<=5000 0.4360 0.4093 0.0437 1.0000 1.5766
>5000 a <=20000 0.5355 0.5182 0.1034 1.0000 0.1623 2.0295
>20000 0.6983 0.6721 0.3206 1.0000 0.1755 2.9520
2009
<=5000 0.5440 0.5266 0.1257 1.0000 0.1674 1.9253
>5000 a <=20000 0.6119 0.6095 0.2648 1.0000 0.1405 1.2963
>20000 0.7196 0.7027 0.3751 1.0000 0.1701 3.3333
2010
<=5000 0.4758 0.4553 0.1312 1.0000 0.1590 1.0251
>5000 a <=20000 0.5385 0.5247 0.2174 1.0000 0.1493 1.6544
>20000 0.7191 0.6960 0.3700 1.0000 0.1698 2.3897
2011
<=5000 0.4882 0.4713 0.1359 1.0000 0.1623 1.1403
>5000 a <=20000 0.5498 0.5414 0.1871 1.0000 0.1491 1.1029
>20000 0.7135 0.6917 0.3620 1.0000 0.1806 2.5735
2012
<=5000 0.4707 0.4538 0.1079 1.0000 0.1574 1.0169
>5000 a <=20000 0.5779 0.5689 0.2099 1.0000 0.1485 0.5597
>20000 0.7224 0.7145 0.2834 1.0000 0.1707 3.3074
2013
<=5000 0.5148 0.4917 0.1138 1.0000 0.1739 1.9296
>5000 a <=20000 0.6112 0.5999 0.2258 1.0000 0.1501 1.3011
>20000 0.7522 0.7364 0.3042 1.0000 0.1723 3.8760
Model 2
Year Size Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008
<=5000 0.4531 0.4228 0.0446 1.0000 0.1839 2.4775
>5000 a <=20000 0.5539 0.5362 0.1064 1.0000 0.1698 2.3985
>20000 0.7228 0.7039 0.3282 1.0000 0.1853 4.7970
2009
<=5000 0.5558 0.5312 0.1268 1.0000 0.1769 3.1710
>5000 a <=20000 0.6228 0.6174 0.2648 1.0000 0.1425 1.6667
>20000 0.7309 0.7173 0.3881 1.0000 0.1747 4.6296
2010
<=5000 0.4888 0.4608 0.1421 1.0000 0.1676 2.0501
>5000 a <=20000 0.5609 0.5469 0.2182 1.0000 0.1587 2.2059
>20000 0.7391 0.7155 0.3706 1.0000 0.1739 3.4926
2011
<=5000 0.5043 0.4842 0.1359 1.0000 0.1723 2.3945
>5000 a <=20000 0.5729 0.5572 0.2113 1.0000 0.1562 1.6544
>20000 0.7367 0.7126 0.3736 1.0000 0.1834 3.8603
2012
<=5000 0.4910 0.4662 0.1269 1.0000 0.1704 1.8079
>5000 a <=20000 0.6020 0.5936 0.2122 1.0000 0.1571 1.4925
>20000 0.7376 0.7375 0.2875 1.0000 0.1739 4.8638
2013
<=5000 0.5323 0.5095 0.1299 1.0000 0.1821 3.0647
>5000 a <=20000 0.6325 0.6181 0.2276 1.0000 0.1566 2.9740
>20000 0.7696 0.7608 0.3058 1.0000 0.1737 6.0078
Model 3
Year Size Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008
<=5000 0.6526 0.6106 0.0614 1.0000 0.2572 22.8604
>5000 a <=20000 0.7148 0.7347 0.0745 1.0000 0.2672 31.7343
>20000 0.7910 1.0000 0.1665 1.0000 0.2669 14.0221
2009
<=5000 0.7154 0.6936 0.1651 1.0000 0.2159 23.2163
>5000 a <=20000 0.7769 0.8302 0.0925 1.0000 0.2401 35.9259
>20000 0.8245 1.0000 0.2508 1.0000 0.2288 14.6296
2010
<=5000 0.6786 0.6408 0.1631 1.0000 0.2234 19.7039
>5000 a <=20000 0.7437 0.7518 0.1142 1.0000 0.2350 32.7206
>20000 0.8187 1.0000 0.2326 1.0000 0.2406 15.2574
2011
<=5000 0.6598 0.6186 0.1461 1.0000 0.2256 18.3580
>5000 a <=20000 0.7344 0.7366 0.1257 1.0000 0.2405 31.2500
>20000 0.8319 1.0000 0.2010 1.0000 0.2342 15.6250
2012
<=5000 0.6650 0.6350 0.1570 1.0000 0.2334 19.6610
>5000 a <=20000 0.7510 0.7642 0.1073 1.0000 0.2338 31.7164
>20000 0.8284 1.0000 0.2769 1.0000 0.2290 16.5370
2013
<=5000 0.6761 0.6512 0.1636 1.0000 0.2279 18.9557
>5000 a <=20000 0.7477 0.7554 0.1044 1.0000 0.2313 29.9257
>20000 0.8334 1.0000 0.2360 1.0000 0.2334 17.0543
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Table 3.10: Summary statistics for efficiency results by population
sizes for FDH
Model 1
Year Size Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008
<=5000 0.6823 0.6684 0.0808 1.0000 0.2359 20.3829
>5000 a <=20000 0.7985 0.8291 0.1759 1.0000 0.1920 28.4133
>20000 0.9244 1.0000 0.4436 1.0000 0.1319 16.6052
2009
<=5000 0.7791 0.7899 0.2087 1.0000 0.1941 24.8018
>5000 a <=20000 0.8605 0.9063 0.3740 1.0000 0.1569 39.8148
>20000 0.8996 1.0000 0.2045 1.0000 0.1525 15.3704
2010
<=5000 0.7313 0.7267 0.1559 1.0000 0.1997 17.8815
>5000 a <=20000 0.8143 0.8417 0.3583 1.0000 0.1770 30.8824
>20000 0.8977 1.0000 0.3636 1.0000 0.1568 15.9926
2011
<=5000 0.6869 0.6692 0.2037 1.0000 0.2088 14.8233
>5000 a <=20000 0.7945 0.8088 0.2754 1.0000 0.1888 28.6765
>20000 0.9057 1.0000 0.3975 1.0000 0.1643 17.8309
2012
<=5000 0.7092 0.6950 0.1497 1.0000 0.2151 18.7571
>5000 a <=20000 0.8114 0.8387 0.2813 1.0000 0.1744 27.4254
>20000 0.9046 1.0000 0.4344 1.0000 0.1571 17.1206
2013
<=5000 0.7198 0.7147 0.2247 1.0000 0.2120 19.4098
>5000 a <=20000 0.7971 0.8147 0.2813 1.0000 0.1807 26.0223
>20000 0.8787 1.0000 0.1497 1.0000 0.1799 16.0853
Model 2
Year Size Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008
<=5000 0.8472 1.0000 0.0945 1.0000 0.2023 51.0135
>5000 a <=20000 0.9351 1.0000 0.2742 1.0000 0.1344 71.7712
>20000 0.9836 1.0000 0.5080 1.0000 0.0679 24.1697
2009
<=5000 0.8920 1.0000 0.3233 1.0000 0.1616 55.7191
>5000 a <=20000 0.9649 1.0000 0.4763 1.0000 0.0908 78.5185
>20000 0.9765 1.0000 0.5625 1.0000 0.0757 24.0741
2010
<=5000 0.8758 1.0000 0.3040 1.0000 0.1750 52.6196
>5000 a <=20000 0.9512 1.0000 0.3874 1.0000 0.1076 74.4485
>20000 0.9722 1.0000 0.6382 1.0000 0.0747 23.7132
2011
<=5000 0.8527 1.0000 0.2428 1.0000 0.2000 51.9954
>5000 a <=20000 0.9329 1.0000 0.3803 1.0000 0.1302 70.7721
>20000 0.9746 1.0000 0.5976 1.0000 0.0750 24.2647
2012
<=5000 0.8574 1.0000 0.2724 1.0000 0.1902 50.3955
>5000 a <=20000 0.9354 1.0000 0.4106 1.0000 0.1269 69.7761
>20000 0.9779 1.0000 0.5620 1.0000 0.0729 26.2646
2013
<=5000 0.8753 1.0000 0.2648 1.0000 0.1772 53.3485
>5000 a <=20000 0.9264 1.0000 0.4106 1.0000 0.1331 67.2862
>20000 0.9723 1.0000 0.5620 1.0000 0.0844 25.9690
Model 3
Year Size Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008
<=5000 0.9037 1.0000 0.2771 1.0000 0.1631 63.1757
>5000 a <=20000 0.9321 1.0000 0.2655 1.0000 0.1425 73.9852
>20000 0.9863 1.0000 0.5829 1.0000 0.0632 24.9077
2009
<=5000 0.9139 1.0000 0.3015 1.0000 0.1594 68.0634
>5000 a <=20000 0.9407 1.0000 0.2655 1.0000 0.1340 75.5556
>20000 0.9701 1.0000 0.2771 1.0000 0.0970 24.2593
2010
<=5000 0.9112 1.0000 0.2648 1.0000 0.1594 66.1731
>5000 a <=20000 0.9442 1.0000 0.4252 1.0000 0.1241 75.5515
>20000 0.9781 1.0000 0.5999 1.0000 0.0670 24.0809
2011
<=5000 0.9024 1.0000 0.2648 1.0000 0.1653 61.6876
>5000 a <=20000 0.9407 1.0000 0.2965 1.0000 0.1284 75.1838
>20000 0.9777 1.0000 0.5999 1.0000 0.0731 24.6324
2012
<=5000 0.8995 1.0000 0.2863 1.0000 0.1689 61.4689
>5000 a <=20000 0.9412 1.0000 0.2385 1.0000 0.1294 74.8134
>20000 0.9761 1.0000 0.5947 1.0000 0.0740 25.8755
2013
<=5000 0.9073 1.0000 0.2977 1.0000 0.1621 64.1317
>5000 a <=20000 0.9327 1.0000 0.2188 1.0000 0.1336 70.8178
>20000 0.9751 1.0000 0.5821 1.0000 0.0789 26.1628
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Table 3.11: Summary statistics for efficiency results by population
sizes for Order-m
Model 1
Year Size Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008
<=5000 0.7875 0.7724 0.0834 1.9813 0.2659 23.9865
>5000 a <=20000 0.8131 0.8418 0.1800 1.2185 0.1900 29.5203
>20000 0.9245 1.0000 0.4436 1.0000 0.1318 16.6052
2009
<=5000 0.8528 0.8501 0.2122 1.7369 0.2319 30.1246
>5000 a <=20000 0.8827 0.9316 0.3782 1.1514 0.1531 40.7407
>20000 0.9153 1.0000 0.5012 1.0026 0.1306 16.1111
2010
<=5000 0.8233 0.8148 0.2172 1.8080 0.2280 23.0068
>5000 a <=20000 0.8421 0.8604 0.3611 1.3291 0.1674 31.4338
>20000 0.9138 1.0000 0.4043 1.0002 0.1424 17.0956
2011
<=5000 0.7878 0.7718 0.2368 2.0281 0.2440 19.9544
>5000 a <=20000 0.8154 0.8219 0.3022 1.2693 0.1812 29.7794
>20000 0.9058 1.0000 0.3975 1.0004 0.1642 17.8309
2012
<=5000 0.8055 0.7884 0.1797 1.8914 0.2450 25.1977
>5000 a <=20000 0.8262 0.8531 0.2967 1.1719 0.1721 27.9851
>20000 0.9047 1.0000 0.4344 1.0005 0.1570 17.1206
2013
<=5000 0.8070 0.7912 0.1785 1.9204 0.2464 24.7446
>5000 a <=20000 0.8194 0.8371 0.3041 1.1683 0.1727 27.1375
>20000 0.9045 1.0000 0.4344 1.0016 0.1555 17.2481
Model 2
Year Size Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008
<=5000 0.9054 1.0000 0.0969 1.8544 0.2275 53.1532
>5000 a <=20000 0.9380 1.0000 0.2820 1.0871 0.1323 71.7712
>20000 0.9836 1.0000 0.5080 1.0000 0.0679 24.1697
2009
<=5000 0.9488 1.0000 0.3420 1.7793 0.1927 58.7769
>5000 a <=20000 0.9730 1.0000 0.4814 1.1234 0.0842 79.6296
>20000 0.9861 1.0000 0.5625 1.0004 0.0548 25.0000
2010
<=5000 0.9401 1.0000 0.3130 2.0046 0.2032 55.2392
>5000 a <=20000 0.9583 1.0000 0.3874 1.4095 0.1055 75.1838
>20000 0.9782 1.0000 0.6382 1.0000 0.0673 24.4485
2011
<=5000 0.9307 1.0000 0.2800 2.2371 0.2279 55.7583
>5000 a <=20000 0.9382 1.0000 0.4025 1.1165 0.1262 70.7721
>20000 0.9746 1.0000 0.5976 1.0000 0.0750 24.2647
2012
<=5000 0.9273 1.0000 0.2946 2.3782 0.2200 54.6893
>5000 a <=20000 0.9397 1.0000 0.4120 1.1081 0.1249 69.7761
>20000 0.9779 1.0000 0.5620 1.0000 0.0729 26.2646
2013
<=5000 0.9433 1.0000 0.2937 2.4632 0.2181 56.6402
>5000 a <=20000 0.9350 1.0000 0.4122 1.1174 0.1282 68.2156
>20000 0.9778 1.0000 0.5620 1.0000 0.0733 26.5504
Model 3
Year Size Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008
<=5000 0.9155 1.0000 0.2771 1.3837 0.1623 63.7387
>5000 a <=20000 0.9322 1.0000 0.2676 1.0002 0.1420 73.9852
>20000 0.9863 1.0000 0.5829 1.0000 0.0632 24.9077
2009
<=5000 0.9252 1.0000 0.2771 1.4062 0.1660 67.8369
>5000 a <=20000 0.9449 1.0000 0.2677 1.0010 0.1278 76.2963
>20000 0.9831 1.0000 0.5999 1.0000 0.0630 25.3704
2010
<=5000 0.9258 1.0000 0.2648 1.8670 0.1667 65.1481
>5000 a <=20000 0.9474 1.0000 0.4252 1.0030 0.1204 77.0221
>20000 0.9830 1.0000 0.5999 1.0003 0.0585 25.0000
2011
<=5000 0.9210 1.0000 0.2648 2.0400 0.1706 62.7138
>5000 a <=20000 0.9409 1.0000 0.3030 1.0029 0.1281 75.1838
>20000 0.9777 1.0000 0.5999 1.0000 0.0731 24.6324
2012
<=5000 0.9178 1.0000 0.3049 1.7124 0.1698 62.8249
>5000 a <=20000 0.9414 1.0000 0.2526 1.0037 0.1289 74.8134
>20000 0.9761 1.0000 0.5947 1.0000 0.0740 25.8755
2013
<=5000 0.9245 1.0000 0.3050 1.6945 0.1690 64.8127
>5000 a <=20000 0.9360 1.0000 0.2335 1.0026 0.1312 71.9331
>20000 0.9805 1.0000 0.5832 1.0000 0.0679 26.7442
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Table 3.12: Summary statistics for efficiency results by population
sizes for KSW
Model 1
Year Size Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008
<=5000 0.3769 0.3583 0.0400 0.9227 0.1481 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.4908 0.4742 0.0989 1.0000 0.1458 0.0000
>20000 0.6441 0.6241 0.1122 1.0000 0.1754 0.0000
2009
<=5000 0.4940 0.4770 0.1180 0.9573 0.1514 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.5721 0.5725 0.2458 1.0000 0.1339 0.0000
>20000 0.6676 0.6500 0.3010 1.0000 0.1698 0.0000
2010
<=5000 0.4064 0.3909 0.0635 0.9359 0.1368 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.4721 0.4626 0.1141 1.0000 0.1439 0.0000
>20000 0.6542 0.6361 0.2569 1.0000 0.1728 0.0000
2011
<=5000 0.4340 0.4246 0.1178 0.9287 0.1411 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.4906 0.4840 0.1572 1.0000 0.1355 0.0000
>20000 0.6455 0.6260 0.2879 1.0000 0.1847 0.0000
2012
<=5000 0.3994 0.3832 0.0134 0.9142 0.1319 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.5219 0.5147 0.1596 1.0000 0.1447 0.0000
>20000 0.6573 0.6340 0.2464 1.0000 0.1758 0.0000
2013
<=5000 0.4673 0.4477 0.1071 0.9440 0.1558 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.5729 0.5700 0.1376 1.0000 0.1483 0.0000
>20000 0.7016 0.6766 0.2769 1.0000 0.1735 0.0000
Model 2
Year Size Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008
<=5000 0.3781 0.3570 0.0310 1.0000 0.1523 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.4964 0.4794 0.1004 1.0000 0.1516 0.0000
>20000 0.6599 0.6354 0.2426 1.0000 0.1949 0.0000
2009
<=5000 0.4906 0.4726 0.1040 1.0000 0.1549 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.5671 0.5693 0.2361 1.0000 0.1365 0.0000
>20000 0.6646 0.6407 0.2996 1.0000 0.1837 0.0000
2010
<=5000 0.4031 0.3863 0.0531 1.0000 0.1384 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.4835 0.4665 0.0944 1.0000 0.1560 0.0000
>20000 0.6659 0.6402 0.2264 1.0000 0.1871 0.0000
2011
<=5000 0.4359 0.4247 0.1163 1.0000 0.1436 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.5017 0.4881 0.1470 1.0000 0.1442 0.0000
>20000 0.6584 0.6255 0.2220 1.0000 0.1992 0.0000
2012
<=5000 0.4054 0.3866 0.0013 1.0000 0.1389 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.5379 0.5332 0.1281 1.0000 0.1543 0.1946
>20000 0.6671 0.6382 0.2343 1.0000 0.1888 0.6623
2013
<=5000 0.4803 0.4603 0.1375 1.0000 0.1644 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.5708 0.5703 0.1200 1.0000 0.1599 0.1938
>20000 0.6795 0.6445 0.0982 1.0000 0.1939 0.0000
Model 3
Year Size Mean Median Min Max S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2008
<=5000 0.5686 0.5356 0.0064 1.0000 0.2205 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.5948 0.5865 0.0017 1.0000 0.2801 0.0000
>20000 0.7108 0.8552 0.0609 1.0000 0.3153 0.0000
2009
<=5000 0.5531 0.5282 0.0357 1.0000 0.2204 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.6164 0.5968 0.0351 1.0000 0.2638 0.0000
>20000 0.7148 0.7571 0.1109 1.0000 0.2922 0.0000
2010
<=5000 0.5558 0.5185 0.0636 1.0000 0.2163 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.6379 0.6174 0.0466 1.0000 0.2456 0.0000
>20000 0.7209 0.8038 0.0817 1.0000 0.2879 0.0000
2011
<=5000 0.5527 0.5110 0.0193 1.0000 0.2091 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.6662 0.6425 0.0602 1.0000 0.2347 0.0000
>20000 0.7714 0.8951 0.2308 1.0000 0.2525 0.6623
2012
<=5000 0.5596 0.5273 0.0295 1.0000 0.2161 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.6590 0.6472 0.0566 1.0000 0.2301 0.1946
>20000 0.7663 0.8476 0.2257 1.0000 0.2542 0.0000
2013
<=5000 0.5664 0.5365 0.0000 1.0000 0.2084 0.0000
>5000 a <=20000 0.6363 0.5999 0.0362 1.0000 0.2351 0.0000
>20000 0.7426 0.8039 0.1130 1.0000 0.2656 0.6536
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economies, and in some interior regions such as Castile and Leon, which had not been
as heavily involved in the growth of the real estate bubble (Méndez Gutiérrez del Valle,
2015).
In addition, territorial differences in the regional financing system could also affect
the provision of local public services. Note that local governments receive transfers
from regional governments; hence, if the latter are underfinanced, local governments’
resources may be affected. On this point, a 2014 report from the Spanish Ministry of
the Treasury and Public Administrations concluded that some regions, such as the
Balearic Islands, Valencian Community or Murcia, had the lowest rates per capita of
funding received by the homogeneous regional powers in 2011, while the regions of
Navarre, the Basque Country, La Rioja and Cantabria were the best funded.12
Therefore, given that the effects derived from the economic crisis and the regional
financing system have not been equal in all Spanish territories, the local governments’
location in a given territory could determine the more efficient provision of local
public services. Some local entities faced an even more complicated situation, in which
they had to continue providing public services with considerably lower resources but
attending to their budgetary balance. In this context, we examine the existence of
interregional differences showing higher or lower efficiency levels across municipalities
located in different areas. Table 3.13 reports the descriptive statistics of the average
efficiency scores classified for the Spanish regions and provinces.13
When considering the efficiency scores by regions we found that over the whole pe-
riod municipalities in the region of Galicia seem to have the highest levels of efficiency.
Indeed, Table 3.13 shows that better-performing municipalities are concentrated in the
north of the country (i.e., Galicia, Cantabria and Asturias). Moreover, a comparison
of provinces’ efficiency scores reveals that the four provinces making up the region
of Galicia are among the most efficient, confirming the higher performance of local
12Report from the Spanish Ministry of the Treasury and Public Administrations (Ministerio de Hacienda
y Administraciones Públicas), July 2014. “Informe sobre la dimensión territorial de la actuación de las
Administraciones Públicas, Ejercicio 2011”. Retrieved from http://www.minhafp.gob.es
13For the sake of simplicity, we focus the analysis on output Model 3 (note that we found statistical
evidence of the possible implications of service quality when measuring local government cost efficiency.)
However, qualitative results for output Models 1 and 2 are not greatly different and are available upon
request.
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Table 3.13: Distribution of the efficiency scores grouped by regions and provinces
This table reports the distribution of the efficiency results classified by Regions and Provinces for the
years 2008 and 2013 in output Model 3.
DEA FDH Order-m KSW
Territory 2008 2013 2008 2013 2008 2013 2008 2013
Almería 0.7079 0.7347 0.9369 0.9362 0.9393 0.9400 0.6003 0.6116
Cádiz 0.8572 0.7424 1.0000 0.9578 1.0000 0.9582 0.7548 0.6655
Córdoba 0.6754 0.6350 0.9636 0.9066 0.9666 0.9136 0.5289 0.5616
Granada 0.7028 0.7113 0.9140 0.9427 0.9210 0.9470 0.5440 0.5916
Jaén 0.6538 0.5885 0.9270 0.8890 0.9281 0.8930 0.4869 0.5157
Málaga 0.6048 0.5852 0.8331 0.8323 0.8353 0.8373 0.5597 0.5140
Sevilla 0.7321 0.7518 0.9299 0.9509 0.9304 0.9456 0.5654 0.6442
Andalusia 0.6977 0.6815 0.9243 0.9184 0.9271 0.9210 0.5632 0.5858
Teruel 0.6065 0.6450 0.9205 0.8814 0.9333 0.9019 0.5782 0.5197
Zaragoza 0.5892 0.5918 0.8962 0.8253 0.9007 0.8330 0.5115 0.5192
Aragon 0.5927 0.6029 0.9012 0.8369 0.9074 0.8472 0.5253 0.5193
Asturias 0.7222 0.7580 0.9551 0.9552 0.9617 0.9671 0.5646 0.5347
Balearic Islands 0.7008 0.6577 0.8928 0.8600 0.8950 0.8656 0.5907 0.5820
Las Palmas 0.5751 0.7979 0.9144 0.9595 0.9144 0.9595 0.4377 0.6796
S.C. de Tenerife 0.5800 0.6217 0.9306 0.8695 0.9317 0.8637 0.5609 0.5571
Canary Islands 0.5783 0.6830 0.9250 0.9008 0.9257 0.8970 0.5180 0.5997
Cantabria 0.7680 0.8346 0.9532 0.9639 0.9583 0.9694 0.4285 0.4547
Ávila 0.7509 0.7555 0.9221 0.9452 0.9225 0.9487 0.5566 0.6100
León 0.7386 0.7416 0.9374 0.9443 0.9719 1.0461 0.4687 0.6006
Palencia 0.5371 0.6773 0.9188 0.8378 0.9188 0.8378 0.5403 0.6033
Salamanca 0.6431 0.6929 0.8366 0.8708 0.8558 0.9020 0.5436 0.6044
Segovia 0.7040 0.7998 0.9446 0.9917 0.9647 0.9997 0.6749 0.7306
Soria 0.7170 0.6205 0.8762 0.8412 0.8762 0.9139 0.5897 0.5447
Valladolid 0.6778 0.7287 0.9709 0.9358 0.9922 0.9612 0.5438 0.6166
Zamora 0.7457 0.7054 0.9362 0.9442 0.9983 0.9893 0.5781 0.2801
Castile and Leon 0.7045 0.7273 0.9307 0.9297 0.9555 0.9761 0.5411 0.5815
Albacete 0.5303 0.6839 0.9121 0.9145 0.9223 0.9403 0.5297 0.5313
Ciudad Real 0.6782 0.7051 0.8774 0.9047 0.8834 0.9214 0.5228 0.5902
Cuenca 0.5566 0.6162 0.8185 0.8350 0.8235 0.8417 0.6111 0.5667
Toledo 0.6917 0.7346 0.9594 0.9499 0.9649 0.9516 0.6070 0.6261
Castile La Mancha 0.6383 0.7027 0.9125 0.9177 0.9191 0.9288 0.5703 0.5902
Badajoz 0.6646 0.6972 0.9429 0.9521 0.9532 0.9625 0.5527 0.5186
Cáceres 0.5999 0.6196 0.8149 0.8544 0.8275 0.8706 0.5462 0.5532
Extremadura 0.6406 0.6684 0.8954 0.9159 0.9066 0.9284 0.5503 0.5315
A Coruña 0.9140 0.8517 0.9915 0.9874 0.9919 0.9892 0.7502 0.7022
Lugo 0.9112 0.8064 0.9948 0.9789 1.0009 0.9926 0.4936 0.5997
Orense 0.8606 0.8942 0.9708 0.9721 0.9717 0.9877 0.6660 0.5446
Pontevedra 0.9183 0.8976 0.9745 0.9903 0.9745 0.9948 0.7385 0.7032
Galicia 0.8987 0.8686 0.9818 0.9823 0.9831 0.9905 0.6859 0.6408
Murcia 0.5194 0.6615 0.8585 0.8706 0.8590 0.8716 0.5014 0.5734
La Rioja 0.5135 0.5557 0.8021 0.8108 0.8129 0.8291 0.5211 0.5042
Alicante 0.6717 0.7727 0.9313 0.9522 0.9357 0.9601 0.6085 0.6600
Castellón 0.5988 0.6874 0.8469 0.9296 0.8672 0.9489 0.5702 0.6039
Valencia 0.5569 0.6701 0.8890 0.9027 0.8951 0.9162 0.5304 0.5888
Valencian Community 0.5961 0.7023 0.8953 0.9209 0.9029 0.9335 0.5586 0.6116
Notes: In our final sample there was no information available for the full period 2008 to 2013 for the Basque
Country, Navarre, Catalonia and Madrid regions and the provinces of Burgos, Huesca, Guadalajara and
Huelva.
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governments located in this region. In contrast, municipalities from La Rioja region
show the lowest average efficiency results, followed by the regions of Murcia in 2008
and Aragon in 2013. Efficiency scores considered by provinces again reveal munici-
palities in La Rioja as having the lowest levels of efficiency, although other provinces
such as Cuenca (in Castile La Mancha), Zaragoza (Aragon) or Málaga (Andalusia)
also present poor performances in most cases.
The above descriptive analysis gives us an initial insight into the existence of
interregional differences, where municipalities with higher or lower levels of efficiency
seem to concentrate. In order to statistically support this point, we carry out a
Kruskal-Wallis14 test to determine whether any of the differences between the medians
of the regions (or provinces within each region) are statistically significant. We
consider the null hypothesis H0 : The medians for all regions are equal, meaning that
there is no statistically significant difference between the median efficiency scores of
municipalities located in different regions (or provinces within a region), against the
alternative hypothesis H1 : At least two regions differ. Results are provided in Table
3.14. The test results show that differences across regions are significant. However, the
differences between provinces are significant depending on the region analysed. For
instance, there are differences at the 5% level of significance for Andalusia or Castile
and Leon, while there are no differences for Galicia, which is in line with our findings
in the descriptive analysis.
3.5. Conclusion
In recent years, the context of the international economic crisis has prioritised the
improvement of public management efficiency in local governments. In most euro-area
countries, the economic and financial situation has had a huge impact on many local
governments’ incomes, leading to increased deficits. Interest in public efficiency is even
higher in countries such as Spain, where municipalities have faced stricter budget
limitations with the law on budgetary stability (Ley General Presupuestaria), which
tightened control over public debt and public spending. Spain has also experienced
14Kruskal-Wallis test is the nonparametric alternative to the one-way ANOVA.
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a deep economic recession since 2007, and came under serious scrutiny within the
Eurozone in 2012. In these circumstances, issues related to Spanish local government
efficiency and their contribution to public sector deficit are even more relevant. In
this chapter, we have analysed the overall cost efficiency of Spanish local governments
during the period of the economic crisis (2008–2013) which to date has scarcely been
examined, and which has had serious effects on Spanish local governments.
Regardless of the context of the analysis, the current large body of literature evalu-
ating local government efficiency shares two important and still unsolved problems.
The first is the complexity of defining local governments’ outputs and inputs; the
second is the lack of a clear standard methodology to measure efficiency (these two
common problems from previous literature were earlier discussed in chapter 2). The
present study also contributes to fill these gaps by defining several output models and
employing four separate non-parametric approaches to estimate local government cost
efficiency. The sample included 1,574 Spanish local governments with populations
between 1,000 and 50,000 for the period 2008–2013, the widest-ranging sample based
on Spanish data used to date.
Our results point to significant differences in the distribution of the efficiency
scores between years 2008 and 2013. In general, efficiency scores improved over
the years. In the context of economic crisis, Spanish local governments have come
under pressure to accommodate severe economic restrictions while still attending
to citizen needs. Thus, we conclude that Spanish local governments have improved
their efficiency levels since they reduced their budget expenditures (inputs or costs)
while maintaining or increasing local public service provision (outputs) over the
crisis period 2008–2013. Additionally, results also vary according to the size of the
municipalities. Larger municipalities perform better, i.e., smaller municipalities are
further from their efficient frontier, whereas most of larger municipalities are efficient
and closer to the frontier.15 These differences may be related to the quality of public
management, given that larger municipalities use more innovative management tools
15Of special note is that given our variable returns to scale assumption we only compare municipalities
of similar sizes.
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(such as financial budgetary control, contracting out of services, etc.) than smaller
municipalities (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007).
Moreover, given the problems of defining the bundle of services and facilities
that municipalities must provide, we propose three output models including quantity
and quality variables. Our results confirm the importance of considering alternative
input-output models in order to assess whether the different choices might explain
heterogeneity among local governments. Moreover, in our sample of Spanish local
governments we find statistical evidence of the possible implications of service quality
when measuring local government cost efficiency. There is a trade-off between cost
efficiency and service quality when quality variables are accounted for. In this setting,
the inclusion of quality variables in efficiency analysis is particularly interesting and
informative for policy-makers, since performance decisions may have an impact on
their quality and not on their quantity.
Another important issue concerns the structural differences in the average cost
efficiency between municipalities located in different Spanish regions and provinces.
This is the first time that local governments’ location in a given territory has been
investigated in the local government efficiency literature. We found that municipalities
with higher efficiency scores are concentrated in the north of the country, while La
Rioja and some of the eastern provinces such as Murcia or Aragon present lower
efficiency values. These results suggest that these interregional differences should be
considered when public policies and fiscal adjustments are being designed to control
local governments’ budget expenditures since they could affect equality of access to
local public services.
Finally, the comparison of results from the four non-parametric methodologies
reveals that efficiency scores can vary widely depending on the method applied
(Geys and Moesen, 2009b). Since there is no clear standard methodology to measure
efficiency, accurately assessing cost efficiency remains difficult. It therefore makes
sense to use a variety of methodologies in order to check the robustness of the results.
As expected, local managers have some margin to optimise the use of public resources,
suggesting that Spanish municipalities could achieve the same level of local output
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with fewer resources. We found considerable differences in the mean efficiency scores
between the various reference technologies, ranging from 0.44 to 0.96 (also depending
on the model and the year). Therefore, in line with previous research our results
confirm that the level and variation of the efficiency scores are affected by the approach
taken.
In the next chapter, since the method chosen to measure efficiency analysis may
affect the efficiency results, we compare the estimation techniques explained in this
chapter following the method employed in Badunenko et al. (2012). The aim is
to uncover which techniques are more appropriate to assess local government cost
efficiency in Spain in an attempt to provide a system for assessing local government
performance with practical relevance.
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Chapter 4
Which estimator to measure local
governments’ cost efficiency?
4.1. Introduction
Aforementioned in chapter 1, managing the available resources efficiently at all levels
of government (central, regional, and municipal) is essential, particularly in the sce-
nario of the current international economic crisis, which still affects several European
countries. Given that increasing taxes and deficit is politically costly (Doumpos and
Cohen, 2014), a reasonable way to operate in this context is to improve economic
efficiency (De Witte and Geys, 2011), which in cost terms means that an entity should
produce a particular level of output in the cheapest way. In this setting, since local
regulators must provide the best possible local services at the lowest possible cost,
developing a system for evaluating local government performance that allows bench-
marks to be set over time could have relevant practical implications (Da Cruz and
Marques, 2014). However, measuring the performance of local governments is usually
highly complex.
As shown in chapter 2, in which an extensive review of the existing literature on
local governments efficiency is provided, local government efficiency has attracted
much scholarly interest in the field of public administration. However, despite the high
number of empirical contributions, a major challenge to analysis of local government
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performance is the lack of clear, standard methodology to perform efficiency analysis,
a common problem from previous literature earlier discussed in chapters 2 and 3. This
is not a trivial question as much previous literature has proposed different frontier
techniques, both parametric and non-parametric, to analyse technical, cost or other
forms of efficiency in local governments.
Although this problem is well-known in the efficiency measurement literature,
few studies have attempted to use two or more alternative approaches comparatively.
For instance, De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) analysed local governments in Belgium
using five different reference technologies, two non-parametric (DEA and FDH)
and three parametric frontiers (one deterministic and two stochastic). They found
large differences in the efficiency scores for identical samples and, as a consequence,
suggested using different methods to control for the robustness of results whenever
the problem of choosing the “best” reference technology is unsolved. Other studies
compared the efficiency estimates of DEA and SFA,1 or DEA and FDH or other
non-parametric variants,2 and drew similar conclusions.
Since there is no obvious way to choose an efficiency estimator, the method se-
lected may affect the efficiency analysis (Geys and Moesen, 2009b) and could lead
to biased results. Therefore, if local government decision makers set a benchmark
based on an incorrect efficiency score, a non-negligible economic impact may result.
Accordingly, as Badunenko et al. (2012) point out, if the selected method overestimates
the efficiency scores, some local governments may not be penalised and, as a result,
their inefficiencies will persist. In contrast, if the efficiency scores are underestimated
some local governments would be regarded as “low performers” and could be un-
necessarily penalised. Hence, although we note that each particular methodology
leads to different cost efficiency results for each local government, one should ideally
report efficiency scores that will be more reliable, or closer to the truth Badunenko
et al. (2012).3
1Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Worthington (2000); Geys and Moesen (2009b); Boetti et al.
(2012); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Pevcin (2014b)
2Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Fogarty and Mugera (2013); El Mehdi and Hafner (2014)
3We will elaborate further on this a priori ambitious expression.
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The present chapter addresses these issues by comparing four non-parametric
methodologies and uncovering which measures might be more appropriate to assess
local government cost efficiency in Spain. The study contributes to the literature in
three specific aspects. First, we seek to compare the four non-parametric estimation
techniques explained in chapter 3 (see section 3.2), namely DEA, FDH, the order-m
partial frontier and KSW; the first two are the most popular in the non-parametric
field while the latter two are more recent proposals. These techniques have been
widely studied in the previous literature, but little is known about their performance
in comparison with each other.
Second, we attempt to determine which of these methods should be applied to
measure cost efficiency in a given situation. In contrast to previous literature, which
has regularly compared techniques and made alternative proposals, we follow the
method set out by Badunenko et al. (2012), with the aim to compare the different
methods used and identify those that perform better in different settings. We carry
out the experiment via Monte Carlo simulations and discuss the relative performance
of the efficiency estimators under various scenarios.
As a final contribution, we uncover which methodologies perform better with
our particular dataset, i.e., the ones which are more appropriate to measure local
governments’ efficiency in Spain. From the simulation results, we determine in which
scenario our data lies in, and we follow the suggestions related to the performance of
the estimators for this scenario. Therefore, we use a consistent method to choose an
efficiency estimator, which provides a significant contribution to previous literature in
local governments efficiency. We focus on a sample of 1,574 Spanish local governments
between 1,000 and 50,000 inhabitants for the period 2008–2013 (for further details, see
output specificatin Model 1 from section 5.2.1 in chapter 3).
Note that, as stated in chapters 1 and 3, the sample is also relevant in terms of the
period analysed. The economic and financial crisis that started in 2007 has had a huge
impact on most Spanish local government revenues and finances in general. Under
these circumstances, issues related to Spanish local government efficiency have gained
relevance and momentum. Evaluation techniques give the opportunity to identify
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policy programs that are working well, to analyse aspects of a program that can be
improved, and to identify other public programs that do not meet the stated objectives.
In fact, giving insight into the amount of local government inefficiency might help to
further support effective policy measures to correct and or control it. Therefore, it is
obvious that obtaining here a reliable efficiency score would have relevant economic
and political implications.
Our results suggest that there is no one approach suitable for all efficiency analysis.
When using these results for policy decisions, local regulators must be aware of
which part of the distribution is of particular interest and if the interest lies in the
efficiency scores or the rankings estimates. We find that for our sample of Spanish
local governments, all methods showed some room for improvement in terms of
possible cost efficiency gains, however they present large differences in the inefficiency
levels. Both DEA and FDH methodologies showed the most reliable efficiency results,
according to the findings of our simulations. Therefore, our results indicate that the
average cost efficiency would have been between 0.54 and 0.77 during the period
2008–2013, suggesting that Spanish local governments could have achieved the same
level of local outputs with about 23% to 36% fewer resources. From a technical point
of view, the analytical tools introduced in this chapter would represent an interesting
contribution that examine the possibility of using a consistent method to choose an
efficiency estimator, and the obtained results give evidence on how efficiency could
certainly be assessed to provide some additional guidance for policy makers.
The chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2 shows the methodological com-
parison experiment and the results for the different scenarios. Section 4.3 gives a
suggestion of which methodology performs better with our particular dataset and
presents and comments the most relevant efficiency results. Finally, section 4.4 sum-
marises the main conclusions.
4.2. Methodological comparison
In contrast to the previous literature, in this section we compare DEA, FDH, order-m
and KSW approaches (for further details, see section 3.2 in chapter 3) following the
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method proposed by Badunenko et al. (2012).4 Our aim is to uncover which measures
perform best with our particular dataset, that is, which ones are the most appropriate
to measure local government efficiency in Spain in order to provide useful information
for local governments’ performance decisions.
To this end, we carry out the experiment via Monte Carlo simulations. We first
define the data generating process, the parameters and the distributional assumptions
on data. Second, we consider the different methodologies and take several standard
measures to compare their behaviour. Next, after running the simulations, we discuss
the relative performance of the efficiency estimators under the various scenarios. Fi-
nally, we decide which methods are the most appropriate to measure local government
efficiency in Spain.
4.2.1. Simulations
Several previous studies analysing local government cost efficiency with parametric
techniques used the SFA estimator developed byAigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and
Van den Broeck (1977) as a model to estimate cost frontiers.5 These studies considered
the input-oriented efficiency where the dependent variable is the level of spending or
cost, and the independent variables are output levels. As a parametric approach, SFA
establishes the best practice frontier on the basis of a specific functional form, most
commonly Cobb-Douglas or Translog. Moreover, it allows researchers to distinguish
between measurement error and inefficiency term.
Following this scheme, we conduct simulations for a production process with one
input or cost (c) and two outputs (y1 and y2).6 We consider a Cobb-Douglas cost
function. For the baseline case, we assume constant returns to scale (CRS) (γ = 1).7
4The study of Badunenko et al. (2012) compared two estimators of technical efficiency in a cross-
sectional setting. Specifically, they compared SFA, represented by the non-parametric kernel SFA
estimator of Fan et al. (1996), with DEA, represented by the non-parametric bias-corrected DEA estimator
of Kneip et al. (2008).
5See, for instance, the studies of Worthington (2000), De Borger and Kerstens (1996a), Geys (2006),
Ibrahim and Salleh (2006), Geys and Moesen (2009a,b), Kalb (2010), Geys et al. (2010), Kalb et al. (2012)
or Štastná and Gregor (2015), Lampe et al. (2015), among others.
6For simplicity, we use a multi-output model with two outputs instead of six.
7In subsection 4.2.4, we consider robustness checks with increasing and decreasing returns to scale to
make sure that our simulations accurately represent the performance of our methods.
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We establish a = 1/3 and b = γ− a.
We simulate observations for outputs y1 and y2, which are distributed uniformly
on the [1, 2] interval. Moreover, we assume that the true error term (υ) is normally
distributed N(0, σ2υ) and the true cost efficiency is TCE = exp(−u), where u is half-
normally distributed N+(0, σ2u) and independent from υ. We introduce the true
error and inefficiency terms in the frontier formulation, which takes the following
expression:
c = ya1 · yb2 · exp(υ+ u), (4.1)
where c is total costs and y1 and y2 are output indicators. For reasons previously
explained in section 3.2 in chapter 3, there is no observable variation in input prices,
so input prices are ignored (see, for instance, the studies of Kalb, 2012, and Pacheco
et al., 2014).
We simulate six different combinations for the error and inefficiency terms, in
order to model various real scenarios. Table 4.1 contains the matrix of the different
scenarios. It shows the combinations when συ takes values 0.01 and 0.05 and σu takes
values 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. The rows in the table represent the variation of the error
term (συ), while the columns represent the variation of the inefficiency term (σu). The
first row is the case where the variation of the error term is relatively small, while the
second row shows a large variation. The first column is the case where the inefficiency
term is relatively small, while the second and third columns represent the cases where
variation in inefficiency is relatively larger. The Λ parameter, which sets each scenario,
is the ratio between of σu and συ.
Table 4.1: Combinations of error and inefficiency terms in Monte Carlo simulations to
model scenarios
σu = 0.01 σu = 0.05 σu = 0.1
συ = 0.01 s1: Λ = 1.0 s3: Λ = 5.0 s5: Λ = 10.0
συ = 0.05 s2: Λ = 0.2 s4: Λ = 1.0 s6: Λ = 2.0
Within this context, scenario 1 is the case when the error and the inefficiency terms
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are relatively small (σu = 0.01, συ = 0.01, Λ = 1.0), which means that the data has
been measured with little noise and the units are relatively efficient, while scenario
6 is the case when the error and the inefficiency terms are relatively large (σu = 0.1,
συ = 0.05, Λ = 2.0), which means that the data is relatively noisy and the units are
relatively inefficient.
For all simulations we consider 2,000 Monte Carlo trials, and we analyse two
different sample sizes, n= 100 and 200.8 We note that non-parametric estimators do
not take into account the presence of noise, however, we want to check how it affects
the performance of our estimators since all data tend to have noise.9
4.2.2. Measures to compare the estimators’ performance
In order to compare the relative performance of our four non-parametric methodolo-
gies, we consider the following median measures over the 2,000 simulations. We use
median values instead of the average, since it is more robust to skewed distributions.
• Bias(TCE) = 1n ∑ni=1(T̂CEi − TCEi)
• RMSE(TCE) = [ 1n ∑ni=1(T̂CEi − TCEi)2]1/2
• UpwardBias(TCE) = 1n ∑ni=1 1 · (T̂CEi > TCEi)
• Kendall’s τ (TCE)= nc−nd0.5n(n−1)
where T̂CEi is the estimated cost efficiency of municipality i in a given Monte Carlo
replication (by a given method) and TCEi is the true efficiency score. The bias
reports the difference between the estimated and true efficiency scores. When it
is negative (positive), the estimators are underestimating (overestimating) the true
efficiency. The RMSE (root mean squared error) measures the standard deviation or
error from the true efficiency. The upward bias is the proportion of T̂CE larger than
8To ease the computational process, we use samples of n= 100 and 200 to conduct simulations. In
subsection 4.2.4, we consider a robustness check with a bigger sample size (n = 500) to ensure that our
simulations accurately represent the performance of our data.
9In subsection 4.2.4, we consider a robustness check with no noise to ensure that our simulations
accurately represent the performance of our data.
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the true efficiencies. It measures the percentage of overestimated or underestimated
cost efficiencies. Finally, the Kendall’s τ test represents the correlation between the
predicted and true cost efficiencies, where nc and nd are the number of concordant
and discordant pairs in the data set, respectively. This test identifies the differences in
the ranking distributions of the true and the estimated ranks.
We also compare the densities of cost efficiency across all Monte Carlo simulations
in order to report a more comprehensive description of the results, not only restrict
them to a single summary statistic—the median. So, for example, if we were interested
in estimating the poorer performers, we would focus on which estimator perform best
at the 5th percentile of the efficiency distribution. For each draw, we sort the data
by the relative value of true efficiency. Since we are interested in comparing the true
distribution for different percentiles of our sample, we show violin plots for 5%, 50%
and 95% percentiles.
4.2.3. Relative performance of the estimators
Table 4.2 provides baseline results for the performance measures of the cost efficiency
with the Cobb-Douglas cost function. First we observe that the median bias of the cost
efficiency scores is negative in DEA and KSW in all cases. This implies that the DEA
and KSW estimators tend to underestimate the true cost efficiency in all scenarios.
FDH and order-m present positive median bias except for scenario 2 in FDH, implying
a tendency to overestimate the true efficiency. Bias for all methodologies tends to
increase with the sample size when the bias is negative, and decrease when the bias
is positive, except for order-m in scenarios 1, 3 and 5. The RMSE is smaller when συ
is small, except for FDH in scenario 5 and order-m in scenarios 3 and 5. Moreover,
the RMSE of the cost efficiency estimates increases with the sample size for all cases
except for FDH in scenarios 1, 3, 5 and 6 and order-m in scenarios 5 and 6.
We also consider the upward bias. This shows the percentage of observations for
which cost efficiency is larger than the true value (returning a value of 1). The desired
value is 0.5. The values less (greater) than 0.5 indicate underestimation (overestimation)
of cost efficiencies. In this setting, DEA and KSW systematically underestimate the
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true efficiency. Moreover, as the sample size increases, so does the percentage of
underestimated results. In contrast, FDH and order-m tend to overestimate the true
efficiency, but as the sample size increases overestimated results decrease. Finally,
we analyse Kendall’s τ for the efficiency ranks between true and estimated efficiency
scores. In each scenario and sample size, DEA and KSW have a larger Kendall’s τ;
they therefore perform best at identifying the ranks of the efficiency scores.
We also analyse other percentiles of the efficiency distribution, since it is difficult
to conclude from the table which methods perform better. Figures 4.1 to 4.6 show
results for the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles of true and estimated cost efficiencies. We
compare the distribution of each method with the TCE.
The figures show that results depend on the value of the Λ parameter. As expected,
when the variance of the error term increases our results are less accurate (note that
non-parametric methodologies assume the absence of noise). In contrast, when the
variance of the inefficiency term increases, our results are more precise.
Under scenario 1 (see Figures 4.1a, 4.1b, 4.1c, 4.1d, 4.1e and 4.1f), when both
error and inefficiency terms are relatively small, DEA and KSW methodologies con-
sistently underestimate efficiency (their distributions are below the true efficiency
in all percentiles). If we consider median values and density modes, order-m tends
to overestimate efficiency in all percentiles, while FDH also tends to overestimate
efficiency at the 5th and 50th percentiles. Moreover, we observe that FDH performs
well in estimating the efficiency units in the 95th percentile.
Although scenario 4 (see Figures 4.4a, 4.4b, 4.4d, 4.4c, 4.4e and 4.4f) is the opposite
case to scenario 1, when both error and inefficiency terms are relatively large they
have the same value of Λ. As in scenario 1, DEA and KSW methodologies consistently
underestimate efficiency. On the other hand, we see from the 5th percentile that both
FDH and order-m tend to overestimate efficiency. However, at the 50th and 95th
percentiles both methods perform better at estimating the efficiency units since their
median values and density modes are closer to the TCE distribution.
Similarly, in scenario 2 (see Figures 4.2a, 4.2b, 4.2d, 4.2c, 4.2e and 4.2f), when
the error term is relatively large but the inefficiency term is relatively small, DEA
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Figure 4.1: Distributions (violin plots) for scenario 1
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Figure 4.2: Distributions (violin plots) for scenario 2
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Figure 4.3: Distributions (violin plots) for scenario 3
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Figure 4.4: Distributions (violin plots) for scenario 4
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Figure 4.5: Distributions (violin plots) for scenario 5
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Figure 4.6: Distributions (violin plots) for scenario 6
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and KSW tend to underestimate the true efficiency scores, while FDH and order-m
appear to be close to the TCE distribution (in terms of median values and mode). This
scenario yields the poorest results as the dispersion of TCE is much more squeezed
than the estimators’ distributions. Therefore, when Λ is small, all four methodologies
perform less well in predicting efficiency scores.
Scenario 3 (see Figures 4.3a, 4.3b, 4.3c, 4.3d, 4.3e and 4.3f), the error term is
relatively small but the inefficiency term is relatively large. Because the Λ value
has increased, all methodologies do better at predicting the efficiency scores. At the
5th and 50th percentiles, we observe that DEA and KSW underestimate efficiency,
while order-m and FDH tend to overestimate it. However, if we consider the median
and density modes, DEA (followed by KSW) is closer to the TCE distribution in
both percentiles. At the 95th percentile FDH does better at estimating the efficient
units, while DEA and KSW slightly underestimate efficiency and order-m slightly
overestimates it.
In scenario 5 (see Figures 4.3a, 4.3b, 4.3c, 4.3d, 4.3e and 4.3f), the error variation is
relatively small but the inefficiency variation is very large. This scenario shows the
most favourable results because the TCE distribution is highly dispersed and therefore
better represents the estimators’ performance. At the 5th and 50th percentiles DEA
and KSW densities are very close to the true distribution of efficiency, while FDH and
order-m overestimate it. In contrast, at the 95th percentile FDH seems to be closer to
the TCE although it slightly overestimates it.
Finally, in scenario 6 (see Figures 4.6a, 4.6b, 4.6c, 4.6d, 4.6f and 4.6e) the error term
is relatively large and the inefficiency term is even larger. Again, we observe that when
the variation of the inefficiency term increases (compared with scenarios 2 and 4), all
the estimators perform better. At the 5th and 50th percentiles, DEA and KSW slightly
underestimate efficiency and FDH and order-m slightly overestimate it (in terms of
median values and density mode). However, despite all methods being quite close
to the TCE distribution, DEA underestimates less than KSW, and FDH overestimates
less than order-m. Finally, at the 95th percentile FDH (followed by order-m) is the best
method to determine a higher number of efficient units because its mode and median
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values are closer to the true efficiency.
To sum up, in this subsection we have provided the baseline results for the relative
performance of our four non-parametric methodologies. We have considered four
median measures as well as other percentiles of the efficiency distribution. We found
that the performance of the estimators vary greatly according to each particular
scenario. However, we observe that both DEA and KSW consistently underestimate
efficiency in nearlly all cases, while FDH and order-m tend to overestimate it. Moreover,
we note that DEA and KSW perform best at identifying the ranks of the efficiency
scores. In section 4.2.5 we will explain in greater detail which estimator to use in the
various scenarios.
4.2.4. Robustness checks
We consider a number of robustness checks to verify that our baseline experiment
represent the performance of our estimators. Tables with the results of the robustness
checks are in Tables A.5 to A.9 of the appendix A.
• No noise (see table A.5): All our non-parametric estimators assume the absence of
noise. However, in the baseline experiment we include noise in each scenario. In
this situation, we consider the case where there is no noise in the data generating
process. Results show that DEA and KSW perform better at predicting the
efficiency scores, while FDH and order-m are slightly worse than the baseline
experiment. All methods perform better at estimating the true ranks, except
order-m in scenario 1. In short, we find that when noise is absent, DEA and
KSW have a greater performance.
• Changes in sample size (see table A.6): The baseline experiment analyses two
different sample sizes, n= 100 and 200. We also consider the case where the
sample size is very large, that is, n= 500. There is a slight deterioration in the
performance of DEA and KSW, while FDH and order-m vary depending on
the scenario. However, the results only differed slightly. We find no qualitative
changes from the baseline results.
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• Returns to scale (see tables A.7 and A.8)): The baseline experiment assumes CRS
technology. We also consider the case where the technology assumes decreasing
and increasing returns to scale (γ = 0.8 and γ = 1.2). We find a slight deteriora-
tion in the performance of DEA and KSW estimators. Performance for order-m
improves with decreasing returns to scale and deteriorates with increasing re-
turns to scale, while FDH varies depending on the scenario. However, despite
these minor quantitative differences, the qualitative results do not change.
• Different m values for order-m (see table A.9): Following Daraio and Simar’s
(2007a) suggestion, in order to choose the most reasonable value of m we
considered different m sizes (m = 20, 30 and 40). In our application the baseline
experiment sets m = 30. In general, compared with the other m values there are
some quantitative changes (i.e., performance with m = 20 worsens, while with
m = 40 it improves slightly); however, the qualitative results from the baseline
case seem to hold.
In sort we find that after considering several robustness checks, we do not see any
major differences from the baseline experiment. Therefore, despite the initial assump-
tions done, our simulations accurately depict the performance of our estimators.
4.2.5. Which estimator in each scenario
Based on the above comparative analysis of the four methodologies’ performance,
inspired by our results as well as Badunenko et al.’s (2012) proposal, we summarise
which ones should be used in the various scenarios, assuming that the simulations re-
main true for different data generating processes. Table 4.3 suggests which estimators
to use for each scenario when taking into account the efficiency scores. The first row
in each scenario shows the relative magnitudes of the estimators compared with the
True Cost Efficiency (TCE), while the rest of the rows suggest which estimators to use
for each percentile (5th, 50th or 95th). In some cases the methodologies vary little in
terms of identifying the efficiency scores.
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Badunenko et al. (2012) conclude that if the Λ value is small, as in scenario 2
(Λ = 0.2), the efficiency scores and ranks will be poorly estimated.10 This scenario
yields the worst results, since the estimators are far from the “truth”. Although Table
4.3 suggests scenario 2, we do not recommend efficiency analysis for this particular
scenario, since it would be inaccurate.
Although scenarios 1 and 4 present better results than scenario 2 (when Λ = 1),
estimators also perform poorly at predicting the true efficiency scores. In scenario 1,
FDH seems to be the best method to estimate efficiency in all percentiles; however,
DEA should also be considered at the 5th percentile (the TCE remains between DEA
and FDH at this percentile). Similarly, in scenario 4 FDH predominates at the 5th
percentile, although DEA should also be considered. On the other hand, both FDH
and order-m perform better at the 50th and 95th percentiles. For efficiency rankings,
DEA and KSW methodologies show a fairly good performance when ranking the
observations in both scenarios.
Similarly, scenario 6 performs better than scenarios 1 and 4, since the variation of
the inefficiency term increases and, as a consequence, the value of Λ also increases
(Λ = 2). In this scenario the best methodologies for estimating the true efficiency
scores seem to be DEA and FDH at the 5th and 50th percentiles, and FDH (followed
by order-m) at the 95th percentile. In contrast, DEA and KSW methodologies are
better at ranking the observations.
In scenario 3, the Λ value increases again (Λ = 5), and all the methodologies
predict the efficiency scores more accurately. For the 5th and 50th percentiles, the
closest estimator to the true efficiency seems to be DEA (followed by KSW). At the
95th percentile FDH is the best method. For the rankings, however, DEA and KSW
provide more accurate estimations of the efficiency rankings.
Finally, scenario 5 has the largest Λ value (Λ = 10). Here, the estimators perform
best at estimating efficiency and ranks. DEA (followed by KSW) performs better at
the 5th and 50th percentiles and FDH at the 95th percentile. DEA and KSW excel at
estimating the efficiency rankings.
10It is difficult to obtain the inefficiency from a relatively large noise component.
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4.3. Results
Finally, in this section we identify the most appropriate methodologies to measure
local government efficiency in Spain. First, we estimate Λ values for our particular
dataset via Fan et al.’s (1996) non-parametric kernel estimator, hereafter FLW.11 The
estimated Λ value helps to determine in which scenario our data lies (see Table 4.1).
Second, we refer to Table 4.3, check the recommendations for our scenario, and choose
the appropriate estimators for our particular needs.
Table 4.4 reports results of the Λ parameters for our sample of 1,574 Spanish
local governments for municipalities between 1,000 and 50,000 inhabitants for the
2008–2013 period (for further details, see output specification Model 1 from section
5.2.1 in chapter 3). The results of the Λ estimates range from 1.69 to 2.21, which
are closer to 2 and correspond to scenario 6. Moreover, the goodness-of-fit measure
(R2) of our empirical data lies at around 0.8. The summary statistics for the overall
cost-efficiency results averaged over all municipalities for each year are reported in
Table 4.5. Figure 4.7 shows the violin plots of the estimated cost efficiencies for further
interpretation of results.12
Table 4.4: Estimates to determine the scenario for Spanish local governments dataset
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Λ 2.0596 2.2143 1.7256 1.6953 1.8283 1.8371
R2 0.7980 0.8331 0.8250 0.8244 0.8209 0.8478
In scenario 6, the DEA and FDH methods performed better than the others at
the 5th and 50th percentiles of the distribution (the former slightly underestimates
efficiency while the latter slightly overestimates it), and FDH (followed by order-m)
performed better at the 95th percentile. Therefore, the true efficiency would lie between
the results of DEA and FDH both at the median and the lower percentiles, while
FDH perform best at estimating the benchmark units. When using these results for
performance decisions, local managers must be aware of which part of the observations
are of particular interest and whether interest lies in the efficiency score or the ranking.
11In the appendix we describe how to obtain Λ measures via FLW derived from a cost function.
12For visual simplicity, we plot together years 2008–2013.
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Table 4.5: Summary statistics for efficiency results in Spanish local governments
DEA
Mean Median Min Max Q1 Q3
2008 0.4943 0.4689 0.0437 1.0000 0.3611 0.6038
2009 0.5843 0.5740 0.1257 1.0000 0.4633 0.6830
2010 0.5212 0.4953 0.1312 1.0000 0.4017 0.6135
2011 0.5314 0.5092 0.1359 1.0000 0.4104 0.6237
2012 0.5316 0.5128 0.1079 1.0000 0.4077 0.6429
2013 0.5712 0.5591 0.1138 1.0000 0.4458 0.6823
2008–2013 0.5390 0.5199 0.1097 1.0000 0.4150 0.6415
FDH
Mean Median Min Max Q1 Q3
2008 0.7444 0.7678 0.0808 1.0000 0.5644 1.0000
2009 0.8186 0.8563 0.2045 1.0000 0.6821 1.0000
2010 0.7761 0.7848 0.1559 1.0000 0.6251 1.0000
2011 0.7453 0.7434 0.2037 1.0000 0.5808 0.9892
2012 0.7630 0.7737 0.1497 1.0000 0.6104 1.0000
2013 0.7619 0.7721 0.1497 1.0000 0.6104 0.9999
2008–2013 0.7682 0.7830 0.1574 1.0000 0.6122 0.9982
Order-m
Mean Median Min Max Q1 Q3
2008 0.8089 0.8255 0.0834 1.9813 0.6312 1.0000
2009 0.8691 0.8926 0.2122 1.7369 0.7318 1.0013
2010 0.8385 0.8515 0.2172 1.8080 0.6938 1.0000
2011 0.8088 0.8100 0.2368 2.0281 0.6497 1.0000
2012 0.8222 0.8358 0.1797 1.8914 0.6644 1.0000
2013 0.8209 0.8328 0.1785 1.9204 0.6609 1.0000
2008–2013 0.8281 0.8414 0.1846 1.8944 0.6720 1.0002
KSW
Mean Median Min Max Q1 Q3
2008 0.4421 0.4239 0.0400 1.0000 0.3183 0.5454
2009 0.5384 0.5297 0.1179 1.0000 0.4250 0.6370
2010 0.4541 0.4294 0.0563 1.0000 0.3420 0.5399
2011 0.4752 0.4558 0.1178 1.0000 0.3697 0.5558
2012 0.4677 0.4477 0.0134 1.0000 0.3503 0.5687
2013 0.4846 0.4711 0.0118 1.0000 0.3678 0.5848
2008–2013 0.4770 0.4596 0.0595 1.0000 0.3622 0.5719
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Figure 4.7: Violin plots for the cost efficiency estimates in Spanish local governments
(2008–2013)
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In this context, DEA results indicate that the average cost efficiency during the period
2008–2013 at the central part of the distribution is 0.54, while the average in FDH is
0.77, so we expect the true cost efficiency scores to lie between 0.54 and 0.77. Moreover,
average scores at the lowest quartile (Q1) are 0.42 in DEA and 0.61 in FDH, so we
expect the true efficiency scores at the lower end of the distribution to lie between 0.42
and 0.61. Similarly, the average FDH scores at the upper quartile (Q3) are 0.99, so we
expect these estimated efficiencies will be similar to the true ones.
The efficiency scores shown by KSW are smaller than those reported by DEA
and FDH (the average efficiency scores in KSW for the period 2008–2013 are 0.36
for the lowest quantile (Q1), 0.48 for the mean and 0.57 for the upper quartile (Q3)).
Based on our Monte Carlo simulations, we believe that KSW methodology consistently
underestimates the true efficiency scores. In contrast, all the statistics estimated by
order-m methodology are larger than those shown in DEA and FDH (the average
efficiency scores in order-m for the period 2008–2013 are 0.67 for the lowest quantile
(Q1), 0.83 for the mean and 1.00 for the upper quartile (Q3)). Therefore, the experiment
leads us to understand that the order-m method overestimates the true efficiency
scores.
As regards the rank estimates, note that in scenario 6, DEA and KSW method-
ologies performed best at identifying the ranks of the efficiency scores. Table 4.6
shows the rank correlation between the average cost efficiency estimates of the four
methodologies for the period 2008–2013. As our Monte Carlo experiment showed,
DEA and KSW have a high correlation between their rank estimates because of their
similar distribution of the rankings. Accordindly, our results show a relatively high
correlation between the rank estimates of these two estimators (0.90). Moreover, al-
though there is a relatively high correlation between order-m and FDH rank estimates
with DEA and KSW, the latter two outperform order-m and FDH. As a consequence,
DEA and KSW estimators would be preferred to identify the efficiency rankings, but
order-m and FDH will not necessarily produce poor efficiency rankings.
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Table 4.6: Rank correlation Kendall coefficients between the average cost efficiency
estimates of all methodologies for the period 2008–2013
DEA FDH Order-m KSW
DEA 1.0000 0.6687 0.6463 0.9004
FDH 0.6687 1.0000 0.7755 0.6136
Order-m 0.6463 0.7755 1.0000 0.5801
KSW 0.9004 0.6136 0.5801 1.0000
4.4. Conclusion
Over the last years, many empirical research studies have set out to evaluate efficiency
in local governments. However, despite this high academic interest there is still a
lack of a clear, standard methodology to perform efficiency analysis. Since there is
no obvious way to choose an estimator, the method chosen may affect the efficiency
results, and could provide “unfair” or biased results. In this context, if local regulators
take a decision based on an incorrect efficiency score, it could have relevant economic
and political implications. Therefore, we note that each methodology leads to different
cost efficiency results for each local government, but one method must provide
efficiency scores that will be more reliable or closer to the truth (Badunenko et al.,
2012).
In this setting, the current chapter has attempted to compare four different non-
parametric estimators: DEA, FDH, order-m and KSW. All these approaches have been
widely studied in the previous literature, but little is known about their performance
in comparison with each other. Indeed, no study has compared these efficiency
estimators. In contrast to previous literature, which has regularly compared techniques
and made several proposals for alternative ones, we followed the method applied
in Badunenko et al. (2012) to compare the different methods used via Montecarlo
simulations and choose the ones which performed better with our particular dataset,
in other words, the most appropriate methods to measure local government cost
efficiency in Spain.
Our data included 1,574 Spanish local governments between 1,000 and 50,000
inhabitants for the period 2008–2013. Note that, as stated in chapters 1 and 3, the
period considered is also important, since the economic and financial crisis that started
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in 2007 has had a huge impact on most Spanish local government revenues and
finances in general. Under these circumstances, identifying a method for evaluating
local governments’ performance to obtain reliable efficiency scores and set benchmarks
over time is even more important, if possible.
In general, we have observed that there is no approach suitable for all efficiency
analysis. When using efficiency results for policy decisions, local regulators must
be aware of which part of the efficiency distribution is of particular interest (for
example, identifying benchmark local governments might be important to decide
penalty decisions to poor performers) and if the interest lies in the efficiency scores or
the rankings, i.e., it should be considered where and when to use a particular estimator.
It is obvious that obtaining reliable efficiency scores might have some implications
for local management decisions. Therefore, gaining deeper insights into the issue of
local government inefficiency might help to further support effective policy measures,
both those that might be appropriate as well as those that are not achieving the their
objectives.
We learn that, for our sample of Spanish local governments, all methods showed
some room for improvement in terms of possible cost efficiency gains, although some
differences in the inefficiency levels obtained were also present. The methodologies
which perform better with our sample of Spanish local governments are the DEA
and FDH methods at the median and lower tail of the efficiency distribution (the
former slightly underestimates efficiency while the latter slightly overestimates it),
and FDH (followed by order-m) for local governments with higher performance,
according to the findings in our simulations. Specifically, the results suggested that
the average true cost efficiency would range between 0.54 and 0.77 during the period
2008–2013, suggesting that Spanish local governments could achieve the same level of
local outputs with between 23% and 36% fewer resources. Similarly, the true efficiency
scores at the lowest quantile would lie between 0.42 and 0.61, and at the upper quartile
would be around 0.99. Further, DEA and KSW methodologies performed best at
identifying the ranks of the efficiency scores.
The obtained results provide evidence as to how efficiency could certainly be
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assessed as close as possible in order to provide some additional guidance for pol-
icy makers. In addition, these results are particularly important given the overall
financial constraints faced by Spanish local governments during the period under
analysis, which have come under increasing pressure to meet strict budgetary and
fiscal constraints without reducing their provision of local public services. There-
fore, identifying accurately efficiency gains might help to limit the adverse impact of
spending cuts on local governments’ service provision.
We also note that the effects on the methodological choice identified in this paper
might be valid only for our sample dataset. However, the analytical tools introduced
in this study could have significant implications for researchers and policy makers
which analyse efficiency using data from different countries. From a technical point of
view, our results are obtained using a consistent method, which provides a significant
contribution to previous literature in local governments efficiency. We emphasize
that few studies from this literature have attempted to use two or more alternative
approaches in a comparative way. Therefore, from a policy perspective one should
take care when interpreting results and drawing conclusions from these research
studies that have used only one particular methodology, since their results might be
affected by the approach taken. We think that the implementation of our proposed
method to compare different efficiency estimators would represent an interesting
contribution that provides the opportunity for further research in this particular issue,
given the lack of a clear and standard methodology to perform efficiency analysis.
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Chapter 5
Explaining differences in local
governments’ cost efficiency: An
instrumental variable quantile
regression approach
5.1. Introduction
Efficiency analysis allows to assess whether local authorities are managing properly
their available resources to provide the best possible local services and facilities.
However, municipalities face different environmental conditions in terms of social,
demographic, economic, political or financial, among others (Da Cruz and Marques,
2014). As efficiency may be affected not only by inadequate management but also by
these external or environmental factors beyond the control of local managers, some
municipalities may be unable to achieve the “best-practice” due to their relative harsh
environment (Afonso and Fernandes, 2008). Therefore, performance analysis should
control for this heterogeneity (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007), otherwise policy-makers
would lead to biased efficiency results which might carry wrong policy decisions.
Accordingly, as stated by De Witte and Kortelainen (2013), efficiency estimations which
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do not account for the effect of the operational environment have only a limited value.
The present chapter takes one step to address the latter question by analysing local
governments’ cost efficiency while explicitly accounting for external or environmental
influences that might affect municipalities’ performance.
Scholars have proposed different ways to incorporate external or environmental
variables in non-parametric efficiency analysis. Following De Witte and Kortelainen
(2008), we can consider different families of models, including methods based on the
two-stage approach –such as Tobit censored regression model, OLS or the bootstrap
approaches of Simar and Wilson, 2007–, the meta-frontier approach or the conditional
efficiency models (Cazals et al., 2002).1 All these procedures only estimate the mean of
a response variable, conditional on the values of the explanatory variables (Abdelsalam
et al., 2014), which means that they only provide information on the average impact
of the determinants of local governments’ efficiency. However, there is no reason why
the impact should be the same over the entire efficiency distribution, since the effect
of the environmental variables in local governments’ efficiency could vary for the best
to the worst performers. Under these circumstances, the use of different measures of
central tendency and statistical dispersion to obtain a more comprehensive analysis of
the relationship between variables might be more appropriate.
In this study we implement quantile regression models controlling for the likely
existence of endogeneity among regressors, to date barely contemplated in the effi-
ciency analysis setting.2 In contrast to previous two-stage initiatives, this technique
provides a more complete view as it considers the effect of the explanatory variables
across different quantiles of the distribution of the response variable, that is, it pro-
vides information on the impact of the environmental variables on local governments’
efficiency according to the differing levels of efficiency. In addition, this procedure
allows to control for the possible endogeneity from “reverse causation” of some of
1The most popular techniques to include environmental variables in local governments’ cost efficiency
literature are Tobit censored regression model and OLS (see section 2.6 in chapter 2).
2The study of Abdelsalam et al. (2014) used quantile regression to analyse the relative performance of
socially responsible investment and Islamic mutual funds. In this paper, we go one step forward since
we also consider the presence of possible endogenous variables by using instrumental variable quantile
regression.
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our explanatory variables using instrumental variables.3 Endogenous variables lead
to inconsistencies in the model estimates since they are correlated with unobserved
factors affecting the response variable. However, despite its relevance, the endogeneity
problem has received little attention in local government efficiency literature, since
past studies have interpreted their results in a causal way, neglecting the endogeneity
issues in the data (this problem from previous literature has been earlier discussed in
chapter 2).
In this setting, we contribute to the literature by combining several non-parametric
methodologies in the first stage –namely DEA, FDH, the order-m partial frontier and
KSW– with instrumental variable quantile regression in the second stage. We note
that some previous researchers (Simar and Wilson, 2007, 2011) expressed their concern
about using conventional models such as OLS or Tobit for the second stage regressions
when analysing the determinants of efficiencies obtained in a first using techniques
such as DEA or FDH.4 However, our procedure offers a great advantage since it
facilitates analyses of the impact of determinants of local governments’ cost efficiency
across different quantiles taking into account the presence of possible endogenous
explanatory variables. Moreover, this method is more robust to departures from
normality.
In addition, as regards of the efficiency estimator selection problem earlier con-
sidered in previous chapters, the present chapter also contributes to the literature
by providing a comparative perspective using different methodologies to measure
efficiency in the first stage. Comparing the results from different models gives a more
complete view of the impact of the environmental variables over efficiency, while at
the same time testing the robustness of our results. Accordingly, if the set of significant
explanatory variables is robust across various methods, then the inefficiency analysis
is not subject to manipulation and provides useful information to policy-makers
(De Borger and Kerstens, 1996a).
3Note that endogeneity can arise as a result of different sources: measurement error, autoregression
with autocorrelated errors, simultaneous or reversed causality and omitted variables. In this study we
focus on simultaneous or reversed causality, which implies a loop of causality between the independent
and dependent variables of a model.
4We will further discuss some theoretical limitations of the different methods to explain inefficiency.
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We perform the analysis for a sample of 1,499 Spanish local governments between
1,000 and 50,000 inhabitants for the period 2009–2013. As stated in previous chapters,
issues related to the study of Spanish public institutions, and particularly in Spanish
local governments, have gained relevance since the beginning of the economic and
financial crisis that started in 2007/2008. In addition, given how problematic it is
to define the bundle of services and facilities that municipalities must provide, we
consider two alternative output models in order to assess whether different choices
might explain variations among local governments, and to determine how the number
of outputs can affect efficiency scores. We use a comprehensive database, which
includes measures of both quantity and quality of the services and facilities provided
(for further details, see output specification Models 1 and 3 from section 5.2.1 in
chapter 3).
Finally, another contribution of the study is related to our selection of determinants.
In local governments’ efficiency applications, the selection of the environmental
variables is not an easy task, a common problem from previous literature earlier
discussed in chapter 2. The inclusion of environmental factors in previous empirical
efficiency studies often lacks structure (Da Cruz and Marques, 2014) and most studies
do not explain the estimated inefficiencies in a systematic way, since there is no
well-established theory as to which variables constitute the “environmental conditions”
that might impact on each municipality’s cost structure (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2013).
In this chapter, we use a comprehensive dataset of environmental variables which
includes different categories in order to facilitate the interpretation of the empirical
results. Our selection is based on previous literature, the availability of data and the
institutional framework of local governments in Spain.
Our results show an asymmetry regarding the determinants of efficiency for the
best and worst local governments. On the one hand, for the best local governments,
performance is a result not only of their managers’ skills but also other factors related
to their environment, such as the unemployment rate, the citizens’ disposable income,
the tourist index and political concentration. On the other hand, for the worst local
governments’ performers their poor performance would be a consequence of the
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factors explaining their efficiency, such as tax revenues, the debt levels, transfers from
higher levels of government, share of retired people or the electoral participation.
The chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 presents the methodologies, the
data employed in measuring efficiency, and results. Section 5.3 sets the environmental
or explanatory variables for efficiency and the model to include the environmental
variables in the second-stage analysis, together with the results. Finally, section 5.4
summarises the main conclusions.
5.2. Dependent variable: efficiency measures for Spanish municipalities
In a first stage, we compute the relative efficiency scores in Spanish local governments
by implementing the four non-parametric estimation techniques previously explained
in chapter 3 (see section 3.2.), namely DEA, FDH, the order-m partial frontier and
KSW.
5.2.1. Sample, inputs and outputs
We carry out the analysis for a sample of Spanish local governments between 1,000
and 50,000 inhabitants for the 2009–2013 period. The final sample contains 1,499 mu-
nicipalities for every year (representing 19.47%), after eliminating all the municipalities
with unavailable data on inputs and outputs for the period 2009 to 2013. For further
details about the sources used, particularities of the data and the selection of input
and output variables, see section 5.2.1 in chapter 3. Table 5.1 shows the descriptive
statistics for inputs and outputs for the period 2009–2013. We include the median
rather than the mean to avoid distortion from outliers.
In addition, following the output specification models defined in section 3.3.3 in
chapter 3, we consider different output models in order to assess whether the different
choices might explain the differences between local governments, and to determine
how the number of outputs can affect the efficiency scores. Specifically, we use output
specification Model 1, which includes 6 output variables (i.e., the minimum services
compulsory for all governments), and output specification Model 3, a more complete
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for inputs and outputs (2009–
2013)
Mean S.d.
Inputsa
Total costs (X1) 6,883,465.89 8,039,103.09
Outputs
Total population (Y1) 7,582.21 8,501.24
Street infrastructure surface areab(Y2) 342,307.42 330,272.66
Number of lighting points (Y3) 1,540.41 1,615.00
Tons of waste collected (Y4) 3,803.01 12,373.95
Length of water distribution networksb(Y5) 50,596.02 90,175.24
Length of sewer networksb(Y6) 30,298.90 33,118.83
Public parks surface areab(Y7) 91,372.20 567,860.52
Public library surface areab(Y8) 373.48 1,807.78
Market surface areab(Y9) 93,238.14 526,126.86
Sport facilities surface areab(Y10) 4,040.65 10,889.28
a In thousands of euros.
b In square metres.
model which includes 10 output variables taking into account quality measures (i.e.,
the minimum services compulsory for all governments and additional services which
must provide larger municipalities with population of over 5,000 to 20,000 taking into
account the quality of the services provided weighted by their quantity).
5.2.2. Efficiency results
We estimate cost efficiency of the provision of local services and facilities for 1,499
Spanish municipalities for the 2009–2013 period using the four non-parametric method-
ologies explained in the previous sections. Overall cost-efficiency results averaged over
all municipalities for each year in output specification Models 1 and 3 are presented in
table 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. They show summary statistics, including apart from the
mean and the standard deviation, additional statistics which provide further insights
on the different parts of the efficiency distributions. Note that we report results
for two different output models in order to assess whether different choices might
contribute to explain the variations between local governments, and to determine how
the number of outputs can affect the efficiency scores.
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics for efficiency results for the period 2009–2013, out-
put specification Model 1a
DEA estimator
Year Mean
1st
quantile Median
3rd
quantile S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2009 0.5841 0.4630 0.5743 0.6821 0.1679 2.6017
2010 0.5275 0.4039 0.5015 0.6188 0.1757 2.2682
2011 0.5353 0.4125 0.5140 0.6277 0.1754 2.5350
2012 0.5331 0.4094 0.5136 0.6433 0.1754 1.9346
2013 0.5727 0.4486 0.5602 0.6832 0.1819 2.8686
FDH estimator
Year Mean 1st quantile Median 3rd quantile S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2009 0.8179 0.6815 0.8561 1.0000 0.1846 32.6217
2010 0.7821 0.6315 0.8001 1.0000 0.1942 26.8179
2011 0.7482 0.5839 0.7488 0.9988 0.2107 24.9500
2012 0.7650 0.6115 0.7763 1.0000 0.2080 26.0173
2013 0.7646 0.6126 0.7757 1.0000 0.2063 25.8839
Order-m estimator
Year Mean 1st quantile Median 3rd quantile S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2009 0.8660 0.7282 0.8922 1.0011 0.1992 36.1574
2010 0.8394 0.6933 0.8611 1.0000 0.2014 30.2201
2011 0.8103 0.6546 0.8128 1.0000 0.2177 28.0187
2012 0.8218 0.6652 0.8365 1.0000 0.2159 29.5530
2013 0.8219 0.6624 0.8367 1.0000 0.2168 29.4863
KSW estimator
Year Mean 1st quantile Median 3rd quantile S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2009 0.5374 0.4246 0.5296 0.6340 0.1579 0.0000
2010 0.4634 0.3448 0.4382 0.5513 0.1666 0.0000
2011 0.4774 0.3686 0.4557 0.5653 0.1592 0.0672
2012 0.4755 0.3581 0.4568 0.5792 0.1666 0.0000
2013 0.5306 0.4073 0.5239 0.6412 0.1740 0.0000
a This model includes minimum services compulsory for all governments (6 outputs variables
from Y1 to Y6).
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Table 5.3: Summary statistics for efficiency results for the period 2009–2013, out-
put specification Model 3a
DEA estimator
Year Mean
1st
quantile Median
3rd
quantile S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2009 0.5926 0.4672 0.5804 0.6935 0.1732 3.5357
2010 0.5448 0.4173 0.5166 0.6405 0.1833 3.6691
2011 0.5519 0.4232 0.5265 0.6525 0.1831 3.8025
2012 0.5580 0.4254 0.5396 0.6669 0.1859 3.4023
2013 0.5924 0.4607 0.5775 0.7106 0.1894 4.8699
FDH estimator
Year Mean 1st quantile Median 3rd quantile S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2009 0.9159 0.8825 1.0000 1.0000 0.1513 65.5103
2010 0.9190 0.8956 1.0000 1.0000 0.1488 66.6444
2011 0.9182 0.8907 1.0000 1.0000 0.1499 66.4443
2012 0.9181 0.8909 1.0000 1.0000 0.1498 65.5771
2013 0.9175 0.8825 1.0000 1.0000 0.1476 64.9767
Order-m estimator
Year Mean 1st quantile Median 3rd quantile S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2009 0.9484 0.9145 1.0000 1.0018 0.1617 66.7779
2010 0.9562 0.9267 1.0000 1.0039 0.1676 67.9787
2011 0.9576 0.9234 1.0000 1.0043 0.1710 67.8452
2012 0.9551 0.9216 1.0000 1.0033 0.1676 66.7779
2013 0.9555 0.9157 1.0000 1.0038 0.1669 66.4443
KSW estimator
Year Mean 1st quantile Median 3rd quantile S.d.
% of efficient
municipalities
2009 0.4987 0.3630 0.4822 0.6194 0.1837 0.0000
2010 0.4928 0.3542 0.4762 0.6100 0.1852 0.0000
2011 0.4975 0.3634 0.4787 0.6062 0.1801 0.0000
2012 0.4825 0.3555 0.4611 0.5875 0.1774 0.0000
2013 0.5336 0.4037 0.5237 0.6483 0.1802 0.0000
a This model includes minimum services compulsory for all governments and additional ser-
vices that must be provided by larger municipalities with populations of over 5,000 and 20,000
taking into account service quality (10 output variables from Y1 to Y10 weighted by their quality).
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DEA results in output specification Model 1 indicate that the mean cost efficiency
during the period 2009–2013 ranges from 0.52 to 0.58. Similarly, the results for the
first quartile (which include the worst performers) range from 0.40 to 0.46, while for
the third quartile (which include the best performers) range from 0.61 to 0.68. We
observe that, out of the 1,499 municipalities, only from 1.93% to 2.60% are found
totally efficient (i.e., with efficiency scores of 1). When comparing FDH results with
DEA, the number of efficient local governments in FDH increases (they range from
24% to 32%) due to the removal of the convexity assumption underlying DEA. As
a consequence, the efficiency scores in all parts of the distribution are also higher.
In addition, we note that the increase in the number of outputs from Model 1 to
Model 3 implies higher efficiency scores for both DEA and FDH methodologies, since
these estimators notoriously suffer from the “curse of dimensionality” (see Daraio
and Simar (2007a), for further discussion). Also we observe that for the FDH case
in output specification Model 3, from the median onwards all local governments are
efficient, however, this trend is not surprising given the characteristics of FDH. This
implies that, despite FDH method is more flexible than DEA, it has difficulties for both
discriminating and ranking the observations (i.e., relative ordering of municipalities)
according to their performance (Abdelsalam et al., 2014).
A comparison of DEA and KSW results shows that the cost efficiency scores
using KSW are lower than those obtained with the DEA approach in all parts of
the efficiency distribution and both output models. Moreover, under KSW most
local governments are found to be inefficient (i.e., we observe 0% of efficient local
governments in most of the years analysed). By construction, KSW methodology takes
the standard DEA estimator to correct its bias and, as a consequence, municipalities
considered as efficient when using DEA are considered inefficient in KSW because
their bias has been corrected (i.e., the units could be very close to an efficiency score
of 1, but they are no longer considered efficient). This means that KSW methodology
is therefore useful for ranking municipalities but not for identifying the benchmark
units.
Finally, the order-m approach yields higher efficiency scores and percentages of
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efficient units than all the other methods (the average cost efficiency ranges from
0.81 to 0.86 and the percentage of efficient units from 28% to 36%). This trend is
actually expected if one takes into account that the results obtained by order-m are not
bounded by 1, and a value greater than 1 indicates super-efficient units. Note that the
order-m is more robust to extreme values and outliers, giving more prudent5 results
than DEA, FDH and KSW. Therefore, given these characteristics, the order-m approach
partly overcome the difficulties from FDH and KSW for ranking the efficient local
governments. In addition, we note that for the order-m case in output specification
Model 3, from the median onwards all local governments are efficient or super-efficient.
However, in contrast to FDH approach, the method allows to discriminate and ranking
the units according to their performance due to the presence of super-efficient local
governments whose efficiencies are leading to values above unity.
The descriptive analysis presented above, based on summary statistics, suggest
that a quantile regression approach might add statistical robustness to these initial
ideas. Moreover, despite some discrepancies are observed on comparing the results
yielded by the different methods and models (output specifications), in general we
observe that every combination shows some room for improvement. However, these
efficiency estimations have not taken into account the effect of the environmental or
exogenous factors that influence the observed efficiency and consequently they would
have only a limited value. We address these issues in the following sections.
5.3. Explaining inefficiency
After the efficiency analysis yielded in the first-stage, we focus on analysing the effect
of a set of environmental variables on efficiency. The four non-parametric models
before only incorporate controllable inputs. However, municipalities face different
external or environmental factors which can have a huge impact on the efficiency
scores, so performance analysis should control for this heterogeneity. Accordingly, a
second-stage analysis is called for, as efficiency results may be affected not only by
5The order-m estimator do not envelope all data points and consequently both the identification of
the efficient units and the estimated efficiency scores are not affected by outliers or extreme values.
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inadequate management but also by exogenous factors beyond the control of each local
government (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007). As we will see, two-stage procedures present
some theoretical limitations, however, our procedure offers significant advantages
given that it allows to control the possible endogeneity issues but, more important, it
provides a specific analysis for each particular quantile of the performance distribution.
5.3.1. Environmental variables
Our selection of determinants is based on previous literature, the availability of
data and the institutional framework of local governments in Spain. Specifically, we
have chosen 12 variables to include in the analysis.6 In line with the classification
proposed in chapter 2 for the different type of determinants that may affect the local
performance, we classify the observed variables in four main categories: social and
demographic, economic, political, and financial.
In our search for environmental variables we considered the information provided
by different institutions. Data on different financial variables, such as tax revenues,
transfers or grants and outstanding debt, comes from the Spanish Ministry of the
Treasury and Public Administrations (Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públi-
cas) and correspond to the years from 2009 to 2013; while political variables, such
as political sign, political concentration and voter turnout, were computed by the
authors using data from the Spanish Home Office (Ministerio del Interior) and refer to
the 2007 and 2011 municipal elections. We also considered information regarding the
citizen’s disposable income provided by the L.R. Klein Institute7, and the variables
unemployment and tourist index, which comes from the Economic Yearbook of La
Caixa8. Finally, we included socio-demographic variables, such as population den-
sity, retired people and immigrants, which come from the Spanish Statistical Office
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE), years from 2009 to 2013.
6Note that initially we had 19 variables. However, after testing multicollinearity using the variance
inflation factor (VIF), we found that dummies for population size (medium, large), population growth,
deficit, economic activity index, and the commercial and industrial activity index were highly correlated.
7An Economic Institute called Instituto de Predicción Económica “Lawrence R. Klein” which depends on
the Autonomous University of Madrid.
8An annual report called Anuario Estadístico de La Caixa, provided until September 2016 by the Spanish
savings bank, La Caixa.
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Summary statistics for the environmental variables are reported in Table 5.4. In
addition, the particular definition of each variable considered and the possible impact
on efficiency are commented on below (see section 2.7 in chapter 2 for an accurate
summary for the impact that all these environmental variables had over efficiency in
previous literature):
Social and demographic determinants
• Population density (DENS) is measured as the total population of each munici-
pality divided by its extension (expressed in squared kilometres). A common
intuition is that higher population density may entail economies of scale to
provide public services and, as a consequence, it would increase efficiency. How-
ever, a higher population concentration also could increase the cost of providing
public services given the problems of agglomeration and higher complexity
(Kalb et al., 2012), so it would affect negatively to efficiency.
• Retired people (RET) represents the number of inhabitants over 65 years old
in each municipality divided by the total population. This population group
can exercise greater control over local governments performance because they
take part in organizations of local nature (Bosch-Roca et al., 2012). However,
the relation between this variable and efficiency could be also negative since
retired people are less likely to use social and recreational services (such as,
primary schools, public sports facilities, parks or playing fields) and could be
less interested in local governments’ performance.
• Immigrants (IMMIG) represents the share of foreign inhabitants over total
population in a municipality. This variable is expected to decrease cost efficiency
because this population group does not have the right to vote (Bosch-Roca et al.,
2012) or are less interested in politics (Bruns and Himmler, 2011).
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Economic determinants
• Unemployment (UNEMP) represents the share of unemployed people over the
working population of each municipality. More unemployment could imply
higher spending on social benefits (“cost effect”), so it would decrease efficiency
(Kalb et al., 2012). Nevertheless, unemployment could entail a lower demand
for high-cost or high-quality public services given the lower purchasing power
of unemployed people (“preference effect”), so it will be expected to increase
efficiency (Kalb, 2010).
• Citizen’s disposable income (INC) is the economic level per capita measured
for each municipality. Higher-income citizens might pay greater taxes and, as a
consequence, they will exert a higher control on local performance (Balaguer-Coll
et al., 2013), leading to higher efficiency levels. However, if local governments
have higher financial resources (because they collect higher incomes), interest
of the politicians in reaching efficiency in the provision of local services and
facilities could be reduced. In addition, citizens from high income municipalities
may be less motivated to monitor expenditures (Bosch-Roca et al., 2012). So, it
could be negatively related to efficiency as well.
• Tourist index (TOUR) indicates the importance of the tourist activity of each
municipality. Its value indicates each municipality’s share (out of 100,000) of
total national economic activities revenues related to tourism (“Impuesto de
Actividades Económicas”). Seasonal population could have an impact on the
provision of services because local governments must face higher investments
during some periods of the year (Da Cruz and Marques, 2014). Moreover,
tourists have a greater demand for higher quality public services that increase
the costs (Kalb et al., 2012). Hence, we will expect a negative relation to efficiency.
However, a higher tourist activity could entail a lower cost excess and thus higher
levels of efficiency would be obtained.
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Political determinants
• Political sign (SIGN) represents the municipal government’s ideological position.
It is a dummy variable which takes values 0 and 1 representing left-wing and
right-wing parties, respectively. The basic hypothesis is that left-wing parties
prefer a larger public sector which, in general, is associated with low efficiency
levels (Ashworth et al., 2014).
• Political concentration (CONCEN) measures the number of councillors from
each party represented in each local council. We use the Herfindahl index as
indicator of political concentration which takes value between 0 and 1, with
higher values indicating a higher degree of political concentration (or a lower
degree of political fragmentation) and therefore a higher degree of political
strength (or lower degree of competition). It is calculated as:
n
∑
i=1
c2i /(
n
∑
i=1
ci)2 (5.1)
where ci is the number of city councillors of party i, and n is the number of
parties in the local government.
When the degree of political concentration and political strength are higher,
there exist a lower political opposition and it is easier to implement policies
and impose budget constraints (Borge et al., 2008), so it is expected to increase
efficiency. Nevertheless, a low political competition makes more difficult to
other parties to effectively control expenditures and therefore efficiency can be
reduced (Ashworth et al., 2014).
• Voter turnout (VOTE) represents the political participation of the citizens en-
titled to vote in local elections. This variable affects the degree of control that
inhabitants can exercise over politicians with their votes in local elections (Geys
et al., 2010), so it is expected to increase local government efficiency. However,
it could also have a negative correlation with efficiency given that lower levels
of local governments’ efficiency could also motivate more citizen participation
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(Asatryan and De Witte, 2015).
Financial determinants
• Tax revenues (TAX) per capita are the total amount of taxes and fees collected by
each local government divided by its number of inhabitants. We may hypothesize
that local governments which are more able to generate revenues (by collecting
higher taxes) are less motivated to manage them properly (Balaguer-Coll et al.,
2007). In addition, these local governments will have good service provision even
if they are not efficient. Therefore, we will expect a negative impact on efficiency.
Nevertheless, higher taxes could increase citizen control on public management,
so it will be expected to increase efficiency (De Borger and Kerstens, 1996a).
• Transfers or grants (GRANTS) per capita represents the municipal revenues
which come from higher levels of government, divided by population. Local gov-
ernments which have greater security in obtaining resources via grants may be
less efficient because politicians will take less care in managing them adequately.
Moreover, there will be less citizen control over public management because
the cost of inefficient performance is shared by regional and national taxpayers
(Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007). Hence, we will expect a negative association with
efficiency. On the contrary, this variable could be positively related to efficiency,
since obtaining transfers and grants could be linked to a more accurate control
of expenditures by higher levels of government.
• Outstanding debt (DEBT) per capita is the value of the financial unresolved
liabilities at the financial year end, divided by population. Local governments
which need to take out loans are those with low fiscal revenue capacity and
might be more concerned about cost saving due to their financial problems.
Moreover, debt can be the result of past investments on equipment that enhance
current efficiency (Benito et al., 2010). As a consequence, debt will be expected
to be positively related to efficiency. However, if local government debt increase,
there will be more resources employed to attend debt interests and amortization
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payments and, as a consequence, less resources for the provision of local services
(Geys and Moesen, 2009a; Ashworth et al., 2014), leading to a decrease in the
efficiency levels.
5.3.2. The Model
In contrast to previous two-stage initiatives, we combine the cost efficiency measures
for Spanish municipalities obtained via non-parametric techniques in a first stage
with instrumental variable quantile regression in the second stage. We note that in
efficiency analysis specialized literature, the study of Simar and Wilson (2007), also
reviewed in Simar and Wilson (2011), expressed their concern about using a two-stage
approach, where the efficiency scores obtained in a first stage via non-parametric
frontier techniques (such as DEA or FDH), are regressed in a second stage including
determinants of efficiency (using techniques such as OLS or Tobit). They outlined
that these procedures could lead to “an unknown serial correlation” between the DEA
efficiency scores and the explanatory variables, which may lead to biased inferences.
However, in their extensive review, they did not mention the literature combining DEA
with other types of regressions based on more flexible methods (Abdelsalam et al.,
2014), such as non-parametric regression, conditional density estimation, quantile
regression or, as we do here, instrumental variable quantile regression.9
Moreover, as stated by Ba˘din et al. (2014), we underline that Simar and Wilson
(2007) did not advocate using the two-stage approach. Their goal was to define a
statistical model where a second-stage regression would be meaningful, and to provide
an approach that would allow for valid inference in the second-stage regression (the
bootstrap method), although this approach also relied on the separability condition
problem (also required by the two-stage approaches) between the input-output space
and the external factors. An alternative to these methods would be the use of non-
parametric conditional approach (Cazals et al., 2002; Daraio and Simar, 2005, 2007b),
9Some examples have already been published in the literature which combine DEA and their variants
(such as FDH and order-m) with these more flexible methods, including Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) and
Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013) in the case of non-parametric regression, Illueca et al. (2009) in the case of
conditional density estimation or Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005) and Abdelsalam et al. (2014) in the case
of quantile regression.
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which avoids the separability condition. However, this technique also present some
difficulties due to the bandwidth selection problem for the computation of conditional
measures.
In this setting, taking into account that some intricate issues remain all the available
methodologies to explain inefficiency, the great advantage of our procedure is that it
allows to measure the impact of the environmental variables on local governments
across different levels of efficiency or quantiles in presence of endogenous regres-
sors. This methodology considers the entire efficiency distribution providing a more
complete view of the effect of the different environmental variables affecting local
governments performance. Moreover, quantile regression is more robust to departures
from normality, given that it is characteristically robust to outliers on the dependent
variable.
We consider different models corresponding to the different efficiency methods
and output specifications described in the first stage. All models incorporate the
environmental variables as well as fixed effects (time and geographic fixed effects).
Regarding the geographic dummies we consider 13 Spanish regions: Andalusia,
Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile and Leon,
Castile La Mancha, Extremadura, Galicia, La Rioja, Murcia and Valencian Community.
In addition, the model includes time fixed effects given that we are dealing with
longitudinal data (2009–2013 period).
Quantile-regression model: panel data and endogeneity issues
Classical procedures to analyse the determinants of efficiency only estimate the
mean of a response variable, conditional on the values of the explanatory variables.
However, we consider that the conditional impact of the covariates on the dependent
variable might vary across quantiles (on the central and non-central location of the
distribution), i.e., that the effects of the environmental variables may differ for different
levels of efficiency. In this setting, Quantile regression model (QR model), introduced
by Koenker and Bassett (1978), allows us to model the quantiles of the conditional
distribution of the dependent variable expressed as functions of the independent
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variables. Given the quantile τ, the parameter estimates of the QR model are obtained
by solving the following minimization problem,
minβ
n
∑
i=1
ρτ(yi − x′iβ) (5.2)
where ρτ = u(τ − I(ui ≤ 0)) is the quantile-regression loss function, yi is dependent
variable (local governments’ cost efficiency), xi is the vector of independent variables
(determinants of efficiency) and β is the vector of parameters, which depends on τ.
Given that we are dealing with longitudinal data, following we consider the extension
of the QR model for panel data with the introduction of fixed effects. Let us consider
the model:
yit = x′itβ+ αi + uit, i = 1, ..., n, t = 1, ..., T (5.3)
where yit is the the efficiency level of a municipality i and year t, xit is a vector of
environmental variables, αi is municipality i’s fixed effect and u is the error term.
The minimizing problem to estimate Model 5.3 for several quantiles (τ1, ..., τq),
under the Koenker and Bassett’s approach is,
minαβ
q
∑
k=1
n
∑
i=1
T
∑
i=t
ωkρτk(yit − αi − x′iβ(τk)) (5.4)
where the weights ωk measure the relevance of quantile τ on the estimation of the αi
parameters.
Endogeneity is a common problem in cross-section or panel data regressions,
leading to inconsistencies in OLS or QR model estimates since they are correlated
with unobserved factors affecting the response variable. It can arise as a result of
measurement error, autoregression with autocorrelated errors, simultaneous causality
and omitted variables. In this setting, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) developed a
model with instrumental variables in the presence of endogeneity along with a robust
inference approach to partial or weak identification, and Harding and Lamarche (2009)
extended the instrumental QR approach by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) by
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allowing for “fixed effects” as introduced in Koenker (2004).10 Let us consider the
following model,
yit = d′itδ+ x
′
itβ+ αi + uit, i = 1, ..., n, t = 1, ..., T (5.5)
di = h(xi,ωi, υi) (5.6)
where yit is the dependent variable for a municipality i and year t, di is the munic-
ipality i’s vector of endogenous variables, xi is the vector of exogenous variables,
αi is municipality i’s fixed effect and u is the error term. Equation 5.6 defines the
endogenous variable d, related to a vector of instrumental variables ωi which are
independent of u. Given a quantile τ, the objective function for the conditional
instrumental quantile is
R(τ, δ, β,γ, α) =
T
∑
t=1
n
∑
i=1
ρτ(yit − d′itδ− x′itβ− z′itα− ωˆ′itγ) (5.7)
where ωˆ is the least square projection of the endogenous variables d on the instrument
variables ω, the exogenous variables x and the vector of individual effects z.
The instrumental QR estimates are then obtained in two steps. In the first step the
estimation of β, γ and α are obtained as a function of τ and δ, i.e.,
βˆ(τ, δ), γˆ(τ, δ)αˆ(τ, δ) ∈ arg min
β,γ,α
R(τ, δ, β,γ, α) (5.8)
Following, the second step allows us estimate the coefficient of the endogenous
variable by finding the value of δ as a function of τ, looking for the value of γ that
minimize the instrumental variables’ coefficients:
δˆ(τ) ∈ arg min
δ
γˆ(τ, δ)′Aγˆ(τ, δ) (5.9)
10Koenker (2004) noted that the introduction of a large number of fixed effects can increase the
variability of the estimations of the covariates. The solution they propose consists of allowing the impact
of the covariates be quantile-dependent, whereas the fixed effects are not.
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where A is a positive-definite matrix. Then, the parameter estimates are (δˆ(τ), βˆ(τ, δˆ)).
5.3.3. Results
In this section we provide results of including the environmental variables in the
local governments’ cost efficiency analysis using quantile regression in presence of
endogeneous variables, which allows to describe the impact of covariates not only on
the average but also on the tails of the response variable distribution.
Before presenting the results, a number of methodological issues should be men-
tioned. First, the dependent variable (local government cost efficiency) is constrained
between 0 and 1,11 in which a number of efficiency scores will be concentrated at 1 (i.e.,
the efficient units). While this may not be severe as only a part of the municipalities
are totally efficient during all the period, in the second stage we remove from our
sample those municipalities that were efficient in at least 4 years during the full period.
If one takes into account that we are studying the sources of inefficiency, dismissing
part of the fully efficient observations seems to be reasonable in order to avoid possible
problems related to the high concentration of efficient observations in some quantiles
of the efficiency distribution. The remaining number of municipalities will depend on
the model analysed.
Second, some environmental variables such as tax revenues (TAX) and outstand-
ing debt (DEBT) might not be exogenous. Inefficient local governments might raise
tax revenues or incur in a higher outstanding debt with the aim to increase municipal
resources to provide the same level of public goods and services as efficient local gov-
ernments do, i.e., inefficiency could affect tax collection and debt. In order to control
for endogeneity issues (i.e., to mitigate the possibility of “simultaneity” or “reverse
causality”), we will use instrumental variables for these two possible endogenous
regressors following the methods presented in section 5.3.2. Since no instruments
are directly available, we use the lagged values (one year) of the corresponding tax
revenues and outstanding debt variables, a common strategy widely applied in social
science studies.
11Note that the order-m approach also considers supper-efficient units above 1.
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Results for the instrumental variable quantile regressions are reported in Tables 5.5
to 5.12. We consider 8 different models which vary according to the different efficiency
methods and output specifications described in the first stage. Specifically, Models 1
to 4 (Tables 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8) correspond to output specification 1 using DEA, FDH,
order-m and KSW methodologies, respectively. Analogously, Models 5 to 8 (Tables
5.9, 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12) correspond to output specification 3. Comparing the results
from different models gives a more complete view of the impact of the environmental
variables over efficiency, while at the same time testing the robustness of our results.
All models incorporate the financial, social and demographic, economic and political
determinants as well as fixed effects (time and geographic fixed effects). The tables
contain the coefficients for the estimated linear quantile regression for each of the
selected quantiles (τ) and bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis. Note that we
are adopting input orientation efficiency models, so higher values of τ are associated
with best performance, and vice versa.
In general, we observe that the results from the two different output specification
models considered are fairly robust both in terms of sign and significance, however,
some differences concerning the different estimation methodologies are found. When
we focus on each particular environmental variable, several observations can be made.
First, regarding the financial variables, we find that the tax revenues (TAX), the
grants or transfers from higher levels of government (GRANTS) and the debt levels
(DEBT) are negative and significant at both the 5% and 1% significance levels. These
results confirm the hypothesis that local governments which easily generate revenues
(by collecting higher taxes or receiving grants from higher levels of government) are
less motivated to manage them properly. Moreover, if the amount of local government
debt is higher, there will be more resources employed to attend debt interests and
amortization payments, and less resources could be employed in public service
provision. The robustness of the results holds in most of the models and quantiles
considered, except the variable outstanding debt (DEBT) in Model 6, which is found
not significant (see Table 5.11). However, despite the general negative and significant
results, we note that the impact of these three variables vary remarkably across
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Table 5.5: Model 1, Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression with output
specification 1a using DEA approach
Dependent variable: cost efficiency
Quantile τ
Less efficient More efficient
Variable τ = 0.10 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.90
(Intercept) 1.286694∗∗∗ 1.116032∗∗∗ 1.015715∗∗∗ 1.000203∗∗∗ 1.013589∗∗∗
(0.076183) (0.013552) (0.000982) (0.000835) (0.003162)
TAX −0.001509∗∗∗ −0.000746∗∗∗ −0.000364∗∗∗ −0.000248∗∗∗ −0.000274∗∗∗
(0.000188) (0.000073) (0.000027) (0.000027) (0.000044)
DEBT −0.013084∗∗∗ −0.009068∗∗∗ −0.007187∗∗∗ −0.006482∗∗∗ −0.006069∗∗∗
(0.003333) (0.001557) (0.000863) (0.001375) (0.001618)
GRANTS −0.000549∗∗∗ −0.000512∗∗∗ −0.000452∗∗∗ −0.000447∗∗∗ −0.000408∗∗∗
(0.000032) (0.000018) (0.000012) (0.000014) (0.000018)
DENS −0.000009∗ −0.000002 0.000000 −0.000003 −0.000001
(0.000004) (0.000003) (0.000001) (0.000002) (0.000003)
RET −0.143883∗∗∗ −0.025763∗∗∗ 0.001331 −0.026249∗∗∗ −0.110311∗∗∗
(0.014354) (0.005877) (0.001011) (0.001417) (0.002812)
IMMIG 0.080089∗ 0.050153∗∗∗ 0.031949∗∗∗ 0.023180∗∗∗ −0.022303∗∗∗
(0.032246) (0.006899) (0.001024) (0.001280) (0.003073)
UNEMP 0.002030 0.001980∗∗∗ 0.001739∗∗∗ 0.002244∗∗∗ 0.002655∗∗
(0.001637) (0.000550) (0.000360) (0.000502) (0.000849)
INC 0.002446 0.003201 0.002604∗∗ 0.006346∗∗∗ 0.009111∗∗∗
(0.005895) (0.002546) (0.000914) (0.001165) (0.001862)
TOUR −0.009841 0.021899 0.033771∗∗∗ 0.064029∗∗∗ 0.055571∗∗∗
(0.007261) (0.023470) (0.002174) (0.001171) (0.005878)
CONCEN 0.046815 0.037348∗∗∗ 0.020186∗∗∗ 0.042357∗∗∗ 0.065342∗∗∗
(0.068692) (0.011115) (0.000922) (0.000749) (0.002027)
SIGN −0.002609 −0.002968 −0.003469 −0.009420∗ −0.015952∗
(0.009009) (0.004132) (0.003032) (0.004463) (0.007341)
VOTE −0.001221 −0.001125∗∗ −0.000903∗∗∗ −0.000794∗∗∗ −0.000590
(0.001651) (0.000420) (0.000176) (0.000228) (0.000358)
Num. obs. 7415 7415 7415 7415 7415
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
a This specification includes minimum services compulsory for all governments (6 outputs
variables from Y1 to Y6).
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Table 5.6: Model 2, Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression with output
specification 1a using FDH approach
Dependent variable: cost efficiency
Quantile τ
Less efficient More efficient
Variable τ = 0.10 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.90
(Intercept) 1.372924∗∗∗ 1.178472∗∗∗ 1.161491∗∗∗ 1.220561∗∗∗ 1.204983∗∗∗
(0.108671) (0.008698) (0.001681) (0.000482) (0.000866)
TAX −0.001462∗∗∗ −0.000641∗∗∗ −0.000271∗∗∗ −0.000242∗∗∗ −0.000095∗∗
(0.000318) (0.000102) (0.000039) (0.000028) (0.000031)
DEBT −0.008551∗∗ −0.006476∗∗∗ −0.005542∗∗∗ −0.005598∗∗∗ −0.004603∗∗∗
(0.003133) (0.001700) (0.001438) (0.001190) (0.001391)
GRANTS −0.000534∗∗∗ −0.000492∗∗∗ −0.000483∗∗∗ −0.000445∗∗∗ −0.000323∗∗∗
(0.000034) (0.000027) (0.000014) (0.000013) (0.000019)
DENS −0.000006 −0.000001 0.000000 −0.000003 −0.000002
(0.000008) (0.000004) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002)
RET −0.121977∗∗ −0.031167∗∗∗ 0.041562∗∗∗ 0.082626∗∗∗ 0.015100∗∗∗
(0.040165) (0.002156) (0.001606) (0.000722) (0.001290)
IMMIG 0.100416 0.064357∗∗∗ 0.048441∗∗∗ 0.012666∗∗∗ 0.023198∗∗∗
(0.062013) (0.006682) (0.002387) (0.001368) (0.000855)
UNEMP 0.001154 0.001390 0.000786 0.000384 0.000505
(0.001591) (0.000839) (0.000681) (0.000595) (0.000542)
INC 0.003288 0.007432∗ 0.009950∗∗∗ 0.009045∗∗∗ 0.003806∗∗
(0.010603) (0.002915) (0.001441) (0.001315) (0.001381)
TOUR −0.010323 0.017791 0.033660∗∗∗ 0.036921∗∗∗ 0.032379∗∗∗
(0.007178) (0.020179) (0.003395) (0.003937) (0.001999)
CONCEN 0.039570 0.038028∗∗∗ 0.004747∗ −0.041937∗∗∗ −0.011071∗∗∗
(0.134794) (0.006601) (0.001930) (0.001001) (0.001201)
SIGN −0.000741 −0.000354 −0.009509 −0.006685 −0.007041
(0.015890) (0.006705) (0.005541) (0.005413) (0.004306)
VOTE −0.000925 −0.001199∗ −0.000706∗ −0.000351 0.000005
(0.002569) (0.000568) (0.000277) (0.000212) (0.000207)
Num. obs. 6160 6160 6160 6160 6160
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
a This specification includes minimum services compulsory for all governments (6 outputs
variables from Y1 to Y6).
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Table 5.7: Model 3, Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression with output
specification 1a using order-m approach
Dependent variable: cost efficiency
Quantile τ
Less efficient More efficient
Variable τ = 0.10 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.90
(Intercept) 1.480487∗∗∗ 1.122877∗∗∗ 1.150745∗∗∗ 1.212334∗∗∗ 1.232550∗∗∗
(0.075248) (0.002371) (0.000987) (0.001240) (0.000594)
TAX −0.001957∗∗∗ −0.000466∗∗∗ −0.000209∗∗∗ −0.000156∗∗ −0.000290∗∗∗
(0.000255) (0.000079) (0.000050) (0.000052) (0.000033)
DEBT −0.003330 0.002196∗ 0.000814 0.000570 0.002539
(0.002331) (0.000894) (0.000931) (0.001422) (0.001948)
GRANTS −0.000566∗∗∗ −0.000449∗∗∗ −0.000456∗∗∗ −0.000443∗∗∗ −0.000339∗∗∗
(0.000050) (0.000021) (0.000014) (0.000017) (0.000015)
DENS −0.000005 0.000003 0.000001 −0.000001 −0.000005∗∗
(0.000005) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002)
RET −0.000833 −0.022504∗∗∗ 0.037926∗∗∗ 0.105274∗∗∗ 0.008291∗∗∗
(0.023973) (0.002170) (0.000868) (0.001711) (0.000853)
IMMIG 0.161222∗∗ 0.105232∗∗∗ 0.099229∗∗∗ 0.069353∗∗∗ 0.077377∗∗∗
(0.052715) (0.001997) (0.000708) (0.001603) (0.000682)
UNEMP 0.003450∗ 0.000364 0.001025 0.001010 0.002940∗∗∗
(0.001414) (0.000670) (0.000584) (0.000710) (0.000687)
INC 0.006384 0.003672 0.005956∗∗∗ 0.007410∗∗∗ 0.004975∗∗
(0.008357) (0.002319) (0.001608) (0.001835) (0.001781)
TOUR 0.000729 −0.004402 −0.016168∗∗∗ 0.016685 0.021800∗∗∗
(0.022107) (0.010909) (0.004264) (0.010563) (0.000609)
CONCEN 0.058498 0.042628∗∗∗ 0.008512∗∗∗ −0.018207∗∗∗ −0.008753∗∗∗
(0.075489) (0.001845) (0.001255) (0.001486) (0.000384)
SIGN −0.011592 −0.007676 −0.010492∗ −0.001305 −0.004597
(0.015012) (0.005583) (0.005286) (0.005832) (0.005858)
VOTE −0.000532 −0.000329 −0.000206 0.000057 0.000168
(0.002164) (0.000357) (0.000276) (0.000280) (0.000221)
Num. obs. 5945 5945 5945 5945 5945
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
a This specification includes minimum services compulsory for all governments (6 outputs
variables from Y1 to Y6).
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Table 5.8: Model 4, Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression with output
specification 1a using KSW approach
Dependent variable: cost efficiency
Quantile τ
Less efficient More efficient
Variable τ = 0.10 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.90
(Intercept) 1.244442∗∗∗ 1.092254∗∗∗ 0.966306∗∗∗ 1.003934∗∗∗ 0.971480∗∗∗
(0.042121) (0.030576) (0.000674) (0.001412) (0.000566)
TAX −0.001492∗∗∗ −0.000777∗∗∗ −0.000251∗∗∗ −0.000247∗∗∗ −0.000271∗∗∗
(0.000212) (0.000085) (0.000018) (0.000031) (0.000053)
DEBT −0.013594∗∗∗ −0.010595∗∗∗ −0.007157∗∗∗ −0.007704∗∗∗ −0.007428∗∗
(0.002996) (0.001348) (0.000905) (0.001248) (0.002567)
GRANTS −0.000544∗∗∗ −0.000503∗∗∗ −0.000432∗∗∗ −0.000433∗∗∗ −0.000396∗∗∗
(0.000037) (0.000016) (0.000010) (0.000014) (0.000016)
DENS −0.000010 −0.000004 0.000001 −0.000002 0.000000
(0.000006) (0.000003) (0.000001) (0.000002) (0.000002)
RET −0.129571∗∗∗ −0.029854∗ 0.013151∗∗∗ −0.043434∗∗∗ −0.087198∗∗∗
(0.006742) (0.014949) (0.000986) (0.001112) (0.000517)
IMMIG 0.050727∗ 0.021956∗ 0.007889∗∗∗ 0.001055 −0.041774∗∗∗
(0.019838) (0.009854) (0.001097) (0.001322) (0.001026)
UNEMP 0.001253 0.001704∗∗ 0.001159∗∗ 0.001743∗∗∗ 0.001841
(0.001582) (0.000612) (0.000353) (0.000488) (0.000966)
INC 0.004341 0.003425 0.001681∗ 0.004576∗∗∗ 0.010042∗∗∗
(0.005080) (0.003909) (0.000786) (0.001149) (0.002119)
TOUR 0.007502 0.042348∗∗ 0.037235∗∗∗ 0.069388∗∗∗ 0.061974∗∗∗
(0.004868) (0.014963) (0.001819) (0.003880) (0.000958)
CONCEN 0.055054 0.024699 0.021147∗∗∗ 0.040709∗∗∗ 0.044933∗∗∗
(0.035393) (0.025343) (0.000848) (0.002030) (0.000829)
SIGN −0.005777 −0.004258 −0.001837 −0.007190 −0.006537
(0.008197) (0.004769) (0.002942) (0.004379) (0.008717)
VOTE −0.001201 −0.001052∗ −0.000991∗∗∗ −0.000953∗∗∗ −0.000439
(0.001382) (0.000517) (0.000152) (0.000222) (0.000426)
Num. obs. 7475 7475 7475 7475 7475
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
a This specification includes minimum services compulsory for all governments (6 outputs
variables from Y1 to Y6).
172
Table 5.9: Model 5, Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression with output
specification 3a using DEA approach
Dependent variable: cost efficiency
Quantile τ
Less efficient More efficient
Variable τ = 0.10 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.90
(Intercept) 1.316578∗∗∗ 1.071944∗∗∗ 1.018861∗∗∗ 1.055196∗∗∗ 1.092859∗∗∗
(0.063506) (0.005936) (0.000730) (0.001200) (0.001428)
TAX −0.001703∗∗∗ −0.000616∗∗∗ −0.000275∗∗∗ −0.000232∗∗∗ −0.000253∗∗∗
(0.000215) (0.000048) (0.000022) (0.000043) (0.000053)
DEBT −0.012788∗∗∗ −0.008163∗∗∗ −0.006869∗∗∗ −0.005758∗∗∗ −0.005393∗∗∗
(0.003405) (0.001283) (0.000963) (0.001436) (0.001207)
GRANTS −0.000555∗∗∗ −0.000482∗∗∗ −0.000452∗∗∗ −0.000454∗∗∗ −0.000423∗∗∗
(0.000029) (0.000015) (0.000010) (0.000016) (0.000017)
DENS −0.000008 0.000001 0.000000 −0.000003 −0.000001
(0.000006) (0.000002) (0.000001) (0.000002) (0.000002)
RET −0.154449∗∗∗ −0.040140∗∗∗ −0.022430∗∗∗ −0.070261∗∗∗ −0.122843∗∗∗
(0.032292) (0.003019) (0.000933) (0.001719) (0.001462)
IMMIG 0.087128∗∗ 0.041067∗∗∗ 0.004976∗∗∗ 0.004006∗∗ −0.068589∗∗∗
(0.033320) (0.004077) (0.000666) (0.001427) (0.001996)
UNEMP 0.002332∗ 0.001761∗∗∗ 0.001825∗∗∗ 0.001825∗∗ 0.001532
(0.001076) (0.000474) (0.000355) (0.000631) (0.000870)
INC 0.004344 0.002070 0.002133∗ 0.004539∗∗ 0.008460∗∗∗
(0.008488) (0.001573) (0.000879) (0.001505) (0.001679)
TOUR 0.029966 0.022314 0.033269∗∗∗ 0.049578∗∗∗ 0.071021∗∗∗
(0.045004) (0.014783) (0.002018) (0.000910) (0.001780)
CONCEN 0.063358 0.026163∗∗∗ 0.031739∗∗∗ 0.048624∗∗∗ 0.051569∗∗∗
(0.068069) (0.005041) (0.000852) (0.001019) (0.001508)
SIGN −0.001620 −0.001652 −0.004411 −0.011198∗ −0.013534
(0.009535) (0.003721) (0.003180) (0.005353) (0.007205)
VOTE −0.000820 −0.000863∗∗ −0.001004∗∗∗ −0.000841∗∗ −0.001088∗∗
(0.001427) (0.000288) (0.000159) (0.000275) (0.000388)
Num. obs. 7350 7350 7350 7350 7350
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
a This specification includes minimum services compulsory for all governments and additional
services which must provide larger municipalities with population of over 5,000 to 20,000
taking into account the quality of the services (10 outputs variables from Y1 to Y10 weighted
by their quality).
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Table 5.10: Model 6, Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression
with output specification 3a using FDH approach
Dependent variable: cost efficiency
Quantile τ
Less efficient More efficient
Variable τ = 0.10 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.75b
(Intercept) 1.165473∗∗∗ 1.125483∗∗∗ 1.129694∗∗∗ 1.128181∗∗∗
(0.002701) (0.004718) (0.002552) (0.007083)
TAX −0.000893∗∗∗ −0.000961∗∗∗ −0.000499∗∗∗ −0.000116
(0.000251) (0.000134) (0.000090) (0.000060)
DEBT −0.013217∗∗∗ −0.009253∗∗∗ −0.004108 −0.000029
(0.003084) (0.002102) (0.002132) (0.001056)
GRANTS −0.000291∗∗∗ −0.000290∗∗∗ −0.000230∗∗∗ −0.000131∗∗∗
(0.000038) (0.000031) (0.000023) (0.000027)
DENS 0.000004 −0.000001 −0.000004 −0.000001
(0.000002) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000002)
RET −0.145022∗∗∗ −0.235251∗∗∗ −0.233678∗∗∗ −0.074029∗∗∗
(0.002330) (0.001359) (0.002365) (0.001254)
IMMIG 0.059818∗∗∗ 0.165842∗∗∗ 0.072312∗∗∗ 0.034254∗∗
(0.001170) (0.003640) (0.003325) (0.011511)
UNEMP 0.007680∗∗∗ 0.005963∗∗∗ 0.000080 −0.000328
(0.001245) (0.000962) (0.001084) (0.000674)
INC −0.000401 0.005396 0.001378 0.001289
(0.007771) (0.004442) (0.003466) (0.002293)
TOUR 0.070803∗∗∗ 0.032891∗∗∗ 0.019877 −0.009255
(0.004439) (0.009817) (0.013639) (0.008664)
CONCEN 0.223312∗∗∗ 0.291298∗∗∗ 0.173104∗∗∗ 0.090363∗∗∗
(0.001287) (0.001956) (0.002771) (0.005815)
SIGN −0.034051∗ −0.009456 −0.005292 −0.005118
(0.013658) (0.010255) (0.010095) (0.005975)
VOTE −0.003345∗∗∗ −0.001156 −0.000538 −0.000544
(0.000800) (0.000598) (0.000459) (0.000387)
Num. obs. 2955 2955 2955 2955
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
a This specification includes minimum services compulsory for all govern-
ments and additional services which must provide larger municipalities with
population of over 5,000 to 20,000 taking into account the quality of the ser-
vices (10 outputs variables from Y1 to Y10 weighted by their quality).
b Given the high concentration of observations at 1 (i.e., the efficient units) on
account of FDH characteristics with a large number of output variables, we
omit the estimation for the 90th percentile that brought problems with the
quantile regression approach.
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Table 5.11: Model 7, Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression with output
specification 3a using order-m approach
Dependent variable: cost efficiency
Quantile τ
Less efficient More efficient
Variable τ = 0.10 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.90
(Intercept) 0.979736∗∗∗ 1.029073∗∗∗ 1.124277∗∗∗ 1.082530∗∗∗ 0.983766∗∗∗
(0.001794) (0.001521) (0.001344) (0.003726) (0.002730)
TAX −0.000449∗∗∗ −0.000789∗∗∗ −0.000505∗∗∗ −0.000181∗ 0.000067
(0.000109) (0.000125) (0.000088) (0.000082) (0.000051)
DEBT −0.008074∗ −0.008026∗∗ −0.002879 0.000639 0.001561
(0.003619) (0.002532) (0.002145) (0.001257) (0.001264)
GRANTS −0.000212∗∗∗ −0.000258∗∗∗ −0.000225∗∗∗ −0.000106∗∗∗ 0.000003
(0.000025) (0.000024) (0.000022) (0.000028) (0.000016)
DENS 0.000004 −0.000002 −0.000002 −0.000002 −0.000002
(0.000004) (0.000003) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002)
RET −0.245922∗∗∗ −0.129432∗∗∗ −0.138695∗∗∗ −0.078877∗∗∗ 0.001132
(0.002916) (0.002566) (0.002492) (0.002514) (0.001921)
IMMIG 0.060586∗∗∗ 0.211126∗∗∗ 0.076357∗∗∗ 0.075840∗∗∗ 0.003980
(0.001145) (0.001583) (0.001882) (0.004068) (0.004073)
UNEMP 0.007561∗∗∗ 0.006274∗∗∗ −0.000663 0.000031 −0.000073
(0.001004) (0.000836) (0.000958) (0.000708) (0.000582)
INC −0.002631 0.005069 −0.000086 0.002496 0.000931
(0.003992) (0.004027) (0.003373) (0.002743) (0.001820)
TOUR −0.114430∗∗∗ −0.172802∗∗∗ −0.010195∗∗∗ −0.108292∗∗∗ −0.128188∗∗∗
(0.002682) (0.002590) (0.001837) (0.003037) (0.002153)
CONCEN 0.234854∗∗∗ 0.221071∗∗∗ 0.152342∗∗∗ 0.118164∗∗∗ 0.038743∗∗∗
(0.002619) (0.001820) (0.002148) (0.002901) (0.002008)
SIGN −0.016136 −0.010357 −0.004459 −0.006056 0.004262
(0.010935) (0.008963) (0.009103) (0.006292) (0.004473)
VOTE −0.001266∗ −0.000462 −0.000068 −0.000238 −0.000235
(0.000491) (0.000489) (0.000441) (0.000416) (0.000258)
Num. obs. 2840 2840 2840 2840 2840
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
a This specification includes minimum services compulsory for all governments and additional
services which must provide larger municipalities with population of over 5,000 to 20,000
taking into account the quality of the services (10 outputs variables from Y1 to Y10 weighted
by their quality).
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Table 5.12: Model 8, Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression with output
specification 3a using KSW approach
Dependent variable: cost efficiency
Quantile τ
Less efficient More efficient
Variable τ = 0.10 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.90
(Intercept) 1.304280∗∗∗ 1.123110∗∗∗ 1.085752∗∗∗ 1.090677∗∗∗ 1.009879∗∗∗
(0.044139) (0.017342) (0.001460) (0.001265) (0.001010)
TAX −0.001608∗∗∗ −0.000947∗∗∗ −0.000612∗∗∗ −0.000321∗∗∗ −0.000384∗∗∗
(0.000262) (0.000104) (0.000039) (0.000044) (0.000055)
DEBT −0.017727∗∗∗ −0.018927∗∗∗ −0.015865∗∗∗ −0.013499∗∗∗ −0.009197∗∗∗
(0.002942) (0.002337) (0.001172) (0.002011) (0.001747)
GRANTS −0.000522∗∗∗ −0.000475∗∗∗ −0.000433∗∗∗ −0.000408∗∗∗ −0.000357∗∗∗
(0.000043) (0.000023) (0.000014) (0.000016) (0.000013)
DENS −0.000004 −0.000004 0.000002 −0.000001 0.000000
(0.000007) (0.000004) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002)
RET −0.270821∗∗∗ −0.141139∗∗∗ −0.109076∗∗∗ −0.159725∗∗∗ −0.267979∗∗∗
(0.002417) (0.013209) (0.001150) (0.001734) (0.001565)
IMMIG 0.102157∗∗∗ 0.015161 −0.009291∗∗∗ −0.044163∗∗∗ −0.062172∗∗∗
(0.022258) (0.009989) (0.002115) (0.001843) (0.000939)
UNEMP 0.000783 0.002705∗∗∗ 0.002567∗∗∗ 0.001178 −0.000727
(0.002038) (0.000730) (0.000476) (0.000613) (0.000738)
INC 0.000205 0.003874 0.003649∗∗ 0.005532∗∗∗ 0.009336∗∗∗
(0.005938) (0.004330) (0.001276) (0.001507) (0.001705)
TOUR −0.018578∗∗∗ 0.075082∗∗∗ 0.050152∗∗∗ 0.035968∗∗∗ 0.056090∗∗∗
(0.004998) (0.019497) (0.004643) (0.004109) (0.001162)
CONCEN 0.042894 0.004323 0.059300∗∗∗ 0.032448∗∗∗ 0.069854∗∗∗
(0.038510) (0.008794) (0.001219) (0.001275) (0.002449)
SIGN −0.005412 −0.004986 −0.006952 −0.006182 −0.006571
(0.009579) (0.005992) (0.004091) (0.005753) (0.007074)
VOTE −0.001861 −0.001637∗∗∗ −0.001965∗∗∗ −0.001534∗∗∗ −0.000059
(0.001540) (0.000487) (0.000220) (0.000275) (0.000359)
Num. obs. 7450 7450 7450 7450 7450
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
a This specification includes minimum services compulsory for all governments and additional
services which must provide larger municipalities with population of over 5,000 to 20,000
taking into account the quality of the services (10 outputs variables from Y1 to Y10 weighted
by their quality).
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quantiles. For instance, the values of the quantile regression coefficients gradually
decrease with the quantiles, being much stronger for the relatively less efficient
performers. Therefore, these results suggest that although, on average, the impact of
financial variables on efficiency is strong, it is particularly higher for the relatively less
efficient municipalities in our sample.
Second, concerning the social and demographic variables, we observe that popula-
tion density (DENS) is found not statistically significant. This result is obtained for
most quantiles and models, which implies that local governments’ efficiency is not
significantly affected by the concentration of the population in a municipality. With
reference to the share of immigrants (IMMIG), although its sign and significance
varies somewhat for some models and quantiles, it is mostly positive and significant
except for the highest quantile, which is found negative in Models 1, 4, 5 and 8
(Tables 5.5, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.12). One reasonable explanation for the unexpected positive
association of the immigration share with local governments’ efficiency is that foreign
population could increase the number of inhabitants and the services of a municipality
in a short term, while expenditures will not increase in the same proportion. Despite
the divergences found across models, we observe a generally decreasing trend of the
coefficients with the quantiles, to such an extent that it becomes negative in some
models for the highest quantile. Hence, the impact of the share of immigrants over ef-
ficiency is relatively beneficial for the worst efficient municipalities, it decreases for the
rest of the quantiles and even becomes adverse for the more efficient municipalities.
Moreover, the share of retired people (RET) is found negative and significant in
most cases, although there are some discrepancies about its impact for some specific
quantiles and models. A negative effect on efficiency could be explained since retired
people could be less interested in local governments’ performance given that they
make less use of some social and recreational services (such as sports facilities, parks
or playing fields). We find a negative and significant impact in Models 1, 4, 5 and 8
(Tables 5.5, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.12), which generally increase its magnitude in both tails of
the efficiency distribution. Similarly, Models 6 and 7 (Tables 5.10 and 5.11) also show
negative and significant results, however, its effect on efficiency is diminishing across
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quantiles, to the point that its significance is completely lost for the most efficient
municipalities. Finally, the results for Models 2 and 3 (Tables 5.6 and 5.7) are found
negative and significant for the lowest quantiles of the distribution, while they become
positive for municipalities located at the median and highest quantiles. Despite all
the differences found across models, we observe that the negative and significant
results hold for the lowest quantiles of the distribution (τ = 0.10 and τ = 0.25), being
stronger for the poorest performers. Therefore, the share of retired people is more
detrimental for the least efficient municipalities in our sample.
Third, referring to the economic variables, we observe that the unemployment rate
(UNEMP) is positive and significant in most models and quantiles. Only the Model 2
(Tables 5.6) find no statistical significance in any quantile. A higher unemployment
rate could lead to a lower demand for high-cost or high-quality public services. In
addition, we find that the magnitude of the coefficients also varies across quantiles but
the trend holds for most of the models considered. Specifically, we observe that the
impact increase in both tails of the efficiency distribution, suggesting that although
the impact of the unemployment rate on efficiency is strong, it is less beneficial for the
municipalities located at the central quantiles.
Moreover, we find that the variable citizens’ disposable income (INC) is positive
and significant, but only from the median onwards (τ = 0.50, τ = 0.75 and τ = 0.90).
This result holds most of the cases except for Models 6 and 7 (Tables 5.10 and 5.11),
which find this variable not statistically significant in any quantile. A plausible
explanation of a positive impact of the citizens’ disposable income over efficiency
previously examined is that richer local residents might pay greater taxes and, as
a consequence, they put an increased pressure to provide efficient local services.
Furthermore, we observe that the magnitude of the estimated coefficients increase
strongly with τ, suggesting that, among the best performers, the higher-income
citizens in a municipality will be more favourable for the most efficient municipalities.
As for the tourist index (TOUR), there are some differences across models, but the
prevailing view is a positive and significant impact over efficiency, suggesting that the
more tourism activity, the lower the cost excess. Models 1, 2 and 5 (Tables 5.5, 5.6 and
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5.9) show positive and significant results only for the median and higher quantiles
of the distribution (τ = 0.50, τ = 0.75 and τ = 0.90), while Models 4 and 8 (Tables
5.8 and 5.12) also show a positive significance at the τ = 0.25 quantile. The most
surprising results are for Model 7 (Table 5.7) which shows negative and significant
results in all quantiles, and Models 3 and 8 (Tables 5.7 and 5.12), which show negative
results for some specific quantile. Despite these discrepancies, we find that the positive
and significant results for the highest quantiles of the distribution hold most of the
models, indicating that a higher tourist index increases efficiency of the municipalities
with better performance.
Finally, regarding the political variables, we observe that the political concentration
(CONCEN) is positive and significant in most models and quantiles. Accordingly, it
confirms the hypothesis that when the degree of political concentration is higher, there
exist a lower political opposition and it is easier to implement policies and impose
budget constraints. Only the Models 1, 4, 5 and 8 (Tables 5.5, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.12) find not
significant results for the less efficient municipalities, while Models 2 and 3 (Tables
5.6 and 5.7) find a negative impact for municipalities located at the highest quantiles
(τ = 0.75 and τ = 0.90). As regards the trend of this variable across quantiles, the
results are ambiguous. Models 1, 4, 5 and 8 (Tables 5.5, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.12), show an
increasing tendency of the coefficients, suggesting that a higher political concentration
is more beneficial for the most efficient municipalities, while Models 2, 3, 6 and 7
(Tables 5.6, 5.7, 5.10 and 5.12) show a decreasing tendency.
Otherwise, we observe that the political sign (SIGN) is found not statistically
significant in most models and quantiles. Only some particular model find significant
and negative results for some quantile at the 5% level of significance. Therefore, in
general the results show that the local governments’ efficiency is not significantly
affected by the ideological position of the municipalities. The last variable is the voter
turnout (VOTE), which has a negative impact on efficiency, supporting the idea that
less efficient local governments motivate more citizen participation. However, this
variable is found significant only for some quantiles of the efficiency distribution. The
dominant view, explained by the Models 1, 2, 4 and 8 (Tables 5.5, 5.6, 5.8 and 5.12),
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is a negative and significant impact only for the central quantiles of the efficiency
distribution (τ = 0.25, τ = 0.50 and τ = 0.75), where the coefficients decrease with the
quantiles. In addition, Model 5 (Tables 5.9) shows the same results, however, it also
finds significance for the most efficient municipalities, while Models 6 and 7 (Tables
5.10 and 5.11) only find significance for the lowest quantile of the distribution.
5.4. Conclusion
The present chapter analyses local governments’ cost efficiency in Spain while explicitly
accounting for external or environmental influences that might affect municipalities’
performance. We have considered an alternative methodology to analyse the impact
of determinants of local governments’ cost efficiency by combining a variety of non-
parametric methods in the first stage (when the cost efficiency results are measured)
and instrumental variable quantile regression in the second stage (when the factors
causing inefficiency are included). In contrast to previous two-stage initiatives, this
technique provides an alternative basis for considering the impact of the environmental
variables on local governments’ efficiency according to the differing levels of efficiency,
while allowing to control for the possible endogeneity of some of our explanatory
variables.
We performed the analysis for a sample of 1,499 Spanish local governments
between 1,000 and 50,000 inhabitants for the period 2009–2013. Note that, as stated
in previous chapters, the period considered is also important, since the economic
and financial crisis that started in 2007 has had a huge impact on most Spanish local
government revenues and finances in general. Under these circumstances, identifying
the causes of inefficiency which come from both the inadequate management of the
available resources and the external or environmental factors beyond the control of
local managers is even more important, if possible. We employed a comprehensive
dataset of environmental variables which includes different categories in order to
facilitate the interpretation of the empirical results.
Our results suggest that, considering the various methodologies and output speci-
fication models in the first stage, we found large differences in the efficiency scores.
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However, despite this variability, the explanatory analysis of inefficiency carried out
in the second stage yielded, at least qualitatively, reasonably robust results. Although
some differences were found in terms of sign and significance levels, it was reassuring
to observe that with some exceptions the explanatory variables consistently had the
same sign and trend across quantiles in most of the models. Therefore, our results
are fairly robust and provide a complete view of the impact of the environmental
variables over efficiency.
Focusing on each particular environmental variable, several observations can be
made. In general, the three financial variables (tax revenues, the grants or transfers
from higher levels of government, and the debt levels) had a negative and significant
impact over efficiency. In addition, the quantile regressions indicated that their average
impact concealed some interesting trends, since it was particularly higher for the
relatively less efficient municipalities in our sample. Moreover, another two variables
that robustly increased cost inefficiency were the share of retired people and the voter
turnout. Results for these two variables also varied greatly according to each particular
quantile. The former showed that, among the lowest quantiles, the impact was more
detrimental for the least efficient municipalities, while the latter was only significant
for the central quantiles of the distribution, where the coefficients decreased with the
quantiles.
In contrast, the variables share of immigrants, unemployment rate, citizens’ dis-
posable income, tourist index and political concentration were found to decrease
inefficiency. Therefore, for the best local governments, performance is a result not only
of their managers’ skills but also these external factors related to their environment.
Quantile regression revealed that both the citizens’ disposable income and tourist
index showed that, among the best performers, their impact was more favourable for
the most efficient municipalities. Moreover, a higher unemployment rate was less
beneficial for the municipalities located at the central quantiles. The most surprising
results were for the share of immigrants, since its impact over efficiency was relatively
beneficial for the worst efficient municipalities, it decreased for the rest of the quantiles
and even became adverse for the more efficient municipalities. Finally, we found that
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local governments’ efficiency was not significantly affected by either the ideological
position or the population concentration in a municipality.
In sum, we find an asymmetry regarding the determinants of efficiency for the
best and worst local governments, a benefit from using quantile regression. Our
results yield a significant contribution to the previous literature which only provide
information on the average impact of the environmental variables in local governments’
efficiency. The application of our proposed method could help to explain inefficiency
in some circumstances, particularly in those cases in which the literature has been
inconclusive about the direction of the determinants on local governments’ cost
efficiency. Indeed, for the worst local governments’ performers, since a large share of
their efficiency is explained by several determinants, their poor performance would
be a consequence of the factors explaining their efficiency. Therefore, for a given level
of efficiency, it is easy to assume that the environmental factors will be more decisive
than the local managers’ decisions. So the policies to be applied would not have
to be universal, since the environmental conditions could be more decisive in some
municipalities allowing to perform better. These results are particularly interesting
for both scholars and policy makers interested in understanding the causes of local
governments inefficiency in search for performance benchmarks.
In addition, another relevant contribution to the literature that analyse local gov-
ernments’ efficiency along with its determinants is that we considered the presence
of the possible endogeneity caused from “reverse causation” of some of our explana-
tory variables using instrumental variables. The large majority of studies tended to
interpret their results in a causal way, neglecting the endogeneity issues in the data.
Therefore, our results represent and interesting contribution that afford opportunities
in this particular issue.
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Chapter 6
General conclusions, contributions
and ways for further research
In recent years the study of local government efficiency has attracted much scholarly
interest in the field of public administration partly due to the macroeconomic crisis
scenario which has highlighted improving efficiency and reducing the costs of local
public services as prime area of concern. In the particular case of Spanish local
governments, on which we focus, the economic and financial situation that started in
2007 had a huge impact on most local revenues and finances in general, provoking
an increase on their deficits. In addition, the huge budgetary limitations became
stricter with the law on budgetary stability (Ley General Presupuestaria), which set up
more control on public debt and public spending. Under these circumstances, during
these last years Spanish local governments have come under increasing pressure to
accommodate severe economic restrictions while maintaining (or even increasing)
their provision of local public services and facilities.
In effect, public sector efficiency is an issue that not only concerns scholars but
also policy makers and citizens. On the one hand, the policy makers’ interest lies in
the principle of doing more with less in order to comply with current legislation, since
more efficient public entities will incur lower costs per unit of output and, therefore,
they will provide more and better services and facilities. On the other hand, citizens’
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interests in public sector efficiency are based on their desire to pay lower taxes for the
public services and facilities they receive, as well as to obtain higher quality services.
Therefore, these objectives are possible to be achieved when local governments are
more efficient.
The present thesis has considered a multidimensional evaluation of the cost effi-
ciency of local governments in Spain, using non-parametric frontier analysis methods.
In doing so, the economic crisis scenario that seriously affected Spanish local gov-
ernment revenues and finances in general has been taken into account. The thesis
contributes to the development of robust tools to evaluate and promote the improve-
ment of the efficiency of local governments in Spain. The empirical results provide
evidence for a better definition of public policies through the evaluation and identifi-
cation of benchmark local governments and, therefore, minimize (cost) inefficiencies
which might help to further support effective policy measures and reduce public
expenditures. The questions that have been tried to answer in the preceding pages
refer to both theoretical and analytical aspects, as well as to the interpretation of the
economic reality under study.
Despite each chapter of the thesis includes a specific section detailing their conclu-
sions, in this section we summarize the main conclusions and contributions in view
of the results obtained. First, in the introductory chapter (chapter 1), we presented
a brief overview on the Spanish economy during the economic crisis, with a special
focus on how local governments finances were affected. Moreover, in order to clarify
the context of local governments in Spain, this chapter also provided an introduction
to the institutional framework.
In chapter 2, we have presented an extensive and comprehensive systematic
review of the existing empirical literature on local governments’ efficiency from a
global point of view, covering all articles from 1990 up to the year 2016. To the best
of our knowledge, it is heretofore the most complete source of references on local
government efficiency analysis. The chapter showed a detailed overview of the studies
on local governments’ efficiency across various countries, comparing the data and
samples employed, and the main results obtained. Moreover, it summarised the inputs,
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outputs and the environmental variables used, as well as the methodologies applied
to measure efficiency in the context of local governments. This chapter provides a
good basis for researchers in the field of local governments’ efficiency since it shows a
complete view of the current status of this research topic. In addition, this literature
review has allowed us to identify some operative directions and considerations to take
into account in the remaining chapters of the thesis.
The chapter led us to several conclusions and ways for further research. Following,
we sum up some of the most important points of debate which have helped to guide
the research line of this thesis:
• First, we found that a minority of studies had an underlying panel data structure
and most of them have not exploited the intertemporal variation as they have
used cross-sectional efficiency techniques. In this line, we suggested that more
research is needed in dynamic efficiency analysis in order to investigate the evo-
lution of local government efficiency over time, since time period analysis could
provide interesting managerial and policy-making insights into the efficiency ef-
fect of long-term decision. Bearing in mind this consideration for future research,
in chapter 3, although we have not set out to analyse the dynamics of efficiency,
we have observed some tendencies and tested whether significant differences in
efficiency levels took place between the initial and the final period of the analysis.
In appendix B we have also included a commonly non-parametric approach
used in previous literature to analyse the evolution of efficiency changes over
time. Moreover, in chapter 5 we have used a panel data regression model which
includes time fixed effects.
• Second, we observed that the accurate definition of local governments’ inputs
and outputs is usually highly complex, due to the difficulties found in data
collection, the measurement of the costs of public activities and the accurate
definition of local services and facilities. In general, there is a lack of consensus
on the selection and number of variables to include in the analysis, which
depends on the availability of data and the specific services and facilities that
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local governments must provide in each country. We suggested to consider
alternative input-output models, in order to assess whether the different choices
might explain the heterogeneity among local governments, and to determine
how the number of outputs can affect the efficiency scores. In addition, we
found interesting and informative to include indicators to measure the quality
of the services, since performance decisions may have an impact on their quality
and not in their quantity. Following these ideas, in chapters 3 and 5 we have
considered alternative output models, including quantity and quality variables.
• Third, we noticed that the large majority of the previous studies have focused
only on one frontier technique to analyse efficiency. Despite the high academic
and policy interest in efficiency measurement, widely applied in local govern-
ments and other public and private organizations, there is no commonly accepted
methodology to perform efficiency analysis. In this context, we must be cautious
when interpreting results from research studies using one particular method,
since their results might be affected by the approach taken. In light of the effi-
ciency estimator selection problem, we found interesting to provide in chapters
3, 4 and 5 a comparative perspective using several methods to estimate efficiency.
In addition, we have dedicated chapter 4 exclusively to further compare method-
ologies by using a consistent method to choose an efficiency estimator which
might be more appropriate to measure local governments performance in Spain.
• Fourth, we concluded that is necessary to consider the influence of environmental
variables on municipal performance. If local governments are affected by factors
beyond their control, performance analysis should control for this heterogeneity.
Moreover, we found that the inclusion of environmental variables in empirical
efficiency analysis often lacks structure and most studies have not explained
the estimated inefficiencies in a systematic way. Given these considerations, in
chapter 5 we have analysed the impact of a comprehensive set of external or
environmental factors that affect local governments’ cost efficiency, including
different categories in order to facilitate the interpretation of the empirical
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results.
• Finally, we also identified that past studies interpreted their results in a causal
way, and the problem of endogenous data in local government efficiency litera-
ture (arising from selection bias, unobserved heterogeneity or reversed causality)
has received little attention. Taking this premise into account, in chapter 5 we
have considered possible endogeneity issues in data by introducing fixed effects
as well as instrumental variables estimation techniques to allow to control both
the unobserved heterogeneity in panel data regression models and the possible
reversed causality bias.
Therefore, given all these considerations and conclusions drawn from chapter 2,
here we have summarised some common problems and limitations found in previous
literature which we have addressed in the remaining chapters from this thesis.
In chapter 3 we have investigated different aspects of the cost efficiency in Spanish
local governments during the period of the economic crisis (2008–2013). Specifically, we
have attempted to learn whether Spanish local governments’ efficiency has improved in
times of crisis. To this end, we used a sample of 1,574 Spanish local governments with
population between 1,000 and 50,000 for the period 2008–2013. Our results suggested
that Spanish local governments became more efficient over the crisis period 2008–2013
since they have succeeded in reducing their budget expenditures (inputs or costs) while
at the same time they managed to maintain (or even increase) local public services and
facilities (outputs). These results are reasonable given that Spanish local governments
have been under pressure to vastly accommodate severe economic restrictions and
indiscriminate budgets cuts while paying attention to citizen needs. Benchmarking
techniques could help to support the implementation of future economic measures in
order to reallocate the available resources and reduce public expenditures.
Moreover, regardless of the context of the analysis, this chapter has also attempted
to address some common problems from previous literature earlier discussed, such as
the accurate definition of output variables as well as the selection of methodologies
to measure efficiency. For this, in order to assess whether the different choices
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might explain the differences between local governments, we have considered several
output models (including both quantity and quality variables) and different non-
parametric methodologies (namely, DEA, FDH, order-m frontier and KSW) to assess
the robustness of the efficiency results. Our results confirmed the importance of
considering both alternative input-output models and the quality of the services
when measuring local governments cost efficiency. The inclusion of quality variables
is particularly interesting and informative for policy-makers, suggesting that some
performance decisions may have an impact in the quality of public services offered to
citizens (service effectiveness) and not in the quantity. Therefore, a properly managed
municipality should operate efficiently but not to the detriment of the quality of the
services.
Finally, this chapter has also investigated the existence of structural differences
in the efficiency scores between municipalities located in different Spanish regions
and provinces as well as the variation of the efficiency scores according to the size of
the municipalities. We found that municipalities which presented higher efficiency
scores were concentrated in the north area of the country, while La Rioja or some
eastern provinces such as Murcia or Aragon showed the lower efficiency values. These
results indicate that the design of public policies and fiscal adjustments that attempt
to control local governments’ budget expenditures should take into account these
interregional differences, which could affect the equal access to local public services.
This is an important contribution to previous literature given that it the first time that
the local governments’ location in a given territory has been investigated. In addition,
we observed that our results also varied according to the size of the municipalities,
indicating that larger municipalities performed better. This result could be attributable
to the economies of scale and the quality of public management given that larger
municipalities use more innovative management tools (such as financial budgetary
control, highly prepared technical staff, contracting out of services, etc.) than smaller
municipalities.
In chapter 4 we have compared the four non-parametric estimation techniques
previously explained in chapter 3 using an extension of the experiment developed in
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the study of Badunenko et al. (2012). Since the method chosen to perform efficiency
analysis may affect the efficiency results, this chapter aimed to uncover which tech-
niques were more appropriate to assess cost efficiency in Spanish local governments.
In contrast to previous literature, which has regularly compared techniques and made
several proposals for alternative ones, we carried out an experiment via Monte Carlo
simulations and we have discussed the relative performance of the efficiency estima-
tors under various scenarios. Then, from the simulation results, we have determined
in which scenario our data lies in, and we have followed the suggestions related to the
performance of the estimators for this scenario. Bearing in mind the economic crisis
situation, the results from this chapter contributes to identify a method for evaluating
local governments’ performance to obtain reliable efficiency gains which might help
to limit the adverse impact of spending cuts on local governments’ service provision.
The findings showed that, in general, there was no one approach suitable for all
efficiency analysis. When using these results for policy decisions, local regulators
must be aware of which part of the distribution is of particular interest and if the
interest lies in the efficiency scores or the rankings estimates. Both DEA and FDH
methodologies showed the most reliable efficiency results, according to the findings of
our simulations. Therefore, our results indicated that the average cost efficiency would
have been between 0.54 and 0.77 during the period 2008–2013, suggesting that Spanish
local governments could have achieved the same level of local outputs with about 23%
to 36% fewer resources. From a technical point of view, the analytical tools introduced
in this chapter represent an interesting contribution that has examined the possibility
of using a consistent method to choose an efficiency estimator, and the obtained
results have given evidence on how efficiency could certainly be assessed as close
as possible in order to provide some additional guidance for policy makers. Indeed,
the implications of these results are particularly important when using efficiency
analysis to take economic performance decisions in real contexts given the important
economic consequences of employing the results of a particular method for efficiency
measurement.
In chapter 5 we have analysed local governments’ cost efficiency in Spain while
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explicitly accounting for external or environmental influences that might affect mu-
nicipalities’ performance. To this end, we performed the analysis for a sample of
1,499 Spanish local governments between 1,000 and 50,000 inhabitants for the period
2009–2013. Based on the classification provided for the different types of determinants
of local governments’ efficiency in chapter 2, we have identified a comprehensive set of
environmental variables which includes different categories in order to explain the es-
timated inefficiencies in a structured and systematic way. Afterwards, the relationship
between these environmental variables and the efficiency scores has been assessed
in a two-stage analysis. In a first stage, cost efficiency results have been measured
via the non-parametric methods developed in chapter 3. In the second stage, when
the factors causing inefficiency are included in the analysis, a instrumental variable
quantile regression has been considered.
In contrast to previous two-stage initiatives, this technique provides an alternative
basis for considering the impact of the environmental variables on local governments’
efficiency according to the differing levels of efficiency, while allowing to control
for the possible endogeneity of some of our explanatory variables. Our results
showed an asymmetry regarding the determinants of efficiency for the best and worst
local governments. Indeed, for the worst local governments, performance was a
result not only of their managers’ decisions but also other factors related to their
environment, such as such as tax revenues, the debt levels, transfers from higher levels
of government, share of retired people or the electoral participation. Therefore, for
a given level of efficiency, it is easy to assume that the environmental factors will be
more decisive than the local managers’ decisions.
These results are particularly interesting for scholars and policy makers which
interested in understanding the causes of local governments inefficiency in search
for performance benchmarks, and yield a significant contribution to the previous
literature which only provide information on the average impact of the environmental
variables in local governments’ efficiency. Therefore, the results obtained advance
our understanding of how to determine the most efficient local governments, taking
into account the particular characteristics of the municipality, and thus facilitate
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decision making by public managers. So the policies to be applied would not have
to be universal, since the environmental conditions could be more decisive in some
municipalities allowing to perform better. The application of our proposed method
could help to explain inefficiency in some circumstances, particularly in those cases in
which the literature has been inconclusive about the direction of the determinants on
local governments’ cost efficiency.
It should be noted that the current thesis, despite their virtues, also suffers some
limitations. Here we propose some ways for further research. First, taking into account
the availability of data, the sample of the municipalities analysed covers several years
from the economic crisis period. However, in future research it would be interesting to
expand the sample to analyse and compare different economic cycles, which might be
affected by the different policies and performance decisions adopted by the economic
agents (related to events such as the political elections in 2011 or 2015, laws concerning
budgetary targets like the Law on Budgetary Stability in 2012 with its subsequent
reforms in 2016, or the Law on transparency, access to public information and good
governance in 2013) and, as a consequence, results might vary according to the period
in which they are analysed.
Second, despite we have analysed some intertemporal variation in chapters 3 and
5, it is necessary more research to further investigate the evolution of local government
efficiency over time. New advanced robust non-parametric techniques are being
developed in order to analyse the dynamics of efficiency, such as the DEA data panel
method proposed by Surroca et al. (2016). These methods allow to estimate a global
coefficient of efficiency for the period of analysis, taking into account the data panel
structure.
Third, despite the method employed to analyse the determinants of efficiency in
chapter 5 allowed to assess the impact of the environmental variables across different
quantiles and to control endogeneity issues in the data, it was based on the traditional
two-stage analysis. In general, it is necessary further research on more advanced
techniques to measure the incorporation of environmental variables which avoid the
separability condition required by two-stage analysis, but taking into account the
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possible endogeneity issues on data. An alternative solution would be to validate the
two-stage approach by using non-parametric test such as the proposed by Daraio et al.
(2010) to test separability condition that is required for the second-stage regression to
be meaningful (Ba˘din et al., 2014).
Finally, given the structural differences in the efficiency scores between munic-
ipalities located in different Spanish regions and provinces found in chapter 3, it
would be an interesting and promising future line of research to perform a multi-level
decomposition of the efficiency to provide useful information about local governments’
location in a given territory. In a decentralised country such as Spain, these analysis
could help to design public policies and fiscal adjustments taking into account the
interregional differences which could affect the equal access to local public services.
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Appendix A
Additional tables
Table A.1: Studies on efficiency in local governments in several countries
Country Author(s) Sample Period studied Main results
Australia
Worthington
and Dollery
(2000b)
177 New South Wales
local governments
1993 Mean efficiency differs from 0.69 to 0.86.
Fogarty and
Mugera (2013)
98 Western Australian
local councils
2009 and
2010
Mean efficiency differs from 0.40 to 0.72.
Marques et al.
(2015)
29 Tasmanian local
councils
From 1999
to 2008
Mean efficiency differs from 0.70 to 0.80.
Belgium
Eeckaut et al.
(1993)
235 Walloon munici-
palities
1985 –
De Borger
et al. (1994)
589 municipalities in
Belgium
1985 Mean efficiency differs from 0.86 to 0.99.
They applied different input specifica-
tions.
De Borger
and Kerstens
(1996a)
589 municipalities in
Belgium
1985 Mean efficiency differs from 0.57 to 0.93.
De Borger
and Kerstens
(1996b)
589 municipalities in
Belgium
1985 Mean efficiency differs from 0.81 to 0.97
depending on the specification used.
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Coffé and
Geys (2005)
305 Flemish munici-
palities
2000 Mean efficiency is 0.70. They study
the relationship between social capital
and institutional performance in Flem-
ish municipalities.
Geys (2006) 304 Flemish munici-
palities
2000 Mean efficiency is 0.84. They analyse
the existence of spatial interdependence
in local government policies.
Geys and
Moesen
(2009b)
304 Flemish munici-
palities
2000 Mean efficiency differs from 0.49 to 0.95.
Geys and
Moesen
(2009a)
300 Flemish munici-
palities
2000 Mean efficiency is 0.86.
Ashworth
et al. (2014)
308 Flemish munici-
palities
2000 Mean efficiency is 0.58. They analyse
whether different aspects of the extent
of competition in the political arena
within the municipality affect local gov-
ernment performance.
Brazil
Sampaio de
Sousa and
Ramos (1999)
3,756 Brazilian munic-
ipalities
1991 –
Sampaio de
Sousa and
Stošic´ (2005)
4,796 Brazilian munic-
ipalities
1991 Mean efficiency differs from 0.52 to 0.92.
Smaller cities in Brazil tend to be less
efficient than the larger ones.
Sampaio de
Sousa et al.
(2005)
4,796 Brazilian munic-
ipalities
2000 Mean efficiency is 0.52. Smaller cities in
Brazil tend to be less efficient than the
larger ones.
Chile Pacheco et al.
(2014)
309 Chilean munici-
palities
From 2008
to 2010
Mean efficiency is 0.70.
Czech
Republic
Štastná and
Gregor (2011)
202 local governments
in Czech Republic
From 2003
to 2008
Mean efficiency differs from 0.3 to 0.79.
Štastná and
Gregor (2015)
202 local governments
in Czech Republic
From 1995
to 1998 and
2003 to 2008
Comparison of public sector efficiency
in and beyond transition. Mean effi-
ciency scores increase from 0.62 in 1995-
1998 to 0.69 in 2005-2008.
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Finland
Loikkanen
and Susiluoto
(2005)
353 Finnish municipal-
ities
From 1994
to 2002
Mean efficiency differs from 0.85 to 0.89.
They applied different output specifica-
tions.
Loikkanen
et al. (2011)
353 Finnish municipal-
ities
From 1994
to 1996
Mean efficiency differs from 0.75 in 1994
to 0.82 in 1996. They examined whether
Finnish city managers’ characteristics
and work environment, in addition to
external factors, explain differences in
cost efficiency.
Germany
Geys et al.
(2010)
987 German munici-
palities
1998, 2002
and 2004
They analyse whether voter involve-
ment in the political sphere is related lo-
cal government performance.
Kalb (2010) 1,111 German munici-
palities
From 1990
to 2004
They analyse the impact of intergovern-
mental grants on local cost efficiency.
Bönisch et al.
(2011)
46 independent mu-
nicipalities and 157 ad-
ministrative collectivi-
ties in Saxony-Anhalt
2004 On average cost should be reduced by
7% to 18%. They study the relevance
of population size in local governments’
efficiency.
Kalb et al.
(2012)
1,015 German munici-
palities
2004 Local governments should reduce in-
puts by 17% to 20%.
Bischoff et al.
(2013)
46 independent mu-
nicipalities and 157
municipal associ-
ations in Saxony-
Anhalt
2004 On average cost should be reduced by
18%. They study the impact of intergov-
ernmental and vertical grants on cost ef-
ficiency.
Geys et al.
(2013)
1,021 German munici-
palities
2001 On average cost should be reduced by
12% to 14%. They study the relevance
of population size in local governments’
efficiency.
Asatryan
and De Witte
(2015)
2,000 Bavarian munici-
palities
2011 On average cost should be reduced by
1% to 3%. They study the role of direct
democracy in explaining efficiency.
Lampe et al.
(2015)
396 German munici-
palities
From 2006
to 2008
They analys the effect of new account-
ing and budgeting regimes on local gov-
ernment efficiency.
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Greece
Athanassopoulos
and Triantis
(1998)
172 Greek municipali-
ties
1986 Mean efficiency differs from 0.5 to 0.85.
Doumpos and
Cohen (2014)
2,017 Greek munici-
palities
From 2002
to 2009
Mean efficiency differs from 0.65 to 0.75.
Indonesia Yusfany
(2015)
491 municipalities in
Indonesia
2010 Mean efficiency is 0.50.
Italy
Barone and
Mocetti (2011)
1,115 Italian munici-
palities
From 2001
to 2004
On average cost should be reduced by
81%. They analyse links between public
spending inefficiency and tax morale.
Boetti et al.
(2012)
262 Italian munici-
palities from Turin
province
2005 Mean efficiency differs from 0.74 to 0.80.
They assessed whether efficiency of lo-
cal governments is affected by the de-
gree of vertical fiscal imbalance.
Lo Storto
(2013)
103 Italian municipali-
ties
2011 Mean efficiency differs from 0.85 to 0.88.
D’Inverno
et al. (2017)
282 Tuscan municipal-
ities
2011 Mean efficiency is 0.44.
Agasisti et al.
(2015)
331 Italian municipali-
ties
From 2010
to 2012
Mean efficiency differs from 0.66 to 0.67.
Lo Storto
(2016)
108 Italian municipali-
ties
2013 Mean efficiency differs from 0.69 to 0.82.
Japan
Nijkamp and
Suzuki (2009)
34 cities in Hokkaido
prefecture in Japan
2005 Mean efficiency differs from 0.75 to 0.82.
Haneda et al.
(2012)
92 municipalities from
Ibaraki prefecture
From 1979
to 2004
Mean efficiency differs from 0.80 to 0.89.
Nakazawa
(2013)
479 Japanese munici-
palities
2005 On average cost should be reduced by
10% to 14%. They examine the cost inef-
ficiency of municipalities after amalga-
mation (municipalities that were amal-
gamated from 2000 to 2005).
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Nakazawa
(2014)
479 Japanese munici-
palities
2005 On average cost should be reduced by
15% to 16%. They examine the effect of
differences in facility distribution meth-
ods on municipal cost inefficiency after
amalgamation.
Korea
Seol et al.
(2008)
106 Korean local gov-
ernments
2003 Mean efficiency is 0.77. They examine
the impact of information technology on
organizational efficiency in public ser-
vices.
Sung (2007) 222 Korean local gov-
ernments
From 1999
to 2001
Mean efficiency differs from 0.57 to 0.97.
They examine the impact of information
technology on local government perfor-
mance.
Macedonia Nikolov and
Hrovatin
(2013)
74 municipalities in
Macedonia
– Mean efficiency is 0.59. They take
into account the ethnic fragmentation of
municipalities as a determinant of effi-
ciency.
Malaysia
Ibrahim and
Karim (2004)
46 local governments
in Malaysia
2000 Mean efficiency is 0.76.
Ibrahim and
Salleh (2006)
46 local governments
in Malaysia
2000 Mean efficiency is 0.59.
Morocco El Mehdi and
Hafner (2014)
91 rural districts in the
oriental region of Mo-
rocco
1998/1999 Mean efficiency differs from 0.38 to 0.50.
Norway
Kalseth and
Rattsø (1995)
407 Norwegian local
authorities
1988 Mean efficiency differs from 0.74 to 0.84.
Revelli and
Tovmo (2007)
205 local governments
in the 12 southern
counties of Norway
– Mean efficiency is 100. They investi-
gates whether the production efficiency
of Norwegian local governments ex-
hibits a spatial pattern that is compat-
ible with the hypothesis of yardstick
competition.
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Borge et al.
(2008)
362-384 Norwegian
municipalities
From 2001
to 2005
Median values differ from 100.9 to 104.8.
They investigate whether efficiency is af-
fected by political and budgetary insti-
tutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic
participation.
Bruns and
Himmler
(2011)
362-384 Norwegian
municipalities
From 2001
to 2005
Mean efficiency efficiency is 103.73.
They examine the role of the newspa-
per market for the efficient use of public
funds by elected politicians.
Sørensen
(2014)
430 Norwegian local
authorities
From 2001
to 2010
Mean efficiency is 100. They study
whether political competition and party
polarization affect government perfor-
mance.
Helland and
Sørensen
(2015)
430 Norwegian local
authorities
From 2001
to 2010
Mean efficiency is 1.04. They study
whether partisan bias and electoral
volatility affect government perfor-
mance.
Portugal
Afonso and
Fernandes
(2003)
51 Portuguese munici-
palities Region of Lis-
boa e Vale do Tejo
2001 Mean efficiency differs from 0.41 to 0.61.
Afonso and
Fernandes
(2006)
51 Portuguese munici-
palities Region of Lis-
boa e Vale do Tejo
2001 Mean efficiency differs from 0.32 to 0.73.
Afonso and
Fernandes
(2008)
278 Portuguese munic-
ipalities
2001 Mean efficiency differs from 0.22 to 0.68.
Da Cruz
and Marques
(2014)
308 Portuguese munic-
ipalities
2009 Mean efficiency differs from 0.73 to 0.84.
Cordero et al.
(2017)
278 Portuguese main-
land municipalities
From 2009
to 2014
Mean efficiency differs from 0.67 to 0.76.
Serbia Radulovic
and Draguti-
novic´ (2015)
143 Serbian local gov-
ernments
2012 On average cost should be reduced by
15% to 33%.
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Slovenia
Pevcin (2014a) 200 Slovenian munici-
palities
2011 Mean efficiency differs from 0.75 to 0.78.
Pevcin (2014b) 200 Slovenian munici-
palities
2011 Mean efficiency differs from 0.75 to 0.88.
Spain
Prieto and
Zofio (2001)
209 municipalities in
Castile and Leon Re-
gion
1994 –
Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2007)
414 municipalities Va-
lencian Region
1995 Mean efficiency differs from 0.53 to 0.90.
Giménez and
Prior (2007)
258 municipalities in
Catalonia Region
1996 The mean cost excess of inefficient mu-
nicipalities is 25%. They decompose the
total cost efficiency into short and long
term.
Balaguer-Coll
and Prior
(2009)
258 municipalities Va-
lencian Region
From 1992
to 1995
Mean efficiency differs from 0.69 to 0.75.
They tested the temporal evolution of
efficiency and applied different output
specifications.
Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2010a)
1,221 Spanish munici-
palities
1995 and
2000
Mean efficiency differs from 0.85 to
0.91. They analyse links between overall
cost efficiency and the decentralization
power in Spain.
Bosch-Roca
et al. (2012)
102 Catalonian munic-
ipalities
2005 Mean efficiency is 0.71. They connect
efficiency with citizen’s control in a de-
centralized context.
Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2010b)
1,164 Spanish munici-
palities
1995, 2000
and 2005
Mean efficiency change differs from 0.96
in 1995-2000 to 0.89 in 2000-2005. They
analysed the links between devolution
and efficiency of Spanish municipalities
from a dynamic perspective.
Benito et al.
(2010)
31 municipalities in
Murcia Region
2002 Mean efficiency differs from 0.53 to 0.90.
Zafra-Gómez
and Muñiz-
Pérez (2010)
923 Spanish munici-
palities
2005 and
2010
Mean efficiency is 0.71 in 2000 and 0.69
in 2005. They evaluation the cost effi-
ciency joint the financial condition.
217
Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Country Author(s) Sample Period studied Main results
Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2013)
1,198 Spanish munici-
palities
2000 Mean efficiency is 0.91. They analyse
efficiency after splinting municipalities
into clusters according to various crite-
ria (output mix, environmental condi-
tions, level of powers).
Cuadrado-
Ballesteros
et al. (2013)
129 Spanish munici-
palities
From 1999
to 2007
Mean efficiency differs from 0.92 to 0.97.
They analyse the effect of functional de-
centralisation and externalisation pro-
cesses on the efficiency of Spanish mu-
nicipalities.
Arcelus et al.
(2015)
260 municipalities
from Navarre Region
2005 Mean cost-inefficiency is 1.264.
Pérez-López
et al. (2015)
1,058 Spanish munici-
palities
From 2001
to 2010
Mean efficiency is 0.85. They analysed
the long term effects of the new delivery
forms over efficiency.
South
Africa
Dollery and
van der West-
huizen (2009)
231 local municipali-
ties and 46 district mu-
nicipalities in South
Africa
2006/2007 Mean efficiency differs from 0.30 to 0.64.
Mahabir
(2014)
129 municipalities in
South Africa
From 2005
to 2010
Mean efficiency differs from 0.42 to 0.46.
Monkam
(2014)
231 local municipali-
ties in South Africa
2007 Mean efficiency is 0.17.
Taiwan Liu et al.
(2011)
22 Local Governments
in Taiwan
2007 Mean efficiency differs from 0.38 to 0.82.
Turkey Kutlar and
Bakirci (2012)
27 municipalities in
Turkey
From 2006
to 2008
Mean efficiency differs from 0.53 to 0.86.
United
Kingdom
Revelli (2010) 148 local authorities in
England
From 2002
to 2007
–
Andrews and
Entwistle
(2015)
386 local authorities in
England
2007 Mean efficiency is 1.05. They examine
the relationship between a commitment
to public-private partnership, manage-
ment capacity and the productive effi-
ciency of English local authorities.
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United
States
Hayes and
Chang (1990)
191 US municipalities 1982 Mean efficiency is 0.81. They study
whether or not the Council Manage-
ment form is more efficient than the
Mayor Council form of government in
formulating and implementing public
policies.
Grossman
et al. (1999)
49 US central cities 1967, 1973,
1977 and
1982
Mean efficiency differs from 0.81 to 0.84.
They measure technical inefficiency in
the local public sector based upon a
comparison of local property values.
Moore et al.
(2005)
46 largest cities in US From 1993
to 1996
–
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Table A.2: Overview of inputs
Variables Studies
1. Financial expenditures
Total expenditures Kalseth and Rattsø (1995); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Prieto and Zofio (2001);
Afonso and Fernandes (2003); Coffé and Geys (2005); Afonso and Fernandes (2006);
Sung (2007); Afonso and Fernandes (2008); Seol et al. (2008); Nijkamp and Suzuki
(2009); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010b); Kutlar and Bakirci (2012); Nakazawa (2013, 2014);
Ashworth et al. (2014); Pevcin (2014a,b); Mahabir (2014); Yusfany (2015); Andrews
and Entwistle (2015); Asatryan and De Witte (2015); Lampe et al. (2015); Cordero
et al. (2017)
Current expenditures Hayes and Chang (1990); Eeckaut et al. (1993); Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998);
Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos (1999); Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Loikkanen and
Susiluoto (2005); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´
(2005); Moore et al. (2005); Geys (2006); Ibrahim and Salleh (2006); Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2007); Geys and Moesen (2009a,b); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Geys
et al. (2010); Kalb (2010); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez
(2010); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Benito et al. (2010); Revelli (2010); Štastná and Gregor
(2011); Barone and Mocetti (2011); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Kutlar and Bakirci (2012);
Kalb et al. (2012); Boetti et al. (2012); Lo Storto (2013); Geys et al. (2013); Nikolov
and Hrovatin (2013); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013);
Pacheco et al. (2014); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Monkam (2014); Pacheco et al. (2014);
Marques et al. (2015); Štastná and Gregor (2015); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015);
Arcelus et al. (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Nakazawa (2014); Lampe et al. (2015);
Agasisti et al. (2015); Lo Storto (2016)
Personnel expenditures Hayes and Chang (1990); De Borger et al. (1994); Worthington (2000); Moore et al.
(2005); Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Sung
(2007); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Giménez and Prior (2007); Seol et al. (2008); Ni-
jkamp and Suzuki (2009); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Dollery and van der West-
huizen (2009); Benito et al. (2010); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a); Zafra-Gómez and
Muñiz-Pérez (2010); Bönisch et al. (2011); Liu et al. (2011); Kutlar and Bakirci (2012);
Haneda et al. (2012); Fogarty and Mugera (2013); Bischoff et al. (2013); Nakazawa
(2013); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Cordero et al. (2017)
Capital and financial ex-
penditures
Hayes and Chang (1990); De Borger et al. (1994); Worthington (2000); Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Nijkamp and Suzuki (2009); Balaguer-
Coll et al. (2010a); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010);
Bönisch et al. (2011); Liu et al. (2011); Kutlar and Bakirci (2012); Balaguer-Coll et al.
(2013); Fogarty and Mugera (2013); Bischoff et al. (2013); Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al.
(2013); Da Cruz and Marques (2014)
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Other financial expendi-
tures
Worthington (2000); Giménez and Prior (2007); Bönisch et al. (2011); Bischoff et al.
(2013); Fogarty and Mugera (2013); Da Cruz and Marques (2014)
2. Financial resources
Local revenues Revelli and Tovmo (2007); Borge et al. (2008); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Sørensen
(2014); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); El Mehdi and Hafner (2014); Helland and
Sørensen (2015)
Current transfers Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Giménez and Prior (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009);
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a, 2013); Benito et al. (2010); Kutlar and Bakirci (2012); Zafra-
Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010)
3. Non-financial inputs
Public health services Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005)
Area Haneda et al. (2012)
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Variables Studies
1. Total output indicator
Afonso and Fernandes (2003, 2006); Revelli and Tovmo (2007); Afonso and Fernandes
(2008); Borge et al. (2008); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Revelli (2010); Bruns and Himmler
(2011); Nakazawa (2013); Nijkamp and Suzuki (2009); Sørensen (2014); Nakazawa
(2014); Yusfany (2015); Andrews and Entwistle (2015); Helland and Sørensen (2015)
2. Population
Eeckaut et al. (1993); De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b);
Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos (1999); Worthing-
ton (2000); Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Coffé and Geys (2005); Sampaio de Sousa et al.
(2005); Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005); Ibrahim and Salleh (2006); Balaguer-
Coll et al. (2007); Giménez and Prior (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Geys
et al. (2010); Kalb (2010); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010); Balaguer-Coll et al.
(2010a,b); Bönisch et al. (2011); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Haneda et al. (2012); Kalb
et al. (2012); Kutlar and Bakirci (2012); Boetti et al. (2012); Fogarty and Mugera (2013);
Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Bischoff et al. (2013);
Geys et al. (2013); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Lo Storto
(2013); Pevcin (2014a,b); Pacheco et al. (2014); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Monkam (2014);
Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Lampe et al. (2015); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015);
Agasisti et al. (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Cordero et al. (2017); Lo Storto (2016)
3. Area of municipality and built area
Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Giménez and Prior (2007); Štastná and Gre-
gor (2011); Lo Storto (2013); Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013); Fogarty and Mugera
(2013); Štastná and Gregor (2015); Arcelus et al. (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015);
Lo Storto (2016)
4. Administrative services
Kalseth and Rattsø (1995); Moore et al. (2005); Sung (2007); Seol et al. (2008); Barone
and Mocetti (2011); Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013); Arcelus et al. (2015); Marques
et al. (2015); Cordero et al. (2017)
5. Infrastructures
Street lighting Prieto and Zofio (2001); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009);
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a,b); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010); Barone and
Mocetti (2011); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Arcelus et al.
(2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015)
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Municipal roads Eeckaut et al. (1993); De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996b); Wor-
thington (2000); Prieto and Zofio (2001); Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Moore et al.
(2005); Ibrahim and Salleh (2006); Geys (2006); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Sung
(2007); Giménez and Prior (2007); Geys and Moesen (2009a,b); Balaguer-Coll and
Prior (2009); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a,b); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010);
Barone and Mocetti (2011); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Boetti et al. (2012); Lo Storto
(2013); Fogarty and Mugera (2013); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Balaguer-Coll et al.
(2013); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Da Cruz and Marques
(2014); Ashworth et al. (2014); Štastná and Gregor (2015); Marques et al. (2015); Aga-
sisti et al. (2015); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015); Arcelus et al. (2015)
6. Communal services
Waste collection Hayes and Chang (1990); Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos (1999); Worthington (2000);
Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Moore et al. (2005); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Sam-
paio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005); Ibrahim and Salleh (2006); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007);
Giménez and Prior (2007); Geys and Moesen (2009a,b); Balaguer-Coll and Prior
(2009); Benito et al. (2010); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a,b); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-
Pérez (2010); Benito et al. (2010); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Barone and Mocetti
(2011); Boetti et al. (2012); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Pacheco et al. (2014); Mahabir
(2014); Monkam (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Ashworth et al. (2014); Pérez-
López et al. (2015); Štastná and Gregor (2015); Agasisti et al. (2015); Cordero et al.
(2017).
Sewerage system Worthington (2000); Prieto and Zofio (2001); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Sam-
paio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005); Sung (2007); Liu et al. (2011); Pacheco et al. (2014);
Monkam (2014); Mahabir (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Marques et al. (2015)
Water supply Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos (1999); Worthington (2000); Prieto and Zofio (2001);
Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005); Moore et al.
(2005); Sung (2007); Benito et al. (2010); Mahabir (2014); Monkam (2014); Da Cruz
and Marques (2014); Marques et al. (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Arcelus et al.
(2015); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015); Cordero et al. (2017)
Electricity (Dollery and van der Westhuizen, 2009; Monkam, 2014; Mahabir, 2014)
7. Parks, sports, culture and recreational facilities
Sport facilities Prieto and Zofio (2001); Benito et al. (2010); Štastná and Gregor (2011, 2015)
Cultural facilities Prieto and Zofio (2001); Benito et al. (2010); Štastná and Gregor (2011, 2015)
Libraries Benito et al. (2010); Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Moore et al. (2005); Loikkanen
et al. (2011)
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Parks and green areas Prieto and Zofio (2001); Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Moore et al. (2005); Ibrahim and
Salleh (2006); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Sung (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009);
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a,b); Benito et al. (2010); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez
(2010); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Pacheco et al. (2014);
Štastná and Gregor (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015)
Recreational facilities De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Coffé and Geys (2005);
Geys (2006); Geys and Moesen (2009a,b); Geys et al. (2010); Balaguer-Coll et al.
(2010a,b); Bönisch et al. (2011); Kalb et al. (2012); Geys et al. (2013); Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2013); Bischoff et al. (2013); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Ashworth et al. (2014);
Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Lampe et al. (2015); Asatryan and De Witte (2015)
8. Health
Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Moore et al. (2005); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Kutlar
and Bakirci (2012); Pacheco et al. (2014); Marques et al. (2015)
9. Education
Kindergardens or nurs-
ery places
Geys et al. (2010); Revelli (2010); Barone and Mocetti (2011); Boetti et al. (2012);
Štastná and Gregor (2011); Kalb et al. (2012); Lo Storto (2013); Nikolov and Hrovatin
(2013); Geys et al. (2013); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Lampe et al. (2015); Štastná and
Gregor (2015); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015); Asatryan and De Witte (2015)
Primary and secondary
education
Eeckaut et al. (1993); De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Sam-
paio de Sousa and Ramos (1999); Coffé and Geys (2005); Sampaio de Sousa et al.
(2005); Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005); Geys
(2006); Geys and Moesen (2009a,b); Geys et al. (2010); Kalb (2010); Revelli (2010);
Štastná and Gregor (2011); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Bönisch et al. (2011); Boetti et al.
(2012); Kalb et al. (2012); Kutlar and Bakirci (2012); Bischoff et al. (2013); Nikolov and
Hrovatin (2013); Geys et al. (2013); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Ashworth et al. (2014);
Pacheco et al. (2014); Pevcin (2014a,b); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015); Štastná
and Gregor (2015); Asatryan and De Witte (2015); Lampe et al. (2015)
10. Social services
Grants beneficiaries Eeckaut et al. (1993); De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Coffé
and Geys (2005); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Sampaio de Sousa and Stošic´ (2005);
Geys (2006); Geys and Moesen (2009a,b); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Ashworth et al.
(2014)
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Care for elderly Eeckaut et al. (1993); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Loikkanen and Susiluoto
(2005); Coffé and Geys (2005); Kalb (2010); Geys et al. (2010); Štastná and Gregor
(2011); Kutlar and Bakirci (2012); Boetti et al. (2012); Kalb et al. (2012); Nikolov and
Hrovatin (2013); Geys et al. (2013); Pevcin (2014a,b); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Ash-
worth et al. (2014); Lampe et al. (2015); Štastná and Gregor (2015); Asatryan and
De Witte (2015); Arcelus et al. (2015)
Care for children Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Bönisch et al. (2011);
Bischoff et al. (2013)
Social services and orga-
nizations
Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Sung (2007); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Balaguer-
Coll et al. (2010a,b); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015); Štastná and Gregor (2011);
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013); D’Inverno et al. (2017);
Štastná and Gregor (2015)
11. Public safety
Eeckaut et al. (1993); Hayes and Chang (1990); Moore et al. (2005); Benito et al. (2010);
Štastná and Gregor (2011); Barone and Mocetti (2011); Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al.
(2013); Štastná and Gregor (2015); Agasisti et al. (2015)
12. Markets
Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Ibrahim and Salleh (2006); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a,b,
2013)
13. Public transport
Štastná and Gregor (2011, 2015)
14. Environmental protection
Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Liu et al. (2011);
Lo Storto (2013); Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013)
15. Business development
Geys et al. (2010); Kalb (2010); Bönisch et al. (2011); Liu et al. (2011); Kalb et al. (2012);
Bischoff et al. (2013); Geys et al. (2013); Pevcin (2014a,b); Asatryan and De Witte
(2015); Lampe et al. (2015); Arcelus et al. (2015)
16. Quality index
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Balaguer-Coll et al.
(2010b); Zafra-Gómez and Muñiz-Pérez (2010); Haneda et al. (2012)
17. Others
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Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Grossman et al. (1999); Nijkamp and Suzuki
(2009); El Mehdi and Hafner (2014); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Pérez-López et al.
(2015)
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Variables Studies
1. Social determinants
Population density Kalseth and Rattsø (1995); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a); Athanassopoulos and Tri-
antis (1998); Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Geys
(2006); Sung (2007); Giménez and Prior (2007); Revelli and Tovmo (2007); Afonso and
Fernandes (2008); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Geys et al. (2010); Kalb (2010); Revelli
(2010); Bönisch et al. (2011); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Kalb
et al. (2012); Boetti et al. (2012); Fogarty and Mugera (2013); Bischoff et al. (2013); Geys
et al. (2013); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Da Cruz and Mar-
ques (2014); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Ashworth et al. (2014); Pevcin (2014a,b); Arcelus
et al. (2015); Yusfany (2015); Agasisti et al. (2015); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015);
Lampe et al. (2015); Andrews and Entwistle (2015); Lo Storto (2016); Cordero et al.
(2017)
Population growth Kalseth and Rattsø (1995); Afonso and Fernandes (2008); Bönisch et al. (2011); Bischoff
et al. (2013); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Monkam (2014)
Population size De Borger et al. (1994); Kalseth and Rattsø (1995); Grossman et al. (1999); Loikka-
nen and Susiluoto (2005); Sung (2007); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Giménez and Prior
(2007); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Benito et al. (2010); Revelli (2010); Štastná and Gre-
gor (2011); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Boetti et al. (2012);
Nakazawa (2013, 2014); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Sørensen
(2014); Ashworth et al. (2014); Štastná and Gregor (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015);
Andrews and Entwistle (2015); Asatryan and De Witte (2015)
Age distribution of
the population
Bönisch et al. (2011); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Nakazawa
(2013); Bischoff et al. (2013); Nakazawa (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Agasisti
et al. (2015); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015); Andrews and Entwistle (2015)
Education level De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Ibrahim and Karim (2004);
Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Afonso and Fernandes (2008); Geys and Moesen
(2009a); Revelli (2010); Kalb (2010); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Štastná and Gregor
(2011); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Da Cruz and Marques (2014);
Monkam (2014); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015); Štastná and Gregor (2015)
Immigration share
and ethnic diversity
Hayes and Chang (1990); Revelli (2010); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Bosch-Roca et al.
(2012); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Andrews and Entwistle (2015); Lampe et al.
(2015)
Share of homeowners Hayes and Chang (1990); Geys (2006); Geys and Moesen (2009a)
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Other related social
and demographic
characteristics
Revelli (2010); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Nakazawa (2013); Da Cruz and Marques
(2014); Agasisti et al. (2015); Andrews and Entwistle (2015); Lo Storto (2016)
2. Economic determinants
Unemployment Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Balaguer-Coll and Prior
(2009); Revelli (2010); Kalb (2010); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Bönisch et al. (2011); Kalb
et al. (2012); Geys et al. (2013); Pevcin (2014a,b); Radulovic and Dragutinovic´ (2015);
Pérez-López et al. (2015); Lampe et al. (2015); Cordero et al. (2017)
Citizen’s income or
purchasing power
De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Ibrahim and Karim (2004);
Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Geys (2006); Giménez
and Prior (2007); Afonso and Fernandes (2008); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Balaguer-
Coll and Prior (2009); Benito et al. (2010); Afonso et al. (2010); Bruns and Himm-
ler (2011); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Boetti et al. (2012); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013);
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013); Monkam (2014); Ash-
worth et al. (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Asatryan and De Witte (2015); Aga-
sisti et al. (2015); Yusfany (2015); Cordero et al. (2017)
Municipal economic
situation
Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Revelli (2010); Fogarty and Mugera (2013); Balaguer-
Coll et al. (2013); Andrews and Entwistle (2015); Lo Storto (2016)
Tourism Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Giménez and Prior (2007); Geys and Moesen (2009a);
Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Kalb (2010); Benito et al. (2010); Bosch-Roca et al.
(2012); Kalb et al. (2012); Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013); Da Cruz and Marques
(2014); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Lampe et al. (2015)
Commercial activity Giménez and Prior (2007); Sung (2007); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Bosch-Roca
et al. (2012)
Industrial activity Giménez and Prior (2007); Geys and Moesen (2009a)
Other related eco-
nomic characteristics
Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Revelli (2010); Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2013); Da Cruz and Marques (2014)
3. Political determinants
Ideological position De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Geys (2006); Geys and Moe-
sen (2009a); Borge et al. (2008); Geys et al. (2010); Kalb (2010); Revelli (2010); Benito
et al. (2010); Bruns and Himmler (2011); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Loikkanen et al.
(2011); Kalb et al. (2012); Boetti et al. (2012); Sørensen (2014); Doumpos and Cohen
(2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Ashworth et al. (2014); Štastná and Gregor (2015);
Agasisti et al. (2015); Asatryan and De Witte (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Helland
and Sørensen (2015); Andrews and Entwistle (2015); Cordero et al. (2017)
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Political concentra-
tion/ fragmentation
and strentgh
Eeckaut et al. (1993); De Borger et al. (1994); Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Geys
(2006); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Revelli and Tovmo (2007); Borge et al. (2008); Geys
et al. (2010); Revelli (2010); Kalb (2010); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Bruns and Himmler
(2011); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Kalb et al. (2012); Geys et al. (2013); Cuadrado-
Ballesteros et al. (2013); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Doumpos and Cohen (2014);
Ashworth et al. (2014); Monkam (2014); Pacheco et al. (2014); Sørensen (2014); Yusfany
(2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Helland and Sørensen (2015)
Voter turnout and
democratic participa-
tion
Revelli and Tovmo (2007); Borge et al. (2008); Geys et al. (2010); Loikkanen et al. (2011);
Štastná and Gregor (2011); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Da Cruz and Marques (2014);
Asatryan and De Witte (2015); Štastná and Gregor (2015)
Re-election and num-
ber of years for elec-
tions
Boetti et al. (2012); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Da Cruz and
Marques (2014); Agasisti et al. (2015)
Other related politic
characteristics
Grossman et al. (1999); Bruns and Himmler (2011)
4. Financial determinants
Self-generated rev-
enues
De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Moore et al.
(2005); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Revelli and Tovmo (2007); Sung (2007); Borge et al.
(2008); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Benito et al. (2010); Štastná and Gregor (2011);
Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Boetti et al. (2012); Nikolov and Hrovatin (2013); Fogarty
and Mugera (2013); Ashworth et al. (2014); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Da Cruz and
Marques (2014); Monkam (2014); D’Inverno et al. (2017); Yusfany (2015); Arcelus et al.
(2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Štastná and Gregor (2015); Agasisti et al. (2015)
Transfers or grants De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b); Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Grossman
et al. (1999); Worthington (2000); Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Geys (2006);
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Borge et al. (2008); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Balaguer-
Coll and Prior (2009); Geys et al. (2010); Kalb (2010); Bönisch et al. (2011); Štastná
and Gregor (2011); Bosch-Roca et al. (2012); Boetti et al. (2012); Bischoff et al. (2013);
Pacheco et al. (2014); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Ash-
worth et al. (2014); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Yusfany (2015); Štastná and Gregor (2015);
Agasisti et al. (2015)
Debt or financial liabil-
ities
Worthington (2000); Geys (2006); Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Revelli and Tovmo (2007);
Geys and Moesen (2009a); Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009); Benito et al. (2010); Štastná
and Gregor (2011); Bönisch et al. (2011); Bischoff et al. (2013); Ashworth et al. (2014);
Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Cordero et al. (2017)
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Table A.4 – continued from previous page
Variables Studies
Fiscal surplus Geys (2006); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Ashworth et al. (2014); Agasisti et al. (2015);
Yusfany (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015)
Infrastructure invest-
ments
Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Doumpos and Cohen
(2014); Pacheco et al. (2014); Arcelus et al. (2015); Štastná and Gregor (2015); Agasisti
et al. (2015)
Other related financial
characteristics
Worthington (2000); Borge et al. (2008); Revelli (2010); Kalb (2010); Benito et al. (2010);
Boetti et al. (2012); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Agasisti
et al. (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Andrews and Entwistle (2015)
5. Geographical or natural determinants
Distance from cen-
tre and localization
effects
Grossman et al. (1999); Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005);
Afonso and Fernandes (2008); Loikkanen et al. (2011); Štastná and Gregor (2011); Boetti
et al. (2012); Pacheco et al. (2014); Štastná and Gregor (2015); Radulovic and Draguti-
novic´ (2015); Andrews and Entwistle (2015)
Area Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Moore et al. (2005); Sung (2007); Nakazawa (2013); Da Cruz
and Marques (2014)
Type of municipality
(Sea, Mountain)
D’Inverno et al. (2017); Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Boetti et al. (2012); Agasisti et al.
(2015); Cordero et al. (2017)
Other related to ge-
ographical or natural
characteristics
Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Moore et al. (2005); Agasisti et al. (2015); Arcelus et al.
(2015)
6. Institutional and management determinants
Informatization or
level of computer
usage
Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Sung (2007); Seol et al.
(2008)
Mayor and local gov-
ernment employees
Grossman et al. (1999); Worthington (2000); Ibrahim and Karim (2004); Sampaio de
Sousa et al. (2005); Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Revelli (2010); Loikkanen et al.
(2011); Boetti et al. (2012); Fogarty and Mugera (2013); Agasisti et al. (2015)
Amalgamation Geys (2006); Geys and Moesen (2009a); Nakazawa (2013, 2014); Da Cruz and Marques
(2014)
Managerial forms Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005); Benito et al. (2010);
Bönisch et al. (2011); Boetti et al. (2012); Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013); Bischoff
et al. (2013); Arcelus et al. (2015); Pérez-López et al. (2015); Agasisti et al. (2015); An-
drews and Entwistle (2015)
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Table A.4 – continued from previous page
Variables Studies
Other related to insti-
tutional and character-
istics
Hayes and Chang (1990); Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005); Moore et al. (2005); Andrews
and Entwistle (2015); Arcelus et al. (2015); Agasisti et al. (2015)
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Appendix B
Efficiency over time: Malmquist
productivity index
When panel data is available, a commonly non-parametric approach used in previous
literature to analyse the efficiency changes over time is the Malmquist productivity
index (MPI) (Caves et al., 1982; Färe et al., 1992, 1994). This method, based on the
non-parametric DEA approach, allows to measure the productivity changes between
two time periods as the distance between a DMU and the frontier for each period.
The MPI in its input-oriented version is defined as follows:
MPIi(t, t + 1) =
θt+1i (x
t+1
i , y
t+1
i )
θti (x
t
i , y
t
i)
·
√
θti (x
t+1
i , y
t+1
i )
θt+1i (x
t+1
i , y
t+1
i )
· θ
t
i (x
t
i , y
t
i)
θt+1i (x
t
i , y
t
i)
(B.1)
where (xti , y
t
i) and (x
t+1
i , y
t+1
i ) are the input and output data for the municipality i
over periods t and t + 1, and θri (x
j
i , y
j
i) indicate the distance of the DMUi from the
efficiency frontier defined by a input-oriented algorithm at period r, with r = t or
t + 1, given its inputs x and output y at period j, with j = t or t + 1.
MPI values higher than one indicate productivity improvements from period t to
period t + 1, low values correspond to a decline in productivity and values equal to
1 indicate no productivity changes. The first element in B.1 indicates the efficiency
change, which captures the efficiency improvements, while the second element (the
one within the square root) represents the technological change, i.e., the shift of the
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efficiency frontier between periods t and t + 1. Moreover, the efficiency change factor
can be further decomposed into into changes involving the pure technical efficiency
and the scale efficiency.
In order to assess whether there are some important changes in the efficiency levels
or some technological progress over time, we carry out the MPI with our panel data
of Spanish local governments. Results are reported in Table B.1, computed for the full
period 2008–2013. The table contains the Malmquist productivity index together with
all its components.
Table B.1: Efficiency variation over time: Malmquist index
Years MPI
Efficiency
change
Technological
change
Pure Technical
Efficiency
Scale
Efficiency
Model 1 2008–2013 1.1958 1.2735 0.9532 1.2514 1.0247
Model 2 2008–2013 1.2059 1.2678 0.9645 1.2490 1.0222
Model 3 2008–2013 1.1940 1.2072 0.9959 1.0556 1.1640
The results indicate that the mean MPI is higher than 1 in all Models, so the total
productivity factor has increased from 2008 to 2013 in Spanish municipalities. On
the one hand, the efficiency change show levels above unity, i.e., the Spanish local
governments have improved their efficiency levels in times of crisis. These results
confirm that Spanish local governments have reduced their costs between 2008 and
2013, while maintaining (or even increasing) the level of services and facilities (outputs).
These findings are consistent with the results found in section 3.4.3. The improvement
in the efficiency factor where driven from both the pure technical efficiency and scale
efficiency. On the other hand, the efficiency change factor has decreased during the
period 2008–2013, which could be explained by the lower public investments during
the period.
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Appendix C
Estimation of Λ
We use the following semi-parametric stochastic cost frontier model:
Ci = g(yi) + ε i, i = 1, ....., n, (C.1)
where yi is a p× 1 vector of random regressors (outputs), g(.) is the unknown smooth
function and ε i is a composed error term, which has two components: (1) υi, the
two-sided random error term which is assumed to be normally distributed N(0, σ2υ ),
and (2) ui, the cost efficiency term which is half-normally distributed (ui ≥ 0). These
two error components are assumed to be independent.
We use available data on cost (municipal budgets) due to the difficulty of using
market prices to measure public services. Hence the assumption allows us to omit the
factor prices from the model.
We derive the concentrated log-likelihood function ln l(Λ) and maximise it over
the single parameter Λ:
max
Λ
ln l(Λ) = max
Λ
{
− n ln σˆ+
n
∑
i=1
ln
[
1+Φ
(
eˆi
σˆ
Λ
)]
− 1
2σˆ2
n
∑
i=1
eˆi
2
}
, (C.2)
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with eˆi = Ci − Eˆ(Ci|yi) + µ(σˆ2,Λ) and
σ2 =
{
1
n
n
∑
i=1
[Ci − Eˆ(Ci|yi)]2
/[
1− 2Λ
2
pi(1+Λ2)
]}1/2
, (C.3)
where Eˆ(Ci|yi) is the kernel estimator of the conditional expectation E(Ci|yi) and it is
given as:
Eˆ(Ci|yi) =
n
∑
j=1
Cj · K
(
yi − yj
h
)/ n
∑
j=1
K
(
yi − yj
h
)
, (C.4)
where K(.) is the kernel function and h = hn is the smoothing parameter. For further
details about the estimation procedure see Fan et al. (1996).
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